Opinion
August 1, 1961
Present — Bergan, P.J., Gibson, Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court entered in Clinton County upon the verdict of a jury in favor of defendant in an automobile negligence action. The sole question presented is whether it was error for the trial court to have excluded, on the ground of its remoteness, the testimony of two witnesses offered by plaintiff in rebuttal. The collision between the respective vehicles of the parties occurred at about 5:30 P.M. on February 21, 1959 at a point on a public snow-covered highway which had been narrowed to approximately one half of its normal macadam width by snowbanks piled high along its sides. Blowing snow impaired visibility. The gist of plaintiff's complaint, which contained no counts of negligence charging defendant with excessive speed or lack of illuminating headlights, was the failure of defendant to use due care in the circumstances of the existing traffic conditions. Neither was an important factor bearing on the subject of proximate causation. (Cf. Clay v. Monington, 266 App. Div. 695.) By the testimony of the first witness plaintiff sought to show the speed and absence of headlighting of defendant's vehicle approximately four miles distant from the scene of the collision. The testimony of the second would have related to the question of its speed of travel some eight miles to its north. This was offered ostensibly to impair defendant's veracity by contradicting testimony elicited on cross-examination. "Generally, the problem as to whether specific facts are relevant or are too remote is for the sound discretion of the Trial Judge." ( Christie v. Mitchell, 10 A.D.2d 52, 53; Shaw v. Skopp, 198 App. Div. 618.) The rulings complained of were well within discretionary limits and were not error. Judgment unanimously affirmed, without costs.