Furthermore, "in a proper case a trial court may, in its discretion, apply the `rape shield' principle even where the exclusion is not mandated under OCGA § 24-2-3."Bates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 597, 598 ( 454 S.E.2d 811) (1995). 3. (a) Abdulkadir claims that the trial court erred when it construed the rape shield statute to bar the proffered testimony of Ahmed and to restrict the cross-examination of the victim.

Since Bing denied having any sexual contact with T. M. and there was no evidence that, prior to the charged acts, he had any knowledge of T. M.'s sexual activities, the trial court correctly concluded that the Rape Shield Statute barred her prior sexual history as having any relevance to Bing's intent at the time. Davis v. State, supra. (Prior sexual activity with the defendant not admissible); Bates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 597 ( 454 S.E.2d 811) (1995) (prior sexual activity with boyfriend not admissible). Williams, supra, involved statements made to a nurse over several hours by two 13-year-old victims who had been kidnapped, held for eight days, and repeatedly raped and sodomized by Williams.

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony on this ground. See Davis v. State, 235 Ga. App. 362, 363(1) ( 509 S.E.2d 655) (1998); Bates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 597 ( 454 S.E.2d 811) (1995).Bates, supra.

OCGA § 24-2-3. There was no error. Snow v. State, 228 Ga. App. 649, 651(4) ( 492 S.E.2d 564) (1997); Bates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 597 ( 454 S.E.2d 811) (1995); see Brown v. State, 214 Ga. App. 676(2) ( 448 S.E.2d 723) (1994). 4. Johnson's eighth enumeration of error was not the subject of an objection below and will not be considered here for the first time. Thomas v. State, 224 Ga. App. 816(1) ( 482 S.E.2d 472) (1997).

Consequently, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Jordan to ask the officer these questions. See Bates v. State, 216 Ga. App. 597 ( 454 S.E.2d 811) (1995). Judgment affirmed.

OCGA § 24-2-3 generally did not "authorize the court to exclude evidence of a victim's past sexual conduct in rape cases, but instead act[ed] to curtail severely the discretion the trial court might otherwise have to allow essentially irrelevant and potentially prejudicial evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct to be admitted in such trials." Bates v. State , 216 Ga. App. 597, 454 S.E.2d 811 (1995). Under the statute, a trial court could, in its discretion, "apply the ‘rape shield’ principle even where the exclusion [was] not mandated under OCGA § 24-2-3."