We therefore agree with our sister circuits that have considered this issue, and conclude that the phrase "crime of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment" is ambiguous because it is susceptible to multiple, plausible interpretations. See, e.g., Bastias v. U.S. Att'y Gen. , 42 F.4th 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2022) ; Zarate-Alvarez v. Garland , 994 F.3d 1158, 1164 (10th Cir. 2021) ; Garcia v. Barr , 969 F.3d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 2020) ; Mondragon-Gonzalez v. U.S. Att'y Gen. , 884 F.3d 155, 158–59 (3d Cir. 2018) ; Florez v. Holder , 779 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2015). D

Our sister circuits have all held that offenses that create a sufficiently high risk that a child will be harmed qualify as crimes of child abuse. See Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (deferring to the BIA's crime of child abuse definition); Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Att'y Gen., 884 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2018) (same); Garcia v. Barr, 969 F.3d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 2020) (same); Diaz-Rodriguez, 55 F.4th at 732; Bastias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 42 F.4th 1266, 1273-75 (11th Cir. 2022) (same); see also Zarate-Alvarez v. Garland, 994 F.3d 1158, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 2021) (deferring in relevant part). B.

Yu, 568 F.3d at 1333; see also Bastias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 42 F.4th 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that at Chevron step two the agency has a "range of discretion" to interpret the INA and is free to make a policy-based decision from a variety of possible interpretations). As we have discussed, see supra at 732-33, in Matter of Thomas the Attorney General determined that a state court sentence modification order issued for "avoidance of immigration consequences" has no legal effect for immigration purposes.

In 2022, the Eleventh Circuit held that a crime of child abuse encompasses "crimes with a mens rea of criminal negligence." Bastias v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 42 F.4th 1266, 1275 (11th Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed (March 8, 2023) (No. 22-868). In light of Bastias, Caschetto cannot establish a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's ineffective assistance, the outcome of his removal proceeding would have been different.

Other courts of appeals have similarly understood Esquivel-Quintana to require a more searching analysis at Chevron Step One. See, e.g. , Cabeda v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S. , 971 F.3d 165, 185-86, 188 (3d Cir. 2020) (Krause, J. , concurring in part) (criticizing circuit precedent for "wav[ing] the white flag of ambiguity far too readily, and without performing the rigorous analysis Esquivel-Quintana demands" such as "vigorous textual and contextual statutory analysis tailored to the precise interpretive question presented"); Diaz-Rodriguez v. Garland , 12 F.4th 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that Esquivel-Quintana is "highly instructive" because "[a]fter observing that Congress had not defined the term ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ the Court did not throw up its hands and declare the statute ambiguous" but "instead relied on the normal tools of statutory interpretation" (cleaned up)), vacated on other grounds , 55 F.4th 697 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc); Bastias v. U.S. Att'y Gen. , 42 F.4th 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2022) (Newsom, J. , concurring) ("[T]he Supreme Court has taken pains to clarify that Chevron step one has teeth: We judges must actually do the hard work of statutory interpretation; we can't just skip ahead to step two."). It appears that five circuits reject the notion that the BIA's interpretation of "sexual abuse of a minor" in Rodriguez-Rodriguez is entitled to deference.

And his interpretation on the precise question of law at issue here is "reasonable and entitled to deference." Yu , 568 F.3d at 1333 ; see alsoBastias v. U.S. Att'y Gen. , 42 F.4th 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that at Chevron step two the agency has a "range of discretion" to interpret the INA and is free to make a policy-based decision from a variety of possible interpretations). As we have discussed, seesupra at 958–59, in Matter of Thomas the Attorney General determined that a state court sentence modification order issued for "avoidance of immigration consequences" has no legal effect for immigration purposes.

I respectfully disagree that we have the option of ignoring the district court's factual findings here. See Otto v. City of Boca Raton , 42 F.4th 1266, 1285 (11th Cir. July 20, 2022) (Jordan, J., dissenting) ("From my perspective, what the panel majority did here—ignoring and/or revising the district court's factual findings and failing to apply the clear error standard—is seemingly becoming habit in this circuit. If this trend continues, the bench and bar will be forgiven for thinking that a district court's factual findings are only inconvenient speed bumps on the road to reversal.")