Opinion
Rehearing Denied Jan. 12, 1989.
Review Granted March 16, 1989.
Previously published at 206 Cal.App.3d 708
Thomas A. Seaton, Oakland, for plaintiff and appellant.
Manuela Albuquerque, City Atty., Thomas J. Lee, Deputy City Atty., Berkeley, for defendant and respondent.
Samuel E. Trosow, Berkeley, for real party in interest.
NEWSOM, Associate Justice.
In July 1980, appellant purchased property located at 2117--5th Street in Berkeley, California, consisting of a large single family residence on a double lot. He believed the residence was vacant, but occupants of the house prior to appellant's acquisition of it paid a monthly rent of $240. They vacated the premises when appellant became the owner, and thereafter the residence was temporarily vacant.
In April 1981, appellant rented the premises to real parties in interest (hereafter the Tenants), initially charging them rent of $550 per month, which rent was increased to $590 in April 1982, and to $600 in April 1983.
On November 16, 1984, the Tenants filed a petition with the Berkeley Rent Stabilization Board (hereafter the Board), claiming that appellant had not registered the property as required by the Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance (hereafter the Ordinance), and had charged excessive rents from 1981 to 1984. The Tenants sought a downward adjustment of rent and reimbursement for rent overpayments. In December of 1984, appellant registered the property with the Board.
At the hearing on the Tenants' petition in January of 1985, appellant sought to introduce evidence that his costs exceeded the rent charged the Tenants during the period at issue. The hearing officer refused to consider such evidence on the ground that the issue of a fair rate of return on investment could properly be considered under the Ordinance only in a separate landlord petition.
After the hearing, the hearing officer set the monthly rent at the level established by the Ordinance, $210, found that appellant had charged excessive rent in the total The hearing officer's decision was affirmed on appeal by the Board. Appellant thereafter initiated this proceeding by filing a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in Alameda County Superior Court seeking reversal of a decision by the Board finding that he had overcharged the Tenants at 2117--5th Street in Berkeley and ordering reimbursement to those Tenants in the amount of $15,200 representing rent overpayments made during the years 1981 to 1984. After a hearing, the court denied the petition, thereby affirming the Board's decision. This appeal followed.
Appellant's first contention is that the Ordinance vests judicial power in the Board in contravention of article VI, section 1, of the California Constitution. (Perry Farms, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 448, 461, 150 Cal.Rptr. 495.) He claims that the Board acted as a "judicial body" in ordering him to refund excessive rents and in authorizing the Tenants to withhold payment of rent until the overcharges have been recovered.
Article VI, section 1, provides: "The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts and justice courts. All except justice courts are courts of record."
In Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 42, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29, our high court declared that "article IV disposes of all judicial power not expressly disposed of elsewhere in the Constitution, and that, following its amendment in 1950, it no longer authorized the Legislature, in its granting of powers to various local bodies pursuant to article XI, to grant judicial powers." The Constitution does not specifically confer judicial powers upon the Board. Thus, the crucial inquiry to be made in the present case is whether the Board, acting under authority of the Ordinance, exercised judicial functions, or merely administrative and regulatory powers. (Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal. (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 563, 59 P.2d 119.)
Some cases have used the term "quasi-judicial" to refer to adjudicatory authority possessed by administrative agencies which fall short of true judicial powers, and consequently do not violate article VI, section 1. (See East Bay M. U. Dist. v. Dept. of P. Wks. (1934) 1 Cal.2d 476, 478, 35 P.2d 1027; Brecheen v. Riley (1921) 187 Cal. 121, 125, 200 P. 1042.) In Strumsky, the court warned that "quasi" is essentially a "smooth cover" which indicates that "all recognized classifications have broken down, ..." (Strumsky v. San Diego Employees Retirement Assn., supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 42, fn. 14, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.) The question is whether "true judicial powers" have been vested in the administrative agency, not the descriptive adjective employed. (Ibid.)
The Ordinance and regulations promulgated thereunder grant the Board authority to take the following actions: conduct hearings; administer oaths and affirmations; subpoena witnesses and relevant documents; take evidence; and issue findings of fact and orders, including those authorizing a tenant to withhold rent to recover an overcharge or directing a landlord to refund an overcharge. The Board's decisions are not self-enforcing, however; the tenant must utilize the courts to exact compliance with an order of the Board. And, a landlord aggrieved by any action or decision of the Board is free to seek judicial review in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
"Judicial power" has been defined as " 'the power of a court to decide and pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons who bring a case before it for decision.' [Citation.] 'It is the inherent authority not only to decide but to make binding orders or judgments which constitutes judicial power....' " (Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 407, 412, 156 P. 491.) Our courts have repeatedly acknowledged that "administrative boards and officers are often called upon to determine the facts and apply the law to those facts. Such bodies and officers do not exercise judicial functions in the strict sense of that term." (Ibid; see also Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, Thus, as noted in Ray v. Parker, supra, 15 Cal.2d 275, 291, 101 P.2d 665: " 'The practice of delegating to administrative officers or boards powers which were originally performed directly by the legislature is of long standing and has met the approval of the highest courts in this state as well as in other jurisdictions. "The policy of the law favors the placing of detailed responsibility in administrative officers. The courts uphold statutes vesting such powers in such officers if it is possible fairly to do so, at least where the powers are merely ministerial." ' " (Quoting from Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock (1939) 13 Cal.2d 620, 658-659, 91 P.2d 577.)
While the Board makes findings of fact, determines the law as applied to those facts, and issues orders resolving disputes in much the same manner as judicial processes are employed by the courts, such action does not necessarily constitute an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. (East Bay M. U. Dist. v. Depart. of P. Wks., supra, 1 Cal.2d 476, 478, 35 P.2d 1027; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, supra, 172 Cal. 407, 412, 156 P. 491.) The line at which administrative adjudication encroaches on judicial power has not been definitively drawn by the courts. A number of factors, however, have been enumerated as important in determining whether such encroachment has occurred.
First, the extent to which the administrative agency exercises discretion has a bearing on the constitutionality of its action. Where an administrative tribunal acts in a ministerial capacity, the courts have been more reluctant to invalidate its authority. (Ray v. Parker, supra, 15 Cal.2d 275, 291, 101 P.2d 665; Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal., supra, 6 Cal.2d 557, 563, 59 P.2d 119; Agricultural Prorate Com. v. Superior Ct. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 550, 571, 55 P.2d 495.) In contrast, discretionary awards of damages have often been deemed unconstitutional infringements upon the traditional authority of the courts. (See Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 80, 233 Cal.Rptr. 294, 729 P.2d 728; McKee v. Bell-Carter Olive Co. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1230, 1238, 231 Cal.Rptr. 304.)
The purpose underlying the administrative action is also a relevant factor. Orders of an administrative agency undertaken in furtherance of agency goals are more likely to be perceived as legitimate exercises of authority. (Brecheen v. Riley, supra, 187 Cal. at 122, 125, 200 P. 1042; Ex Parte Whitley (1904) 144 Cal. 167, 180, 77 P. 879.) For example, in Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, supra, 13 Cal.2d 620, 91 P.2d 577, the court generally upheld the constitutionality of the Milk Stabilization Act, but invalidated as an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power a provision which authorized the director of agriculture to hold hearings and " 'determine the amount of damage, if any, to which a complainant is entitled as a result of a failure of the distributor to pay for fluid milk or fluid cream as in this chapter provided, and in such case the director may make an order directing the offender to make reparation and pay to such person complaining such amount on or before the date fixed in the order.' " (Id. at p. 651, 91 P.2d 577.) This provision constituted an Another critical consideration is the finality and binding nature of the administrative order. "An administrative body may make factual determinations so long as those determinations are subject to judicial review." (Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 176, 186, 214 Cal.Rptr. 71.) But, if finality is accorded to the action of an administrative agency, it may be declared an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. (Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831, 840, 123 P.2d 457; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, supra, 172 Cal. 407, 411, 156 P. 491.)
When determining whether a landlord has charged rent in excess of the standards specified in the Ordinance and calculating the amount of the overcharge which must be repaid to tenants, the Board acts in a purely ministerial capacity. (Cf. Youst v. Longo, supra, 43 Cal.3d 64, 80, 233 Cal.Rptr. 294, 729 P.2d 728.) The amount of the overcharge is established by the Ordinance, a legislative act, not by the Board. (Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equal., supra, 6 Cal.2d 557, 565, 59 P.2d 119.)
Moreover, the Board's action in awarding reimbursement for an overcharge furthers the policies of the Ordinance. "[R]ent control provisions are intended to counteract the ill effects of 'rapidly rising and exorbitant rents exploiting [the housing] shortage.' " (Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 165, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001.) The Ordinance itself provides that its purposes "are to regulate residential rent increases in the City of Berkeley and to protect tenants from unwarranted rent increases and arbitrary, discriminatory, or retaliatory evictions, in order to help maintain the diversity of the Berkeley community and to ensure compliance with legal obligations relating to the rental of housing. This legislation is designed to address the City of Berkeley's housing crisis, preserve the public peace, health and safety, and advance the housing policies of the City with regard to low and fixed income persons, minorities, students, handicapped, and the aged." Assessment of rent overcharges by the Board is critical to the regulatory and remedial objectives of the Ordinance (Brecheen v. Riley, supra, 187 Cal. 121, 125, 200 P. 1042), in contrast to the powers found unconstitutional in Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, supra, 13 Cal.2d 620, 651-652, 91 P.2d 577.) Administrative enforcement provides tenants with an inexpensive and expeditious means of challenging exorbitant rents. The enforcement mechanism of the Ordinance is integral to its objective of preventing unwarranted rent increases. The Board's decisions are not given the same finality and binding effect as those found unconstitutional by the courts. (Cf. Laisne v. Calif. St. Bd. of Optometry, supra, 19 Cal.2d 831, 844-845, 123 P.2d 457; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, supra, 172 Cal. 407, 411, 156 P. 491.) An order by the Board which requires a landlord to reimburse tenants for rent overcharges is not self-executing; tenants must enforce such an order by court action. And while the effectiveness of an order permitting tenants to withhold rent does not depend upon judicial action, the Ordinance specifically gives landlords the right to seek judicial review by way of administrative mandamus. (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 1094.5, 1085; Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 176, 186, 214 Cal.Rptr. 71.)
We conclude that the Board's statutory power does not impermissibly intrude upon the adjudicative authority traditionally reposed in the courts. Only minor discretionary power is vested in the Board; for the most part administrative decisions are not self-executing; and judicial review remains Next, appellant complains that he has been denied the right to a jury trial guaranteed by article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, arguing that, since he would have been entitled to a jury trial had the tenants initiated their action for rent overcharges in court rather than before the Board, he cannot be deprived of that right simply because the tenants chose an administrative rather than a judicial forum.
We might agree had appellant's action been instituted in a court of law. (Grossblatt v. Wright (1951) 108 Cal.App.2d 475, 484, 239 P.2d 19.) It is a settled principle of law, however, that "the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved." (Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n (1977) 430 U.S. 442, 460-461, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 464, fn. deleted; Myron v. Hauser (8th Cir.1982) 673 F.2d 994, 1004.) In Atlas Roofing Co., supra, the United States Supreme Court upheld an administrative agency's power to impose civil penalties for violation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 against a challenge that such adjudication is violative of the constitutional right to a jury trial. (See also 301 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 149, 160, 221 Cal.Rptr. 610.) Observing that the Seventh Amendment--the federal counterpart to article I, section 16 of the California Constitution--is no bar to the creation of new rights or to their enforcement outside regular courts of law (Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety Comm'n, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 461, 97 S.Ct. at p. 1272), the court reasoned from a long line of cases "that when Congress creates new statutory 'public rights,' it may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment's injunction that jury trial is to be 'preserved' in 'suits at common law.' " (Id. at p. 455, 97 S.Ct. at p. 1269, fn. deleted.)
Accordingly, under the holding of Atlas Roofing Co., we conclude that appellant was not deprived of his right to a jury trial by the Board's adjudication of tenants' petition to recover rent overcharges pursuant to the statutory rights created by the Ordinance. (430 U.S. 442, 461, 97 S.Ct. 1261, 1272; see also Bd. of Trustees v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc. (9th Cir.1984) 749 F.2d 1396, 1404; Myron v. Hauser, supra, 673 F.2d 994, 1004; Western Electric Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 629, 640, 160 Cal.Rptr. 436.)
Appellant also contends that he has been denied a fair return on his investment by the Board's decision. During the hearing on the tenants' petition, he attempted to offer evidence demonstrating that his expenses for the property, including mortgage and interest payments, property taxes, insurance payments and improvement costs, exceeded the rent charged tenants from 1981 to 1984. Neither the hearing officer nor the Board considered such evidence, however, for the stated reason that under the Ordinance appellant could only produce evidence of his losses in his own separate proceeding seeking a rent adjustment. Appellant now claims that he has been denied the right to obtain a fair return on his investment as required by law.
According to a declaration filed by appellant, he lost a total of $1,189.87 on the property from April 1981, through December 1984.
To comply with constitutional standards, a rent control ordinance must be "reasonably calculated to eliminate excessive rents and at the same time provide landlords with a just and reasonable return on their property." (Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, supra, 17 Cal.3d 129, 165, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001. An ordinance which assures landlords of a "fair return on investment" satisfies this requirement. Sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance furnish landlords with mechanisms for obtaining a fair return on their investments. Section 11 provides for annual rent adjustments (ARAS) of rent ceilings to account for increases or decreases in perennial costs such as utilities and property taxes. If this general increase is insufficient, a landlord may petition the Board for an individual rent adjustment (IRA) under section 12. In ruling on an IRA petition, the Board is directed by section 12 to consider many nonexclusive factors, including a landlord's individual costs. The Board cannot deny a rent increase where it is necessary to allow a landlord a "fair return on investment." Our high court has specifically held that the "fair return on investment" standard "will not preclude the Board from avoiding confiscatory results, and hence the administrative standard established in the ordinance is constitutionally valid on its face. [Citations.]" (Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644, 686, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261.)
Appellant complains that, despite sections 11 and 12, the Board denied him a fair return on his investment by refusing to allow him to introduce evidence of his expenses as part of his defense to the tenants' petition to recover rent overcharges. The first question, then, is: Does the Ordinance permit consideration of the fair return on investment standard in a tenants' petition for violation of the base rent ceiling provision? Stated differently: under the Ordinance, are landlords permitted to defend petitions asserting that they have charged rents in excess of the base rent ceiling by showing that the charged rents were necessary to provide them with a fair return on their investments? The Ordinance does not specifically answer this question. We must interpret its provisions in accordance with established maxims of statutory construction.
The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. (People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154; People ex rel. Younger v. Superior Court (1976) 16 Cal.3d 30, 40, 127 Cal.Rptr. 122, 544 P.2d 1322.) "In determining intent, we look first to the words themselves." (People v. Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1007, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.) "When the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, however, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part. (People v. Shirokow (1980) 26 Cal.3d 301, 306-307 [162 Cal.Rptr. 30, 605 P.2d 859]; Morse v. Municipal Court (1974) 13 Cal.3d 149, 156 [118 Cal.Rptr. 14, 529 P.2d 46]; Pennisi v. Department of Fish & Game (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 268, 273 [158 Cal.Rptr. 683].)" (People v. Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.)
The interpretation of a statute may be aided by reference to other statutes with similar language or objectives. (People v. Woodhead, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1008, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.) "A statute must be construed 'in the context of the entire statutory system of which it is a part, in order to achieve harmony among the parts.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1009, 239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154.)
Subdivision (i) of section 12 of the Ordinance states: "No provision of this Ordinance shall be applied so as to prohibit the Board from granting an individual rent adjustment Petitions for violations of rent ceilings or failure to register are separately dealt with elsewhere in the Ordinance. Here, Tenants' petition was brought pursuant to section 15, which grants the Board authority to permit withholding of rent by overcharged tenants. Section 15(a)(1) further states in part that "no landlord who has failed to comply with the Ordinance shall at any time increase rents for a rental unit until such unit is brought into compliance." This clause indicates to us a valid legislative intent to deny a landlord the right to seek an upward IRA until the tenant's petition is finally adjudicated and the rental unit is brought into compliance with the Ordinance.
The procedural scheme thus set forth in the Ordinance contemplates a separation of landlords' actions for rent adjustments and tenants' petitions charging violation of rent ceilings. Regulations enacted by the Board--a persuasive factor in determining the intent of the enactment (Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 633, 638, 211 Cal.Rptr. 683)--confirm this view. Regulation 1211(B) states: "In response to a petition filed solely on the basis of violations of rent ceilings, the landlord may defend as to the issue of violations of rent ceilings, but may not counterclaim for an increase of the lawful rent ceiling. To make such counterclaims, the landlord must file a separate petition in accordance with Chapter 12, ..." (Emphasis added.) Appellant never filed a petition for rent adjustment.
Had appellant filed such a petition, it could have been consolidated with tenants' petition in accordance with Regulation 1212(A).
Moreover, no provision is made in the Ordinance for retroactive upward adjustment of rents, which is essentially the relief appellant was requesting by defending his violation of the rent ceiling provisions with proffered evidence that he lost money during the period of overcharging. Section 12 operates prospectively, allowing an upward adjustment of the rent ceiling upon a showing of need to provide the landlord with a fair return on investment. Wisely or not, nothing in the Ordinance entitles a landlord to recapture lost rents by seeking a rent adjustment. (Searle v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd. (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1255, 243 Cal.Rptr. 449.) Any loss of rent resulting from a landlord's failure to seek an adjustment is permanent. (Ibid.)
Had appellant been permitted to defend Tenants' action for violations of the rent ceiling provisions by claiming denial of a fair return on investment, he would have effectively received a retroactive rent adjustment, which the Ordinance does not countenance. And, if landlords were permitted to justify violations of the rent ceilings, once discovered, by claiming the right to a retroactive fair rate of return, noncompliance with the provisions of the Ordinance might be encouraged, thereby contravening the purpose of the rent control laws to insure affordable housing.
We recognize that our interpretation of the Ordinance may result in collection of a windfall by Tenants, who, in our reading of the record have abused legislation which was intended to protect and benefit but not to reward them. It does not appear that We accordingly conclude that neither the Board nor the trial court erred by foreclosing appellant from seeking to justify his violations of the rent ceiling and his failure to register provisions of the Ordinance with evidence that he did not obtain a fair return on his investment during the period in question. Under the Ordinance, such evidence is limited to a proceeding on a landlord's petition requesting a prospective upward IRA.
Appellant argues that if the Ordinance is construed to deny him the opportunity to present "fair return" evidence in this proceeding, it is to that extent confiscatory, and violative of both principles of due process of constitutional and statutory prohibitions against excessive damages. (Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 403, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512; Cotati Alliance for Better Housing v. City of Cotati, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d 280, 283, 195 Cal.Rptr. 825.) He maintains that his right to a fair return on investment cannot be so abridged. We disagree.
The constitutional proscription against confiscatory takings does not guarantee landlords a fair return on investment; it merely demands availability of mechanisms sufficient to avoid confiscatory results. (Fisher v. City of Berkeley, supra, 37 Cal.3d 644, 687, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261; Searle v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1257, 243 Cal.Rptr. 449; Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, supra, 17 Cal.3d 129, 171, 130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001.) By providing landlords with rent adjustment procedures under section 11 and 12, the Ordinance satisfies constitutional and statutory dictates. (Fisher v. City of Berkeley, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 687-688, 209 Cal.Rptr. 682, 693 P.2d 261; Searle v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1257, 1259, 243 Cal.Rptr. 449.)
Between the time he bought the property in July of 1980 and the filing of tenants' petition in November of 1984, appellant was at all times free to seek both annual and individual rent adjustments. He was given sufficient notice by the Ordinance of the procedures at his disposal to avoid loss of potential rent adjustments. (Searle v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd., supra, at p. 1255, 243 Cal.Rptr. 449.) That he failed to employ such procedures cannot now be ascribed to provisions of the Ordinance.
Nor has appellant been foreclosed by the Board's decision in this proceeding from pursuing an upward IRA to prevent further losses and insure that he receives a fair rate of return on his investment in the future. Until he files a landlord's petition for an IRA and receives a final ruling in that action, we cannot determine whether the Board has denied him a fair rate of return. (MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County (1986) 477 U.S. 340, 352-353, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2568-2569, 91 L.Ed.2d 285; Searle v. City of Berkeley Rent Stabilization Bd., supra, 197 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1259, 243 Cal.Rptr. 449.)
Appellant's final contention is that Tenants are barred by laches from recovering rent overcharges from him. He observes that Tenants knew in 1981 that he had not registered the property, but failed to file a petition until November of 1984. Their delay in bringing an action resulted, he claims, in permanent loss of his right to obtain rent adjustments during the intervening years.
They apparently did not know until 1984, however, that the property had been rented at the time appellant purchased it, or that he was charging rent above the ceiling figure established by the Ordinance.
The defense of laches requires a conjunction of unreasonable delay and either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice from the delay. (Conti v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners (1969) 1 Cal.3d 351, 359, 82 Cal.Rptr. "Generally speaking, the existence of laches is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all of the applicable circumstances, and in the absence of manifest injustice or a lack of substantial support in the evidence its determination will be sustained." (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27 Cal.3d 614, 624, 166 Cal.Rptr. 826, 614 P.2d 258.) Thus, in assessing the availability of laches as a defense, each case must depend upon its own facts. (Volpicelli v. Jared Sydney Torrance Memorial Hosp., supra, 109 Cal.App.3d at p. 253, 167 Cal.Rptr. 610.)
Appellant's claim of laches has two flaws. First, laches is available as a defense "only in equity," not in an action at law such as that before us. (County of Los Angeles v. City of Alhambra (1980) 27 Cal.3d 184, 195, 165 Cal.Rptr. 440, 612 P.2d 24.) Second, since the prejudice to appellant was caused as much by his own inaction as by Tenants' delay in filing a petition against him, he cannot rely on laches as a defense to Tenants' recovery of overcharges.
THE JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED.
RACANELLI, P.J., and HOLMDAHL, J., concur.