. In Bates v. D.C. Bd. of Elections &Ethics, 625 A.2d 891 (D.C. 1993), this court explained that under the "American rule," the person who receives the most votes but is deemed ineligible is viewed as a candidate whose votes must be counted in determining the election results, and that a runner-up finisher cannot be declared the winner in the event the winner is disqualified. See id.

See Hospitality Temps Corp. v. District of Columbia, 926 A.2d 131, 136 (D.C.2007) (“The first step in construing a statute is to read the language of the statute and construe its words according to their ordinary sense and plain meaning.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Bates v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 625 A.2d 891, 893 (D.C.1993) (explaining that prior to deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute, we must first determine whether the meaning of the statute is clear, because if the language is clear, no deference is due to the agency's interpretation); James Parreco & Son v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 567 A.2d 43, 45 (D.C.1989) (“In interpreting a statute, we are mindful of the maxim that we must look first to its language; if the words are clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to its plain meaning.”). The Board asserts that § 25–446(d)(4) requires the Board to make only one finding in order to approve a terminationof a voluntary agreement; however, the statutory provision at issue states:

the body of learning from which it was taken.” 1618 Twenty–First Street Tenants' Ass'n, v. The Phillips Collection, 829 A.2d 201, 203 (D.C.2003) (citing Bates v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 625 A.2d 891, 894 (D.C.1993) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952))). The definition of an “unauthorized use” in the UUV statute, which has been essentially unchanged for nearly a century, is the taking, using, or operating of a motor vehicle without the consent of the owner.

In such circumstances, a court customarily defers to a reasonable interpretation of words by the agency charged with administering the statute. See, e.g., Bates v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections Ethics, 625 A.2d 891, 893 (D.C. 1993). The Board's interpretation of "affiliated" plainly meets the test of reasonableness. Under petitioner's definition, by contrast, the Board would embark on a largely standardless quest to determine a candidate's "actual" allegiance by examining his day-to-day "associations" with one party or another, an inquiry the Board could fairly regard as beyond its practical competence — and even laying aside possible First Amendment objections to it.

Furthermore, "where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meanings of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken." Bates v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections Ethics, 625 A.2d 891, 894 (D.C. 1993) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). While we first employ the plain meaning rule to our task of statutory interpretation, we have acknowledged that in certain circumstances it is appropriate to look beyond even the plain and unambiguous language of a statute to understand the legislative intent.

See Fort Chaplin Park Assocs. v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 649 A.2d 1076, 1080-81 (D.C. 1994) (rejecting agency definition of "habitability" and giving term its plain meaning where term was undefined in statute and explaining that "[i]f the [D.C.] Council intended any meaning other than the ordinary meaning, the Council could have indicated as much within the Act"). See also Bates v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections Ethics, 625 A.2d 891, 894 (D.C. 1993) (explaining that "words of common use are generally construed according to the natural, plain and ordinary meaning"). The root word "continue" appears elsewhere in the statute in a manner reinforcing the distinction between "continuous" and "permanent."

"[I]f the language of the statute involved is clear, we do not defer to the agency's interpretation." Bates v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections Ethics, 625 A.2d 891, 893 (D.C. 1993). In the present case, Congress has unambiguously stated that a club must be a corporation, and we discern no ambiguity which would warrant deference to the Board's construction.