Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:03-CV-149-C.
September 10, 2004
ORDER
The Court has considered the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody and Memorandum in Support filed by Daniel Douglas Bass (Petitioner) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent filed an answer, together with relevant state court records, and Petitioner filed a response.
BACKGROUND
Respondent has lawful custody of Petitioner pursuant to a judgment and sentence out of the 106th Judicial District Court of Gaines County, Texas, in Cause No. 99-2987. Petitioner was charged by indictment with the felony offense of intoxication manslaughter. He entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced on July 11, 2000. Punishment was assessed at 15 years' incarceration.
Although Petitioner waived his rights to file a motion for new trial and to appeal his case, his attorney filed both a motion for new trial and a request to appeal. The trial court denied both the motion for new trial and Petitioner's request to appeal.
Petitioner filed one state habeas application on July 1, 2002, challenging his conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application on September 11, 2002, without written order.
Petitioner filed his § 2254 petition, dated June 11, 2003, with the Clerk on June 26, 2003. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss as time-barred, which was denied on January 24, 2004, after the Court found that Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA); therefore, the AEDPA standards apply.
PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS
Petitioner alleges:
(1) His plea of guilty was involuntary.
Petitioner specifically alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary and unlawfully induced because
(a) he was denied his right to a jury trial based upon erroneous advice from his attorney;
(b) he was forced to enter into a plea bargain under threat from both the trial court and from trial counsel;
(c) there was a conflict of interest between his attorney and himself;
(d) he did not understand the nature of the charge or the consequences of the plea;
(e) he was denied the right of due process and equal protection when he was compelled to be a witness against himself and in conflict with his counsel;
(f) he was forced to plead guilty under threat of being abandoned by trial counsel unless he agreed to accept the plea bargain; and
(g) his attorney misinformed him concerning the actual amount of time he would spend in custody before becoming eligible for parole.
(2) He was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner alleges that his trial counsel
(a) failed to inform him that his plea would require him to serve 50 percent of his sentence;
(b) had conflicts of interest while representing him and represented him on "pain of contempt of Court";
(c) failed to advise him of the correct maximum punishment of 20 years, when in fact he was advised it was 60 years; and
(d) failed to file a direct appeal.
(3) He was denied his motion for new trial and his right to file an appeal.
(5) There was prosecutorial misconduct.
(4) He was denied due process.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the indictment, which charged a felony offense of intoxication manslaughter. In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), the Supreme Court held that
a guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann [ 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970)]. . . .
Petitioner alleges that his attorney was ineffective and that his plea was unknowing and involuntary. If a defendant pleads guilty upon advice of counsel, he must demonstrate that such advice was not "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at 266 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
Petitioner's allegation that his attorney had a conflict of interest is based upon his attorney's advising him to plead guilty. The attorney also advised the trial court that if Petitioner was determined to proceed to trial before the jury, he could not continue to represent him. The weight of the evidence against Petitioner and Petitioner's prior criminal history were factors leading to the attorney's advice for Petitioner to plead guilty. Petitioner advised the trial court that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation.
The Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), established a two-prong standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. First, Petitioner must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This two-part Strickland test applies to "challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a restatement of the standard of attorney competence. . . . The second, or "prejudice," requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.474 U.S. at 58-59.
Petitioner must "affirmatively prove, and not merely allege, prejudice." DeVille v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1994). See Mangum v. Hargett, 67 F.3d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that simply alleging prejudice will not suffice). In addition, a court must consider "whether counsel's deficient performance caused the outcome to be unreliable or the proceeding to be fundamentally unfair." Id. (quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 844 (1993)).
It is not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance if a court can conclude on the record as a matter of law that a movant has failed to establish one or both of the Strickland elements. United States v. Walker, 68 F.3d 931, 934 (5th Cir. 1995). The Court finds that it is not necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner' claims.
"In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show `that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" Mangum, supra (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)).
An attorney has a duty to ascertain that a defendant's plea of guilty is voluntarily and knowingly entered. Randle v. Scott, 43 F.3d 221, 225 (5th Cir. 1995).
Petitioner has failed to show that, but for his counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Further, Petitioner has failed to show that his trial attorney's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by the result.
Petitioner claims that his guilty plea was made involuntarily. A plea of guilty is an admission that the defendant committed the offense. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989); Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1991).
The Supreme Court has found the standard as to voluntariness of guilty pleas to be:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
To satisfy due process requirements, the guilty plea must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. Grabowski v. Jackson, 47 F.3d 1386, 1389 (5th Cir. 1995) (rehrg en banc 79 F.3d 478 as to civil rights claims).
"An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
A defendant carries a strong burden of showing the plea was involuntary after testifying to the voluntariness in court. DeVille v. Whitley, supra. Declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of truth. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
The Court has reviewed the trial court records of Petitioner's guilty plea on July 11, 2000. Upon questioning by the court, Petitioner acknowledged that he was willing to have Mr. Proctor represent him and that he was satisfied with his representation. Petitioner acknowledged several times that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. Petitioner signed a written Guilty Plea Memorandum and Stipulation of Evidence. The trial court admonished Petitioner as to the consequences of his plea.
A review of the record indicates that Petitioner entered a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty to the offense of intoxicated manslaughter. Petitioner has failed to show that his guilty pleas were involuntarily made or unlawfully induced. Further, he has failed to show that he did not understand the nature of the charge, the range of punishment, or the consequences of his pleas.
The state court records clearly show that Petitioner understood the consequences of his plea, that he understood the range of punishment, and that he insisted on pleading guilty. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). "The defendant need only understand the direct consequences of the plea. . . ." United States v. Hernandez, 234 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2000).
Petitioner has failed to show that he did not understand the nature of the charge, the range of punishment, or the consequences of his plea. Further, he has failed to show that his guilty plea was involuntarily made or unlawfully induced. Brady, 297 U.S. at 755.
Petitioner alleges that his attorney advised him that he would only have to serve 3 years of the 15 years that was offered in the plea agreement. "An accused's mere `understanding' that he will have to serve a lesser sentence, . . . will not invalidate a guilty plea." Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1986).
Further, Petitioner waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. A criminal defendant can waive his right to appeal. United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651, 653 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Branam, 231 F.3d 931, 933 (5th Cir. 2000) ("A defendant may waive his statutory right to appeal as part of a valid plea agreement if the waiver is knowing and voluntary.") The trial court is required to ensure that the defendant fully understands his rights and the consequences of his waiver. United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d at 653 (citing United States v. Baty, 980 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir. 1992)). Where the record reveals that a defendant understood the terms of his plea agreement and that he raised no question regarding waiver, the defendant is bound by the terms of the agreement. Wilkes, 20 F.3d at 653.
To the extent that Petitioner is attacking his state habeas proceedings and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to those proceedings, his claims are without merit. "Infirmities in state habeas corpus proceedings do not constitute grounds for federal habeas relief." Vail v. Procunier, 747 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1984); Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1997). "An attack on a state habeas proceeding does not entitle the petitioner to habeas relief in respect to his conviction, as it is an attack on a proceeding collateral to the detention and not the detention itself." Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1275 (5th Cir. 1995).
To the extent Petitioner is arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his state habeas proceeding, his claim must fail. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under Section 2254."); Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 1999) (infirmities in state habeas proceeding do not constitute grounds for relief in federal court).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be DENIED and this case dismissed with prejudice.
All relief not expressly granted is denied and any pending motions are denied.
SO ORDERED.