Opinion
22A-CT-2291
02-13-2023
Scott J. Bastin and Jennifer L. Bastin, Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Blair N. Burns, State of Indiana, Indiana Department of Transportation and Carl C. Chan, Appellees-Defendants.
Attorney for Appellants Frederick W. Crow Young & Young Indianapolis, Indiana. Attorney for Appellee James M. Sabina State Farm Litigation Counsel Indianapolis, Indiana.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Trial Court Cause No. 49D04-1906-CT-25615, The Honorable Cynthia J. Ayers, Judge.
Attorney for Appellants Frederick W. Crow Young & Young Indianapolis, Indiana.
Attorney for Appellee James M. Sabina State Farm Litigation Counsel Indianapolis, Indiana.
Bailey and Vaidik, Judges concur.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Riley, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[¶1] Appellants-Plaintiffs, Scott J. Bastin (Scott) and Jennifer L. Bastin (Jennifer) (collectively, Bastin), appeal the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Appellee-Defendant, Carl C. Chan (Chan), on Bastin's claims of negligence and loss of spousal consortium.
[¶2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[¶3] Bastin presents this court with two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Chan.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[¶4] The designated evidence reflects that on the morning of June 6, 2018, rush hour traffic was heavy in downtown Indianapolis at the intersection of Interstate Highways 65 and 70, commonly known as the "north split." (Appellee's App. Vol. II, p. 69). The sun was shining, and the pavement was dry. A traffic accident ensued in which four drivers were involved: Chan, Jaqueliandra McClard (McClard), Scott, and Blair Burns (Burns), all of whom were driving west on Interstate 70 through the north split and who were all following each other.
(Image Omitted)
[¶5] Chan, who was on his way to work and driving a Honda Accord, noticed that traffic was stop and go. He described it as "a lot of cars. Usual rush hour traffic on I-70." (Appellee's App. Vol. II, p. 4). Vehicles were moving at less than fifty miles per hour because drivers did not have opportunities to accelerate. The vehicle in front of Chan suddenly came to a complete stop while partially pulling onto the shoulder. Chan "was able to stop," pressing his brakes hard while remaining in his lane. (Appellee's App. Vol. II, p. 4). He came to a full stop less than two feet from the vehicle in front of him.
[¶6] McClard, who was operating the vehicle following Chan into the north split, was driving a Subaru Forester and was on her way to work. She was driving in the right lane to exit at Ohio Street, still following Chan. She noticed the two cars in front of her stop "all of a sudden." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 46). When Chan stopped, McClard also came to a complete stop in her lane. She explained that she had to "brace hard" on the brake but did not "slam" on it. (Appellee's App. Vol. II, pp. 8, 12). She was able to come to a complete stop far enough back from Chan that she could see his vehicle's rear bumper and license plate.
[¶7] In vehicle 3, Scott, also on his way to work, noticed the two cars in front of him slowing down and stopping. He came to a complete and gradual stop, two car lengths behind McClard. Three or four seconds after McClard and Scott came to a stop, vehicle 4, driven by Burns, drove into the rear of Scott's vehicle. Burns stated that she only noticed Scott's vehicle "[a]fter the collision." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 199). She did not see any brake lights, flashers, or warning lights prior to the collision. Burns does not have any recollection of the traffic in front or her stopping or slowing prior to the collision and does not recall braking before the collision occurred.
[¶8] The force of the impact of Burns' car colliding with Scott's vehicle pushed Scott's vehicle into McClard's, which, in turn, was pushed into Chan's vehicle. Chan, in vehicle 1, heard the impact of the repeated collisions before McClard's vehicle struck his. Chan's vehicle did not strike the vehicle in front of him. Due to the accident, Scott is paralyzed from the waist down.
[¶9] On June 25, 2019, Bastin filed their Complaint against Chan, McClard, Burns, and the Indiana Department of Transportation, alleging negligence and loss of spousal consortium. On August 10, 2020, McClard filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court after a hearing. The trial court determined that: (1) McClard's duty of care to Scott did not include any obligation to pull off the road or to turn on her hazard lights when she came to a stop; (2) McClard did not otherwise breach the duty of reasonable care she owed to Scott; and (3) in the absence of a negligence claim, no loss of spousal consortium was awarded. The Indiana court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of McClard by memorandum opinion, dated August 8, 2021. On January 6, 2022, Chan filed his motion for summary judgment, memorandum in support thereof, and designation of evidence. On March 7, 2022, Bastin filed their response. On August 30, 2022, after a remote hearing, the trial court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed and issued summary judgment in favor of Chan. In its Order, the trial court determined that: (1) Chan did not breach his duty to maintain a proper lookout or his duty to maintain reasonable control of his vehicle; (2) Chan's duty of care to Scott did not include any obligation to pull off the road or to turn on his hazard lights when he came to a stop; and (3) Chan did not owe Scott any other pre-impact safety duties. Absent the existence of a negligence claim, the trial court concluded that Jennifer's loss of consortium claim also failed.
[¶10] Bastin now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Standard of Review
[¶11] "We review an appeal of a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment using the same standard applicable to the trial court." Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 831 (Ind. 2012). "Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate only if the designated evidence reveals 'no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)). Our review of a summary judgment is limited to evidence designated to the trial court. Id. (citing T.R. 56(H)). All facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence designated by the parties is construed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and we do not defer to the trial court's legal determinations. Id.
[¶12] "The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which may be determined as a matter of law." Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. 2003). Once the moving party has sustained its burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and the appropriateness of judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party must designate specific facts establishing a genuine issue for trial. Id. A factual issue is material for the purposes of Trial Rule 56(C) if it bears on the ultimate resolution of a relevant issue, and a factual issue is genuine if it is not capable of being conclusively foreclosed by reference to undisputed facts. Id. "As a result, despite conflicting facts and inferences on some elements of a claim, summary judgment may be proper where there is no dispute or conflict regarding a fact that is dispositive of the claim." Id. "If the opposing party fails to meet its responsive burden, the court shall render summary judgment." Id.
[¶13] We observe that, in the present case, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon in support of its judgment. Generally, special findings are not required in summary judgment proceedings and are not binding on appeal. Jernagan v. Ind. Univ. Health, 156 N.E.3d 734, 740 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). However, such findings offer a court valuable insight into the trial court's rationale and facilitate appellate review. Id.
II. Analysis
[¶14] The elements of a negligence claim are the existence of a duty, breach of the duty by the defendant, and damages proximately caused by the defendant's breach. Jones v. Hancock Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs., 55 N.E.3d 311, 316 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016). Generally, whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 386 (Ind. 2004). By contrast, the determination of whether a defendant breached the duty of care is generally a question of fact. Springman by Springman v. Hall, 642 N.E.2d 521, 523 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994). Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases. Daisy v. Roach, 811 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004).
[¶15] The duty owed by motorists to fellow motorists is well-established. "All operators of motor vehicles have a general duty to use ordinary care to avoid injuries to other motorists." Wilkerson v. Harvey, 814 N.E.2d 686, 693 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004); see also Cole v. Gohmann, 727 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000) ("A motorist has a duty to use due care to avoid a collision and to maintain his automobile under reasonable control."); Allied Fid. Ins. Co. v. Lamb, 361 N.E.2d 174, 180 (Ind.Ct.App. 1977) ("This State imposes a general duty upon all operators of motor vehicles to use ordinary care to avoid injuries to other motorists."). In this light, Bastin maintains that Chan bears fault for failing to turn onto the shoulder of the highway when the cars in front of him stopped, in violation of Ind. Code § 9-21-16-1. Indiana Code section 9-21-16-1 provides, as follows:
(b) A person may not stop, park, or leave standing an attended or unattended vehicle upon the paved or main traveled part of a highway outside of a business or residence district, if it is practicable to stop, park, or leave the vehicle off the highway.
It is uncontroverted that the collision occurred during morning rush hour in Indianapolis, at a time when traffic was stop and go. There was no reason to believe, and there are no genuine issues of material fact indicating otherwise, that Chan had come to anything more than a momentary stop at the time the collision occurred. Cf. McKinney v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 597 N.E.2d 1001, 1008 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992) (reversing grant of summary judgment in negligence case arising out of multi-vehicle accident; two drivers had stopped their vehicles on an interstate highway in a traffic lane to change a tire, giving rise to a dispute of material fact as to whether they were negligent), trans. denied. Chan "was able to stop" when the vehicle in front of him suddenly came to a complete stop, and he came to a full stop less than two feet from the vehicle in front of him, without swerving or leaving his lane. (Appellee's App. Vol. II, p. 4). In turn, McClard came to a stop far enough behind Chan's vehicle to see its license plate and rear bumper, and Scott came to a controlled stop, a couple of car lengths behind McClard. Under the circumstances of the case, we cannot conclude that Chan's duty of reasonable care included an obligation to pull over onto the highway's shoulder. The nature of the stop and go traffic during rush hour made it impracticable for Chan and every other driver to pull off the highway for every momentary stop and then to re-enter a heavily congested highway during rush hour traffic. As under these circumstances Indiana Code section 9-21-16-1 does not apply, Chan cannot be said to have violated his duty to exercise reasonable care.
[¶16] Next, Bastin argues that Chan breached his duty of reasonable care by failing to turn on his flashing hazard lights when he came to a momentary stop. McClard testified that Chan's brake lights activated when he slowed down and came to a stop. Although Chan pressed his brake hard, he remained in his lane. Bastin now maintains that "[t]he flashers, if [Chan] had turned them on as he was slowing and stopping on the highway, would have alerted other motorists, including [Scott] and Burns, that there was a hazard ahead and give them more time to react." (Appellant's Br. p. 22). It is undisputed that both McClard and Scott were able to bring their cars to a stop solely based on observing Chan's brake lights in the few seconds before the collision occurred. It is also uncontroverted that Burns testified that she only noticed Scott's vehicle "[a]fter the collision." (Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 199). It is unclear how flashing hazard lights by Chan, who was three cars ahead of her, would have improved Burns' ability to stop since she admitted not even having noticed Scott's vehicle directly in front of her until after the impact. As such, Bastin has failed to produce any evidence supporting a genuine issue of material fact that Burns would have noticed Chan's hazard lights and that Chan's failure to switch them on amounted to a breach of his duty of reasonable care.
[¶17] Bastin also claims that Chan violated Indiana Code section 9-21-7-11(b)(5), a motor vehicle safety statute, by failing to activate his hazard lights. Indiana Code section 9-21-7-11(b)(5) (emphasis added) provides, in relevant part, "[f]lashing lights may be displayed on a vehicle . . . [a]s a means of indicating the presence of a vehicular traffic hazard requiring unusual care in approaching, overtaking, or passing." The unambiguous language of the statute does not mandate the display of emergency lights when a motorist notices a possible vehicular traffic hazard, and as a result, Chan did not violate the statute.
[¶18] Lastly, Bastin asserts that Chan breached his duty of care by following too closely to the car in front of him. Bastin contends that when traffic suddenly stopped, Chan "had to apply his brakes hard and quickly stopped." (Appellant's Br. p. 25). In addition, an officer on the scene cited Chan and McClard for following one another too closely. In support of his argument, Bastin relies on Romero v. Brady, 5 N.E.3d 1166, 1169 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), trans. denied, in which this court stated: "whether a motorist was following another motorist too closely goes to the issue of the breach." Romero is factually distinguishable from the cause before us. In Romero's case, his vehicle was struck by Brady's vehicle after a third party swerved into her lane as they all drove on an interstate. Id. at 1167. Romero claimed Brady had been following the third party too closely and did not allow himself sufficient time to stop and avoid striking Romero. Id. at 1170. We concluded that an issue of material fact existed as to whether Brady was following too closely. Id. However, in the case before us, even if Chan was following too closely to the car in front of him, there is no issue of material fact that McClard took note of Chan's brake lights, and Scott, in turn, took note of McClard's brake lights. Unlike in Romero, where Brady struck Romero, Chan, McClard, and Scott managed to stop without hitting the car in front of them. Accordingly, Chan did not breach his duty of care by following the vehicle in front of him too closely.
[¶19] Under the circumstances, Bastin has failed to demonstrate a dispute of material fact as to whether Chan breached his duty of care. Because a loss of consortium claim is "a claim derivative of the injured spouse's personal injury claim," the failure of Scott's claim against Chan necessarily concludes the loss of consortium claim made by Jennifer as a matter of law. Durham ex rel. Estate of Wade v. U-Haul Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755, 765 (Ind. 2001). Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Chan on Scott's negligence claim, and as a result Chan was also entitled to summary judgment on Jennifer's dependent claim for loss of spousal consortium.
CONCLUSION
[¶20] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Chan.
[¶21] Affirmed.
[¶22] Bailey, J. and Vaidik, J. concur.