Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-3184, SECTION "K" (4).
May 20, 2003.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 80), which seeks dismissal of certain Plaintiffs' claims on the basis of prescription and dismissal of all unjust enrichment claims. The Court finds that some of Plaintiffs' claims are indeed prescribed, and will grant Defendants' Motion in part.
I.
Defendants contend that the unpaid wage and rest break claims of Colby Lagrue and Dorothy English are prescribed in their entirety and that the unpaid wage and rest break claims of Regina Geason and Betty Matthews are prescribed insofar as they arise before September 5, 1997.
About one month after Defendants moved for summary judgment, Plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. 90), asserting federal minimum wage and overtime violations. Defendants' Motion, and this Order, address only state law claims.
The first issue is what prescriptive period applies to the named Plaintiffs' unpaid wage and rest break claims. Defendants observe that "[a]n action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered, including payment of salaries [and] wages" is subject to a three-year prescriptive period. La. Civ. Code art. 3494(1). Plaintiffs respond that their claims are contractual in nature and are subject to La. Civ. Code art. 3499, which sets forth the general ten-year prescriptive period for personal actions.
At bottom, these claims are meant to recoup unpaid wages. Based on their contracts with Defendants, Plaintiffs demand compensation for work performed during breaks. Pls.' 4th Am. Compl. ¶ 35. The applicable prescriptive period is therefore three years. See Grabert v. Iberia Parish School Bd., 638 So.2d 645, 646-47 (La. 1994); see also Rice v. Felterman, 814 So.2d 696, 698 (La.App. 1st Cir. 2002). The fact that Plaintiffs' rest break claims have been characterized by the parties and the Court as "breach of contract claims" does not mean that they fall within Article 3499's ten-year prescriptive period. See Grabert, 638 So.2d at 647. Accordingly, any unpaid wage and rest break claims arising before September 5, 1997, are prescribed.
Plaintiffs filed their original state court petition on September 5, 2000, on behalf of themselves and their fellow putative class members. La. C. Civ. P. art. 596 provides that liberative prescription is "suspended on the filing of the petition as to all members of the class as defined or described therein." As Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs' reliance on Article 596, the Court will assume that Article 596 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period even as to Plaintiffs named in later petitions.
Turning now to the individual Plaintiffs, Mr. Lagrue worked for Defendants from March 1990 through December 15, 1997, at which time he began receiving workers compensation. From December 15, 1997, until his resignation on July 27, 1998, Mr. Lagrue continued to work for Defendants intermittently, performing light-duty tasks. Mr. Lagrue admitted at his deposition that he was not asked to work off-the-clock or miss breaks from December 15, 1997, onward. The earnings summary and timeclock record supplied by Defendants indicate that Mr. Lagrue did not work at all between July 18 and December 14, 1997. Plaintiffs do not present any contradictory evidence. Taken together, Mr. Lagrue's admissions and Defendants' hourly records show Mr. Lagrue has no viable unpaid wage and rest break claims for the period after September 5, 1997. And any such claims arising before September 5, 1997, are prescribed.
Ms. English worked for Defendants from August 1995 to April 1996. Because her employment with Defendants ended well before September 5, 1997, her unpaid wage and rest break claims are prescribed.
Finally, Ms. Geason worked for Defendants from February 1995 to February 2000, and Ms. Matthews worked for Defendants from May 1, 1989, to April 30, 2001. Ms. Geason and Ms. Matthews' unpaid wage and rest break claims are prescribed to the extent they arise before September 5, 1997.
II.
To prevail on their equitable claim for unjustified enrichment, Plaintiffs must show: (1) an enrichment to the Defendants; (2) an impoverishment to Plaintiffs; (3) a connection between the enrichment and impoverishment; (4) an absence of justification or legal cause for the enrichment and impoverishment; and (5) the nonexistence of any other remedy at law. Minyard v. Curtis Prods., Inc., 205 So.2d 422, 432 (La. 1968). Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy elements (2), (4), and (5). Plaintiffs counter that they are merely asserting an alternative theory of recovery in the event their other claims fail.
Unjust enrichment principles are only applicable to fill a gap in the law where no express remedy is provided. Mouton v. Louisiana, 525 So.2d 1136, 1142 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1988). Because the plaintiffs have an action under La. Civ. Code art. 3494(1), they are precluded from having an equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. Id. at 1143.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Colby Lagrue's claims for unpaid wages and rest breaks are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Dorothy English's claims for unpaid wages and rest breaks are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Regina Geason and Betty Matthews' claims for unpaid wages and rest breaks are DISMISSED but only to the extent they arise before September 5, 1997.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.