The receiver further complains that the decree is erroneous in that it provides, first, for an unconditional payment of plaintiff's claim, in the absence of a finding that either the funds in his hands were sufficient to pay all other trusts of equal dignity or that no other trust existed; and second, in decreeing interest upon the fund without having first ascertained that the funds in the hands of the receiver were sufficient to pay the principal of all preferred and general claims. Generally, trust claims against the receiver of a closed bank share pro rata with other claims of the same grade or class. Equality of treatment among all creditors of the same grade or class is the underlying principle of distribution. 10 Zollman, Banks and Banking, section 6681; Bates v. People ex rel. Nelson, 265 Ill. App. 1; Smith v. Ringelman, 79 Colo. 333, 245 P. 706; Myers v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 101 Fla. 407, 134 So. 600; Braver, Liquidation of Financial Institutions, section 425. What claims are outstanding and the funds available to pay them do not appear from the present state of the record. It follows that while plaintiff is entitled to a preference, payment must be deferred until it is determined what funds are available for the satisfaction of his claim and all other claims of the same grade or class. If said funds are insufficient, he must share on a pro rata basis with other claimants of the same rank. It likewise follows that the question of whether the claim under scrutiny bears interest should be deferred until final adjudication.

It is urged that a decree ordering a receiver to pay a preferred claim is erroneous if the evidence does not show that the bank liquidation has proceeded far enough to determine whether there would or would not have to be a pro rata distribution among the creditors. Bates v. People ex rel. Nelson, 265 Ill. App. 1. The decree specifically withholds the payment of these preferred claims until it shall be determined by the court whether creditors have equal priorities, and follows the rule laid down in the Bates case. There is no force to this alleged error.

It has been held by all the courts of this State which have passed upon the question that where an account has been sent to a bank with instructions simply to collect, the collection of the fund establishes the relation of debtor and creditor only between the parties, but when the paper is sent with express instructions to collect and remit, then the money when collected by the bank becomes a trust fund. People v. Iuka State Bank, 229 Ill. App. 4; Bates v. People ex rel. Nelson, 265 Ill. App. 1. When the bank accepted the check of Ellrich Brothers and delivered to them the bill of lading and issued the certificate of deposit in question and remitted the same to appellee, its liability to appellee became absolute and cannot be evaded by any system of bookkeeping adopted by the bank in regard to the check executed by Ellrich Brothers. Nor can the contention that appellee accepted the certificate of deposit in payment of its draft on Ellrich Brothers be sustained.