Opinion
CIVIL ACTION 3:22-CV-00668
01-29-2024
RUTH BATES, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, Defendant.
MARIANI, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pro se Plaintiff Ruth Bates (“Bates”) commenced this action on March 1, 2022, against Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East Inc. (“Wal-Mart”) in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, seeking $15 billion in punitive damages. (Doc. 1-1, at 1-2). Wal-Mart removed this action to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on May 6, 2022. (Doc. 1). For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Bates’s complaint be dismissed for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a Court Order.
I. Background and Procedural History
On March 1, 2022, Bates initiated the present action against Wal-Mart by filing a complaint in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that on June 9, 2021, Wal-Mart committed wanton and reckless acts. (Doc. 1-1, at 1-2). On May 11, 2022, WalMart filed a motion to dismiss and a brief in support the following day. (Doc. 3; Doc. 4). On July 22, 2022, the Court issued an Order directing that Bates “file a brief in opposition to Defendant’s motions to dismiss (Doc. 3) on or before Friday, August 05, 2022.” (Doc. 5). The Court warned that if an opposition brief is not timely filed, Bates “shall be deemed not to oppose the motion to dismiss.” (Doc. 5); see L.R. 7.6. Bates never filed a brief in opposition to Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss. On January 27, 2023, the undersigned recommended that Wal-Mart’s motions to dismiss and motion for a more definite statement be granted, and that Bates be granted leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 6). The District Court adopted the Recommendation on February 23, 2023, and granted Bates twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 7). The undersigned directed Bates to show cause on or before July 21,2023, as to why she failed to file an amended complaint as directed in the Order dated February 23, 2023. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). In addition, the Court notified Bates that unless good cause is shown, the action may be dismissed in its entirety. (Doc. 8). Bates has failed to file an amended complaint or to otherwise respond to the Court's Order.
II. Discussion
It appears that Bates has abandoned this action. Bates’s failure to file an amended complaint renders any future adjudication of her claims impossible. See Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App’x 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007) (upholding the dismissal of a Pro se plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for failure to amend his complaint). It is recommended that the Court dismiss this action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that an action may be involuntarily dismissed “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order.” Further, the rule permits sua sponte dismissals by the court. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1988) (same). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an inherent power, governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link, 370 U.S. at 630-31; see also Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1992). Specifically, a plaintiff's failure to comply with a court order constitutes a failure to prosecute his action, and therefore his action is subject to dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). A court's decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is committed to the court's sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). In evaluating whether an action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, a court must balance six factors”
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984).
The Poulis factors are not “a magic formula whereby the decision to dismiss or not to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint becomes a mechanical calculation ....” Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373. No one factor is determinative and not all of the Poulis factors must be met to warrant dismissal. Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373; Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). Instead, the decision must be made in the context of the court’s extended contact with the litigant. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriately labeled a “drastic sanction,” however, because it is “deemed to be an adjudication on the merits, barring any further action between the parties.” Sebrell ex rel. Sebrell v. Phila. Police Dep't, 159 F. Appx. 371, 373 (3d Cir. 2005) (not precedential) (citing Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)).
In light of this framework, the undersigned finds that a careful assessment of the Poulis factors in the case at bar weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action.
B. Analysis of Poulis Factors
1. Plaintiff's Personal Responsibility
Looking to the Poulis factors, the undersigned finds that a consideration of the first factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, shows that the delays in this case are entirely attributable to Bates. Because Bates is a Pro se litigant, she is solely responsible for prosecuting her claim. See Hoxworth v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992). “As a general rule, a Pro se litigant is responsible for his failure to comply with court orders.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential); see also Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191; Winston v. Lindsey, Civ. No. 09-224, 2011 WL 6000991, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011) (concluding that a Pro se litigant “bears all of the responsibility for any failure to prosecute his claims”). Bates has failed to abide by the Court’s orders and neglected to litigate this case. on February 23, 2023, Bates was given an opportunity to file an amended complaint and failed to do so. (Doc. 7). Bates failed to respond to the Court’s order to show cause as to why she failed to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 8). Bates was specifically warned that her failure to respond to the orders may result in the dismissal of this action. (Doc. 8). As of the date of this recommendation, Bates has failed to comply with either directive. Accordingly, the first Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
2. Prejudice to the Moving Party
As for the second Poulis factor, a finding of prejudice does not require “irremediable harm.” Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994). Rather, “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to [effectively prepare] a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, the undersigned finds that Bates’s failure to litigate this case or comply with the Court’s Orders now wholly frustrates and delays resolution of this action. Going forward, such failure to litigate would prejudice Wal-Mart, who without timely responses by Bates could not seek a timely resolution of the case. See Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App'x 728 (3d Cir.2007) (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the second Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
3. History of Dilatoriness
“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874; see also Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (per curium) (finding a history of dilatory conduct where the plaintiff repeatedly requested stays and failed to comply with court-mandated deadlines). Conversely, “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a history of dilatoriness.” Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In deciding whether a history of dilatory conduct exists, this Court must evaluate “a party's problematic acts . . . in light of its behavior over the life of the case.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Here, the Court has afforded Bates an opportunity to file a proper amended complaint in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and she has failed to do so. Further, Bates has never communicated with the Court since its removal to federal Court on May 6, 2022.
Accordingly, Bates’s actions demonstrate a history of dilatoriness that weighs in favor of dismissal.
4. Willful Conduct or Bad Faith
The fourth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether Bates’s conduct reflects mere inadvertence or negligence, as opposed to “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875-76. “Under this factor, the District Court must consider whether the conduct was the type of willful or contumacious behavior which [can be] characterized as flagrant bad faith.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262 (quotation omitted). At this point in the case, Bates has failed to comply with the Court’s instructions directing her to take specific actions in this case and advising her how to do so. (Doc. 7; Doc. 8). The Court is thus compelled to conclude that her actions are not accidental or inadvertent, but rather reflect an intentional disregard for the Court's directives and this case. See Gilyard v. Dauphin Cty. Work Release, No. 10-1657, 2010 WL 5060236, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2010). Thus, the fourth Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
5. Availability of Alternative Sanctions
The fifth Poulis factor examines the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. 747 F.2d at 868. Generally, “sanctions less than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such as [Shehadeh], is proceeding Pro se.” See Lopez, 435 F. App’ x at 116; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191 (per curium); Nowland v. Lucas, No. 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012) (“This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a Pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion.”). Under the instant circumstances where the Court is faced with the complete lack of cooperation on the part of the individual who brought the action, the only appropriate sanction is dismissal. Otherwise the case would linger indefinitely on the Court’s docket. The instant case presents a scenario where Bates’s Pro se status greatly limits the Court’s ability to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this action progresses in an orderly fashion. Thus far, the Court has issued orders advising Bates on her obligations in this case, but to no avail. She still declines to follow the Orders. Since lesser sanctions have been attempted and have been unsuccessful, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the Court. See Stanley v. United States, No. 1:CV-12-0123, 2014 WL 4546530, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2014). Accordingly, the fifth Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
6. Meritoriousness of Plaintiff's Claims
The final Poulis factor enjoins the Court to consider the meritoriousness of Bates’s claims. 747 F.2d at 868. A claim is deemed meritorious when “the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff ....” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. “Generally, in determining whether a plaintiff's claim is meritorious, [courts] use the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70). Here, because Bates has been wholly non-compliant with her obligations as a litigant and refuses to file an amended complaint setting forth the merits of her claims, the undersigned is unable to determine the meritoriousness of Bates’s claims. See Stanley, 2014 WL 4546530, at *4 (“Because Plaintiff has been non-compliant with his obligations as a litigant and refuses to submit an amended complaint setting forth the merits of his claims, his failure to do so cannot be used as a grounds for denying a sanction of dismissal.”). The undersigned previously found that the initial complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to raise a plausible claim against Wal-Mart and failed to provide any meaningful opportunity for Wal-Mart to decipher or answer Bates’s allegations. (Doc. 6, at 7). The untested merits of these claims that Bates has failed to properly amend, despite ample opportunity to do so, cannot prevent the imposition of sanctions.
specifically, Bates’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts necessary to give rise to a viable cause of action against Wal-Mart, let alone identify wanton and reckless conduct. (Doc. 1-1, at 1-2). Bates alleges that on June 9, 2021, Wal-Mart committed wanton and reckless acts and seeks $15 billion in punitive damages. (Doc. 1-1, at 1-2). on the civil cover sheet, Bates identifies the nature of the case as medical professional liability. (Doc. 1-1, at 1). Bates does not include any recitation of the underlying facts or the basis of liability. (Doc. 11, at 1-2). Due to its bare nature, the complaint does not provide “concise and direct” allegations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1); Scibelli v. Lebanon Cty., 219 F. App'x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Bates must assert a claim sufficient enough to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.s. 544, 555 (2007). The factual allegations presented in the complaint are not sufficient to provide Wal-Mart with knowledge as to the charges against it. (Doc. 1-1, at 1-2). overall, the pleading does not provide any meaningful opportunity for Wal-Mart to decipher or answer Bates’s allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.s. at 555. The allegations presented in the complaint are not “simple, concise, and direct” so as to provide Wal-Mart with knowledge as to with what it is being charged, and therefore it is difficult to understand which factual allegations are connected to the conduct that led to her injuries. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1).
C. Balancing of Poulis factors
To reiterate, when weighing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” that automatically warrants dismissal for failure to prosecute. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263. Quite the contrary, the court is guided by the Third circuit’s warning that “no single Poulis factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373. Here, on balance, the Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal of this action for lack of prosecution.
In this situation, where a Pro se plaintiff fails to timely file a proper amended complaint, it is well within the Court’s discretion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice given the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Court directives. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals observed that:
The District Court . . . allowed [the Pro se plaintiff] twenty days in which to file an amended complaint. [The Pro se plaintiff] failed to do so. Because [the pro se plaintiff] decided not to amend his complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed [the Pro se plaintiff’s] complaint with prejudice. See In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 704 (3d Cir.1996). The District Court expressly warned [the Pro se plaintiff] that the failure to amend his complaint would result in dismissal of the action with prejudice. “[I]t is difficult to conceive of what other course the court could have followed.” Id.(quoting Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 455 (3d Cir. 1994)).Pruden, 252 F. App’x at 438.
For these reasons, in this case where Bates has failed to comply with Court Orders, and has failed to amend her deficient complaint despite being ordered to do so, it is recommended that the complaint will be dismissed for failure to prosecute without further leave to amend. See Stanley, 2014 WL 4546530, at *5.
III. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Bates’s complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to prosecute, that final judgment be entered in favor of the Defendant, and that the Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE this case.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated January 29, 2024. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.