And although rejections of arguments based on Miranda are of course not holdings as to the Georgia Constitution, the failure of any court to mention a separate Georgia right to a warning in rejecting a Miranda claim in the years following that decision undermines any suggestion that the Georgia Constitution was widely understood at that time to require a similar warning. See Purvis v. State, 129 Ga. App. 208, 208-209 (1), 199 S.E.2d 366 (1973) (rejecting argument that results of intoximeter test should have been excluded because defendant was not advised of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and his right to refuse; citing Schmerber for the proposition that the federal "constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to non-communicative acts such as an intoximeter test"); Bass v. State, 115 Ga. App. 461, 462 (1), 154 S.E.2d 770 (1967) (recognizing that states may apply Miranda retroactively but stating that "[t]he majority of the judges of this court, however, are not inclined to proclaim stricter standards than the Miranda Case requires"). Given the lack of a consistent and definitive construction or any other intervening development that altered the original public meaning of the 1877 Provision as to the necessity of warnings, we conclude that Paragraph XVI retained the 1877 Provision's original public meaning on this point.
This enumeration is, therefore, deemed to have been abandoned. Bass v. State, 115 Ga. App. 461 (3) ( 154 S.E.2d 770); Coley v. State, 117 Ga. App. 149 ( 159 S.E.2d 452); West v. State, 120 Ga. App. 390 (4) ( 170 S.E.2d 698). 2.
Code Ann. ยง 6-805 (d); Palmer v. Stevens, 115 Ga. App. 398, 402 ( 154 S.E.2d 803). But see Thornton v. State, 209 Ga. 51, 52 ( 70 S.E.2d 733). 4. The remaining enumerations of error are not argued in the defendant's brief and are treated as abandoned. Bass v. State, 115 Ga. App. 461 ( 154 S.E.2d 770); Coley v. State, 117 Ga. App. 149 ( 159 S.E.2d 452). The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial and the judgment is Affirmed. Eberhardt and Deen, JJ., concur.
3. The remaining enumerations assign error on (1) the trial court's overruling defendant's amended motion for new trial, and (2) the trial court's entering the judgment of conviction and sentence when the evidence was insufficient to support every unlawful act charged against the defendant. Neither of these enumerations is argued in the defendant's brief and they are treated as abandoned. Bass v. State, 115 Ga. App. 461, 463 (3) ( 154 S.E.2d 770). Judgment reversed. Bell, P. J., and Pannell, J., concur.
BELL, Presiding Judge. Appellant enumerated error on several grounds, but argued none of them. Thus they were abandoned. Ocmulgee Electric Membership Corp. v. Taylor Sons, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 44 (5) ( 153 S.E.2d 666); Bass v. State, 115 Ga. App. 461 (3) ( 154 S.E.2d 770); Zappa v. Higgins, 116 Ga. App. 81 (3) ( 156 S.E.2d 521). Appellant did argue, but did not set forth in his enumeration, that the finding of the court, which heard the case without the intervention of a jury, was not authorized by the evidence. Under Sec. 14 of the Appellate Practice Act (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 29 as amended by Ga. L. 1965, pp. 240, 243; Code Ann. ยง 6-810), this court has no jurisdiction to consider grounds which though argued are not enumerated according to that section.
Penn v. Ga. Southern c. R. Co., 129 Ga. 856 ( 60 S.E. 172); Walker v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 47 Ga. App. 240, 252 ( 170 S.E. 258). 3. The enumeration of error relating to the admission of documentary evidence, not having been argued, is treated as abandoned. Ocmulgee Electric Membership Corp. v. Taylor Sons, Inc., 115 Ga. App. 44 (5) ( 153 S.E.2d 666); Bass v. State, 115 Ga. App. 461 (3) ( 154 S.E.2d 770). Judgment affirmed. Pannell and Joslin, JJ., concur.
In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 ( 86 SC 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882) the court held that Miranda, supra, must apply to those cases in which the trial began after June 13, 1966. See Bass v. State, 115 Ga. App. 461 (1). As the date of trial of the case before this court is May 18, 1966, only those standards in effect before Miranda need be applied. These standards were explained further in Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 ( 86 SC 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895) as involving in that case the sole issue of whether voluntarily given or the result of overbearing by police authorities.