Opinion
No. COA10-421
Filed 17 May 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 16 June 2009 by Judge W. Erwin Spainhour in Union County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 October 2010.
Perry, Bundy, Plyler Long, L.L.P., by Melanie Cox and H. Ligon Bundy, for plaintiff-appellant. Robinson Elliott Smith, by William C. Robinson and Katherine A. Tenfelde, for defendant-appellant.
Union County No. 06 CVS 2109.
Because plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to make a prima facie showing of negligence and because plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law, we reverse the trial court's order granting defendant a directed verdict on plaintiff's claim of negligence.
The facts taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff Jody Bass, tend to show that, at approximately 6:00 a.m. on 9 March 2006, Bass was driving west on Highway 74, a multi-lane thoroughfare that runs through Monroe in Union County. At the time of the collision, it was still dark. After approaching the intersection of Highway 74 and Stafford Street, traveling behind four other vehicles, Bass entered the intersection traveling at approximately forty miles per hour; the traffic signal controlling her movements was emitting a green light. Although she did not "stop at the green light and look directly to [her] left and look directly to [her] right," Bass testified that she was alert and attentive to her surroundings as she proceeded; with her "peripheral vision and everything else, [she] could see everything that was going around." She acknowledged that her ability to see the other vehicle would have been somewhat obstructed due to lighting conditions, the fact that other vehicles were traveling through the intersection, and the presence of an auto parts store that blocked her view down Stafford Street. Bass's evidence tends to show that she had the right of way when she entered the intersection; that her visibility was, to some extent, obstructed by other vehicles and buildings; and that she was primarily looking forward at the time that she entered the intersection. Bass testified that as she entered the intersection she was immediately struck by another vehicle.
A . . . [T]he next thing I know, I was turned around facing where I had just came from, facing a red truck.
Q How did you end up being turned around?
A I was hit.
Q And who hit you?
A The red truck.
Q Okay. What side of the vehicle were you hit from?
A In the driver's side.
On 14 September 2006, Bass filed a complaint against defendant Teodora Benitez Alvarado, seeking damages in excess of $10,000.00. Bass alleged that Teodora Alvarado was negligent and Lucio Alvarado was liable for damages under the family purpose doctrine . Defendants denied negligence but alleged that if Alvarado was negligent, Bass was contributorily negligent. The matter came on for trial on 27 May 2009. At the close of Bass's presentation of evidence, Alvarado made a motion for a directed verdict. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case based on Bass's asserted failure to establish negligence and for being contributorily negligent. On 16 June 2009, the trial court entered a written order in which it concluded that having reviewed the evidence submitted by Bass, Bass "has failed to make a prima facie showing of negligence against the Defendants and that [Bass] is contributorily negligent as a matter of law." The same day, Bass made a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59; however, the motion was denied. Bass appeals.
According to the record the claim against Lucio Alvarado was voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Therefore, we refer to Teodora Benitez Alvarado throughout this opinion as Alvarado.
On appeal, Bass raises two arguments: did the trial court err in granting Alvarado's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that (I) Bass failed to make a prima facie showing of negligence and (II) Bass was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Standard of Review
"[Our Supreme] Court has stated many times that `[a] motion for directed verdict under Rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, to take the case to the jury.'" Stanfield v. Tilghman, 342 N.C. 389, 394, 464 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1995) (citing Northern Nat'l Life Ins. v. Miller Machine Co., 311 N.C. 62, 69, 316 S.E.2d 256, 261 (1984)).
In reviewing the grant of directed verdict for defendants, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, as the nonmoving party. West v. Slick, 313 N.C. 33, 40-41, 326 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1985). We may affirm the directed verdict for defendants only if, as a matter of law, a recovery cannot be had by plaintiffs upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish. Id. at 40, 326 S.E.2d at 606.
Haas v. Warren, 341 N.C. 148, 152, 459 S.E.2d 254, 256 (1995). "It is seldom appropriate to direct a verdict in a negligence action." Stanfield, 342 N.C. at 394, 464 S.E.2d at 297 (citing Taylor v. Walker, 320 N.C. 729, 360 S.E.2d 796 (1987); 2 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 50-7, at 161 (1989)).
I
Bass first argues that the trial court erred in granting Alvarado's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that Bass failed to make a prima facie showing of negligence. We agree.
In order to set out a prima facie claim of negligence, a plaintiff is required to present evidence tending to show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) such breach constituted an actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and, (4) the plaintiff suffered damages in consequence of the breach. Cucina v. City of Jacksonville, 138 N.C. App. 99, 102, 530 S.E.2d 353, 355 (2000). Here, the question is whether Alvarado breached a duty to Bass.
As a general rule, "[i]t is the duty of the driver of a motor vehicle not merely to look, but to keep an outlook in the direction of travel; and [the driver] is held to the duty to see what she ought to have seen." Kummer v. Lowry, 165 N.C. App. 261, 265, 598 S.E.2d 223, 226 (2004) (quoting Seaman v. McQueen, 51 N.C. App. 500, 503-04, 277 S.E.2d 118, 120 (1981)). "[A] motorist is negligent as a matter of law if he fails to stop in obedience to a red traffic light . . ." Troxler v. Central Motors Lines, Inc., 240 N.C. 420, 425, 82 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1954) (quoting Cox v. Freight Lines, 236 N.C. 72, 72 S.E.2d 25).
In Troxler, our Supreme Court considered whether a trial court was correct in overruling a defendant's demurrer to the plaintiff's claims of negligence which arose from a collision in an intersection. Id. at 424, 82 S.E.2d at 345. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant entered the intersection without a green light and that had he looked he would have seen the plaintiff's vehicle already in the intersection. Id. at 426, 82 S.E.2d at 346.
On the other hand, [the plaintiff], having the green light as she approached the intersection, it seems clear that she had the right to proceed. It is alleged she did proceed into the intersection. But if it be inferred from the allegation that she entered the intersection as the light was in process of changing, she was not under any duty of anticipating negligence on the part of [the defendant], but in the absence of anything which gave or should give notice to the contrary, she was entitled to assume, and to act on the assumption, that he, [the defendant], in the exercise of ordinary care, would not proceed into the intersection until after he had the green light, and she had cleared the intersection.
Id.
Bass testified that she was driving on U.S. Highway 74, fifth in a line of vehicles.
Q Okay. Well, anyway, you're traveling, there's five vehicles approaching the intersection with Stafford all in your right lane. Is that correct?
A Correct.
Q You're the last of those five vehicles?
A Yes.
Q Okay. And the light is green before the first vehicle gets there. Is that correct?
A Correct.
Q So that vehicle crosses the intersection. Is that right?
A That's right.
. . .
Q And then you enter the intersection and the accident happens?
A Yes, sir.
. . .
Q . . . So these four vehicles crossed the intersection without incident.
A Correct.
Q And then just as you enter, you're hit. Is that right?
A Yes.
Officer Carl Haywood, a patrol officer with the Monroe City Police Department, who reported to the scene of the accident testified that the light signals at the intersection of Highway 74 and Stafford Street appeared to be working normally. Officer Christa Haywood, also with the Monroe City Police Department, spoke with Alvarado after the accident.
A I asked her if she was okay. She said yes. I asked her what happened and she said that she thought she could make it.
Q She thought she could make what?
A I was assuming the light. That was just her statement; I thought I could make it.
Bass's evidence make clear that she had a green light when she entered the intersection. Viewed in the light most favorable to Bass, the evidence supports the allegation that Alvarado entered the intersection on a red light after the traffic signal facing Bass on Highway 74 heading west turned green and that Alvarado failed to keep a lookout in her direction of travel and failed "to see what she ought to have seen." Kummer, 165 N.C. App. at 265, 598 S.E.2d at 226; see also Troxler, 240 N.C. 420, 82 S.E.2d 342. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the claim of negligence.
II Bass argues that the trial court erred in granting Alvarado's motion for a directed verdict on the grounds that Bass is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. We disagree. "Under North Carolina law, contributory negligence generally will act as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery." Thompson v. Bradley, 142 N.C. App. 636, 640, 544 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2001) (citations omitted). "Contributory negligence is the breach of duty of a plaintiff to exercise due care for his or her own safety, such that the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care is a proximate cause of his or her injury." Id. (citing Champs Convenience Stores v. United Chemical Co., 329 N.C. 446, 406 S.E.2d 856 (1991); Holderfield v. Trucking Co., 232 N.C. 623, 61 S.E.2d 904 (1950)). A defendant who relies on the doctrine of contributory negligence as a bar to a plaintiff's personal injury claim has the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence that the plaintiff acted negligently and that his or her negligence proximately caused the injury or damage from which the plaintiff's claim stems. Clark v. Bodycombe, 289 N.C. 246, 253, 221 S.E.2d 506, 511 (1976) (citing Poultry Co. v. Thomas, 289 N.C. 7, 220 S.E.2d 536 (1975); Warren v. Lewis, 273 N.C. 457, 160 N.C. 305; Jones v. Holt, 268 N.C. 381, 150 S.E.2d 759; Owens v. Kelly, 240 N.C. 770, 84 S.E.2d 163). "[A] directed verdict for a defendant on the ground of contributory negligence may only be granted when the evidence taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff establishes her negligence so clearly that no other reasonable inference or conclusion may be drawn therefrom." McNeil v. Gardner, 104 N.C. App. 692, 696, 411 S.E.2d 174, 176 (1991) (citing Helvy v. Sweat, 58 N.C. App. 197, 199, 292 S.E.2d 733, 734-35, disc. review denied, 306 N.C. 741, 295 S.E.2d 477 (1982)), aff'd per curiam, 332 N.C. 481, 420 S.E.2d 826 (1992)). In conducting the required analysis, any "[c]ontradictions or discrepancies in the evidence . . . must be resolved by the jury rather than by the trial judge." Id. (citing Helvy, 58 N.C. App. at 199, 292 S.E.2d at 734-35). In view of these well-established legal principles, the only basis upon which the trial court could have properly directed a verdict in favor of Alvarado was in the event that "`all the evidence so clearly establishe[d] [that Bass acted negligently and that her negligence was] one of the proximate causes of [her damages] that no other reasonable conclusion [other than that Bass was contributorily negligent as a matter of law was] possible.'" Id. at 697, 411 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting Ragland v. Moore, 299 N.C. 360, 364, 261 S.E.2d 666, 668 (1980)). As a result, "`[a] rule which by definition requires contributory negligence to be so clear that no other reasonable inference may be drawn therefrom will by its nature be satisfied only infrequently and only in extreme circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Wagoner v. Butcher, 6 N.C. App. 221, 231-32, 170 S.E.2d 151, 158 (1969)). In the instant case, Bass was driving in the far right lane heading west on Highway 74 at approximately 6:00 a.m. when she entered the intersection of Highway 74 and Stafford Street. Highway 74 offered three lanes of travel heading west, a turning lane, a grassy median, and three lanes of travel heading east. There were no obstructions (e.g. road signs or separation walls), and there was no fog or rain.
Q Would you be able to see given the lighting that you remember that day, if you were standing on the side of 74; would you be able to see across the intersection given the lighting?
A Yes, sir.
Q You'd be able to see through the intersection just fine?
A Yes, sir.
. . .
Q So you had no difficulty seeing traffic going in this direction on 74. It was clear and unobstructed for you to look and see those cars?
A I could see traffic going that way and I could see the traffic that I was in.
Q The view was clear and unobstructed?
A Yes.
"`"The fact that the operator of a motor vehicle may have a green light facing him as he approaches and enters an intersection where traffic is regulated by automatic traffic control signals does not relieve him of his legal duty to maintain a proper lookout, to keep his vehicle under reasonable control. . . ."'" Bass v. Lee, 255 N.C. 73, 79, 120 S.E.2d 570, 573 (1961) (quoting Funeral Service v. Charlotte Coach Lines, 248 N.C. 146, 102 S.E.2d 816 (quoting Cox v. Freight Lines, 236 N.C. 72, 72 S.E.2d 25); citing Williams v. Funeral Home, 248 N.C. 524, 103 S.E.2d 714; Shoe v. Hood, 251 N.C. 719, 112 S.E.2d 543). However, "in the absence of anything which gives or should give him notice to the contrary, a motorist has the right to assume and to act on the assumption that another motorist will observe the rules of the road and stop in obedience to a traffic signal." Strathopoulos v. Shook, 251 N.C. 33, 36-37, 110 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1959) (quoting Cox, supra). Thus, the mere fact that plaintiff failed to observe traffic conditions east of the intersection is insufficient to establish that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, since "[w]hether such failure to look was a proximate cause of the collision depended upon whether, if he had looked, what he would or should have seen was sufficient to put him on notice, at a time when plaintiff could by the exercise of due care have avoided the collision, that defendant would not stop in obedience to the red light." Id. at 37, 110 S.E.2d at 455 (citing Currin v. Williams, 248 N.C. 32, 102 S.E.2d 455). As a result, the Supreme Court and this Court have held that evidence tending to show that a driver who entered an intersection in reliance on a green light while traveling at about 15 to 20 miles per hour and collided with a driver who entered the intersection against a red light while traveling at 35 to 40 miles per hour and who was approximately 100 feet from the intersection at the time that the plaintiff entered the intersection, Id. at 37, 110 S.E.2d at 456; that a driver who entered an intersection in reliance on a green light while looking ahead into the intersection rather than "sideways" and traveling at about 15 to 20 miles per hour collided with a driver who entered the intersection against a red light, Currin, 248 N.C. at 35, 102 S.E.2d at 457-58; that a driver who entered an intersection in reliance on a green light, after looking both right and left without seeing anything, and collided with another vehicle that entered the intersection at 35 to 40 miles per hour, Wright v. Pegram, 244 N.C. 45, 48-49, 92 S.E.2d 416, 419 (1956); and that a driver who entered an intersection in reliance on a green light without looking to his left, particularly given that his view was blocked by a school bus, and collided with another vehicle, Seaman v. McQueen, 51 N.C. App. 500, 504-05, 277 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1981), does not establish the existence of contributory negligence as a matter of law. See also Cicogna v. Holder, 345 N.C. 488, 489-90, 480 S.E.2d 636, 637 (1997) (stating that the issue of contributory negligence should not have been submitted to the jury when "[t]he only evidence presented was that the plaintiff had the green light and was struck by the defendant, who violated the red light."). Instead, the appellate courts in this jurisdiction have simply held that such evidence is sufficient to support the submission of a contributory negligence issue to the jury, with the jury given the responsibility for determining whether any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff barred his or her recovery. Bass, 255 N.C. 73, 120 S.E.2d 570 (holding that evidence tending to show that a driver who entered an intersection when the controlling traffic signal was green and made no effort to avoid a collision despite being warned that another driver had "run" a red light and was about to collide with his vehicle supported the submission of a contributory negligence issue to the jury); Hyder v. Battery Co., Inc., 242 N.C. 553, 89 S.E.2d 124 (holding that evidence tending to show that a driver who entered an intersection in reliance on a green light without paying any attention to surrounding traffic and did not see the driver with whom he collided until after his wife attempted to alert him to the other driver's presence supported the submission of a contributory negligence issue to the jury); Kummer, 165 N.C. App. 261, 598 S.E.2d 223 (2004) (holding that evidence tending to show that a driver who entered an intersection when the light was green and visibility was good without looking right or left and collided with a vehicle that had almost completely crossed the intersection supported the submission of a contributory negligence issue to the jury); Love v. Singleton, 145 N.C. App. 488, 550 S.E.2d 549 (2001) (holding that evidence tending to show that a driver who entered an intersection in reliance on a green light without noticing that another vehicle, which was apparently in the process of turning, was in the intersection until she was about a car length away from the "stop line" supported the submission of a contributory negligence issue to the jury). After a careful examination of the relevant authorities, we have not been able to find any reported decision concluding that a driver who entered an intersection at a time when the light was green was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Although the record evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Alvarado, suffices to support the submission of a contributory negligence issue to the jury, Bass, 255 N.C. at 79-80, 120 S.E.2d at 573-74; Kummer, 165 N.C. App. at 264, 598 S.E.2d at 226, we are unable to conclude that the record evidence establishes that Bass's recovery is barred by her contributory negligence as a matter of law. The evidence in the present record permits, but does not compel or require, a conclusion that Bass's claim is barred by contributory negligence. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case to the Superior Court of Union County for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges STEELMAN and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).