Opinion
1D22-1134
07-26-2023
Arthur L. Bateman, Appellant, v. Regions Bank, Heron Development Group, Inc., et al., Appellee.
Donald G. Peterson and Jonathan M. Weirich of Yarnell &Peterson, P.A., Naples, for Appellant. Ben H. Harris III of Jones Walker LLP, Mobile, AL, for Appellee.
Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Bay County. James J. Goodman, Judge.
Donald G. Peterson and Jonathan M. Weirich of Yarnell &Peterson, P.A., Naples, for Appellant.
Ben H. Harris III of Jones Walker LLP, Mobile, AL, for Appellee.
OSTERHAUS, C.J.
In this appeal involving post-judgment debt collection proceedings, Arthur L. Bateman challenges a discovery order that appoints a monitor to ensure compliance with discovery. Appellant argues that the discovery order is a final order, an appealable nonfinal order, or, alternatively, eligible for certiorari review. Because, however, we find no jurisdictional basis for review, we dismiss his appeal.
Regions Bank obtained a final judgment of foreclosure on certain property for which Appellant was jointly and severally liable for repayment of the outstanding loan debt. After sale of the property, the remaining debt totaled hundreds of thousands of dollars, for which the Bank received a judgment. Edgefield Holdings, LLC, then acquired the judgment. When Edgefield Holdings began trying to collect, Appellant objected time-and-again to appearing for a deposition citing health-related reasons and raised other objections to discovery. Faced with numerous discovery obstacles, Edgefield Holdings moved to have the trial court appoint a monitor to oversee discovery. The trial court granted the motion and appointed a monitor. Appellant then appealed.
Florida's district courts possess jurisdiction to review final orders on direct appeal pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110, as well as certain non-final orders identified in Rule 9.130. M.M. v. Florida Dept. of Child. and Fam., 189 So.3d 134, 137-38 (Fla. 2016). When it wasn't clear that the trial court's order appointing a discovery monitor was appealable under the rules, this court issued a show cause order asking Appellant why his appeal should not be dismissed as premature.
Appellant responded to the show cause order by asserting first that the trial court's order was a final order. But we don't agree that the order granting a discovery monitor is a final order. Judicial labor must be ended before an order can be considered a final order. Id. at 137 (citing S.L.T. Warehouse Co. v. Webb, 304 So.2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1974) ("Generally, the test employed by the appellate court to determine finality of an order, judgment or decree is whether the order in question constitutes an end to the judicial labor in the cause, and nothing further remains to be done by the court to effectuate a termination of the cause as between the parties directly affected.")). As it stands here, the parties are in the middle of a judgment creditor's collection proceeding involving Appellant's outstanding debt. The trial court's order appointing a monitor merely serves to move discovery along towards final resolution of the case. A final order will come later. Cf. Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 Committee Notes to 2014 Amendment (addressing subdivision (a)(4) and noting that "non-final orders entered after a final order are no more or less reviewable than the same type of order would be if issued before a final order"); Phillip Morris Inc. v. Jett, 802 So.2d 353, 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (recognizing that "[w]here a post-judgment motion in effect triggers a new proceeding with disputed issues to be resolved by trial and which will culminate in a final order, the issues raised will be appealable when final judgment is entered"). In addition to not being a final order, we reject Appellant's erroneous characterization of the order as a de facto guardianship, receivership, or incapacity-related appointment that is appealable as a non-final order under Rule 9.130.
Finally, Appellant asked alternatively that this court review his case by certiorari. Non-final orders not listed under Rule 9.130 may be reviewed by certiorari. M.M., 189 So.3d at 137-38. But "[c]ertiorari petitions seeking relief from discovery orders face a high hurdle." People's Tr. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 333 So.3d 773, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). To gain certiorari relief, a petitioner must show, as a jurisdictional matter, that he stands to suffer "material injury for the remainder of the case that cannot be corrected on appeal." Id. (quoting Dodgen v. Grijalva, 331 So.3d 679, 683-84 (Fla. 2021). Here, there is no question that as a judgment creditor, Edgefield Holdings is entitled to take Appellant's deposition and obtain discovery in furtherance of collecting on its judgment. The trial court's order merely appointing a monitor under these circumstances doesn't necessarily presage an injury, much less material injury. Thus, even if it were legally incorrect for the trial court to have appointed a discovery monitor, Appellant doesn't show that material injury will come from the appointment.[*]
Accordingly, we dismiss this matter for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED.
B.L. THOMAS and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.
[*] We note that Florida law provides expressly for the appointment of a special magistrate in other actions involving the collection of unsatisfied judgments. See § 56.29(4), Fla. Stat. (authorizing special magistrates where a judgment creditor holds an unsatisfied judgment or judgment lien and initiates proceedings supplementary); Calderon v. Kalb, 963 So.2d 857, 857 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (allowing the appointment of a special magistrate without petitioner's consent in proceedings supplementary).