But, if one or more counts in a complaint are good, a motion to dismiss will not be sustained. ( Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank (1939), 371 Ill. 412, 416; Stenwall v. Bergstrom (1947), 398 Ill. 377, 383.) Accordingly, on this motion to dismiss the complaint, count II should not have been segregated from count I. Each was a substantial part of the amended counterclaim which should not have been thus dismembered.

The matter having been disposed of on a motion to strike, the facts stated in the pleading will be taken as true. This rule does not, however, extend to conclusions drawn by the pleader. (Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412; Miller v. City of Chicago, 348 Ill. 34.) It appears that in 1910 George B. Kurtzon and Morris Kurtzon, brothers, acquired title to the lots in question. The property was used as a site for the business in which they were engaged. Buildings were added from time to time to meet the demands of a growing business.

Such motions do not admit the legal conclusions of the pleader as they are alleged and set forth in this complaint. Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412; Harris v. Ingleside Building Corp. 370 Ill. 617. We consider the original complaint in this case to be vague and uncertain; to contain many conclusions not based on facts; to intimate only by reference in lieu of supplying definite information, and to lack the definiteness which is required in stating a cause of action under our system of pleading, and the circuit court of DuPage county properly dismissed the complaint for want of equity.

They cite just two inapposite cases, neither of which addresses IIED. See Stenwall v. Bergstrom, 398 Ill. 377 (1947) (reversing dismissal of a complaint seeking partition and an accounting of inherited land); Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412 (1939) (affirming dismissal of a complaint seeking to quiet title). Homeowners fail to provide citation to relevant authority and to develop their argument in violation of Rule 341(h) (7).

The practice of striking or dismissing a complaint should be confined to cases where there is a want of equity on the face of the complaint and it is clear that no amendment will aid it. A complaint should not be dismissed where, when liberally construed, it is sufficient to state a cause of action for which equitable relief may be provided. Darst v. Lang, 367 Ill. 119, 10 N.E.2d 659; Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412, 21 N.E.2d 294. • 3 Based upon the above legal propositions, we believe plaintiff's first amended complaint does state a cause of action for which a court of chancery could provide equitable relief. While this court has considerable doubt that plaintiff possesses either a statutory lien, since no property was received by plaintiff's clients in which that lien could attach, or a common law retaining lien, since plaintiff would need to be in physical possession of such property for that lien to attach, the question of whether he possesses an equitable lien over certain property, enforceable in a chancery court, is clearly arguable.

It does not, however, admit conclusions drawn by the pleader. Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412; Bailey v. Keck, 286 Ill. App. 624. [3] Even construing the complaint most strongly against the pleader on this motion to dismiss, Garofalo Co., Inc. v. St. Mary's Packing Co., 339 Ill. App. 412; Cates v. City of Bloomington, 333 Ill. App. 189, we do not agree with defendant's contention that the complaint discloses no allegation of fact that the defendant's product was either negligently or faultily constructed or designed.

The petitioner's motion to strike the answer and separate defenses admitted the facts directly alleged in the answer and defenses. ( Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412. ) The facts stated in the motion to strike are admitted by the respondents. That part of the motion which is reply to the defense that the petitioner was not legally appointed fire marshal will be first considered to determine if he was an officer, (fire marshal,) de jure or de facto.

Such a motion admits the facts which are directly alleged. Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412. For the reasons indicated the decree of the trial court is affirmed.

A motion to strike admits only such facts as are well pleaded but does not admit any legal conclusions to be deduced from such facts. ( County of Christian v. Merrigan, 191 Ill. 484; Barzowski v. Highland Park State Bank, 371 Ill. 412.) The vital question to be determined is whether the defenses which are set up in defendant's answer can properly be asserted in this type of proceeding. If such defenses cannot be asserted in this proceeding, then they are not well pleaded.