Spot zoning is often considered impermissible because it benefits an individual property owner at the expense of the community’s interest in a harmonious, comprehensive zoning plan. See, e.g., Morningside Assn. v. Planning & Zoning Board, 162 Conn. 154, 161–62, 292 A.2d 893 (1972); Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 93–94, 68 A.2d 308 (1949). But not always.

1 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, 3rd Ed., Chap. 26, Sec. 2, p. 380; 2 Metzenbaum, Law of Zoning, 2nd Ed., p. 1519; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown (N.Y.), 96 N.E.2d 731, 735, ("If, therefore, an ordinance is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan, it is not 'spot zoning,' even though it (1) singles out and affects but one small plot * * * or (2) creates in the center of a large zone small areas or districts devoted to a different use. * * * Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether the particular zoning under attack consists of areas fixed within larger areas of different use, but whether it was accomplished for the benefit of individual owners rather than pursuant to a comprehensive plan for the general welfare of the community.") Feraut v. City of Sacramento (Cal.), 269 P. 537, 541; Marshall v. Salt Lake City (Utah), 141 P.2d 704, 709, 711; Thomson v. Tafel (Ky.), 218 S.W.2d 977, 980, 981; Bartram v. Zoning Commission of City of Bridgeport (Conn.), 68 A.2d 308, 310-311 ("The commission might be guilty of spot zoning either in the original regulations it made or in later amendments, but, if in one or the other it decides, on facts affording a sufficient basis and in the exercise of a proper discretion, that it would serve the best interests of the community as a whole to permit a use of a single lot or small area in a different way than was allowed in surrounding territory, it would not be guilty of spot zoning in any sense obnoxious to the law.") Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals (Conn.), 53 A.2d 659; Kutcher v. Town Planning Commission (Conn.), 88 A.2d 538; Levinsky v. Zoning Commission of City of Bridgeport (Conn.), 127 A.2d 822; Co-Ray Realty Co. v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment (Mass.), 101 N.E.2d 888; Holt v. City of Salem (Ore.), 234 P.2d 564; Shell Oil Company v. Edwards (Ala.), 81 So.2d 535, certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 885, 100 L.Ed. 780; Gratton v. Conte (Pa.), 73 A.2d 381; Graham v. Graybar Electric Co. (Neb.), 63 N.W.2d 774; Higbee v. Chicago,

The commission apparently did not believe, nor did the court find that there was a public need for the establishment of any such new business zone as the plaintiffs proposed. See Bartram v. Zoning Board, 136 Conn. 89, 95, 68 A.2d 308. The plaintiffs also claim that business would be the highest and best use for their land. Here again, the commission has refused to accept this claim and the court to find that it was so. See Mallory v. West Hartford, 138 Conn. 497, 503, 86 A.2d 668; see also A-294 Rec. Briefs, back of p. 29, par. 42.

The change must also be one that presents a reasonable and logical development of the comprehensive plan. That is to say, it must do more than meet the wishes of the owner in carrying out some proposal he may make; it must serve the public interest in the zoning development of the community. Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 93, 68 A.2d 308; Parsons v. Wethersfield, 135 Conn. 24, 29, 60 A.2d 771. The circumstances and conditions in matters of zone changes and regulations are peculiarly within the knowledge of the zoning commission. Where it appears that an honest judgment has been reasonably and fairly exercised after a full hearing, courts should be cautious about disturbing the decision of the local authority.

But they question favoritism in relation to what criterion? In Bartram v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89 (1949), the court said: "The vice of spot zoning lies in the fact that it singles out for special treatment a lot or small area in a way that does not further such a (comprehensive) plan, id. p. 94. The law and cases on spot zoning are only relevant because of the manner in which the concern or favoritism is addressed by spot zoning case law.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) T. Tondro, supra, p. 69, quoting Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 94, 68 A.2d 308 (1949). The term "'contract zoning'" refers to a circumstance where "an agreement is entered between the ultimate zoning authority and the zoning applicant/property owner which purports to determine contractually how the property in question will be zoned, in derogation of the legal prerequisites for the grant of the desired zone. Absent valid legislative authorization, it is impermissible because it allows a property owner to obtain a special privilege not available to others . . . disrupts the comprehensive nature of the zoning plan, and, most importantly, impermissibly derogates the exercise of the municipality's powers."

In our view, the "all or nothing" approach of traditional zoning techniques is insufficient in today's world of rapid industrial expansion and pressing urban and rural social and economic problems. See Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949); Shapiro, The Case For Conditional Zoning, 41 Temp. L.Q. 267 (1968). Having so stated, we hasten to add that, just as this type of zoning can provide much-needed and valuable flexibility to the planning efforts of local zoning authorities, it could also be as easily abused.

"The vice of spot zoning lies in the fact that it singles out for special treatment a lot or a small area in a way that does not further such a [comprehensive] plan." Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 94, 68 A.2d 308. Further, we fail to see how the authorization of a use not permitted in the zoning regulations possibly could be in harmony with their intent and purpose.

A zoning authority is endowed with a wide and liberal discretion. Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 96, 68 A.2d 308. When the commission, however, has not acted fairly, with proper motives and upon valid reasons, this discretion is to be overruled. Mallory v. West Hartford, 138 Conn. 497, 505, 86 A.2d 668. The most generous reading of the commission's reason for the upgrading of the zone area fails to show any compliance with even a single requirement of the legislative direction contained in 8-2.

When it is based on community need such as that demonstrated in the instant situation, allowing light industry adjacent to residential areas is the present trend in zoning and is not arbitrary or unreasonable. See Jablon v. Town Planning Zoning Commission, 157 Conn. 434, 254 A.2d 914; Levinsky v. Zoning Commission, 144 Conn. 117, 124, 125, 127 A.2d 822; Bartram v. Zoning Commission, 136 Conn. 89, 94, 68 A.2d 308. There was ample evidence from which the zoning board could reasonably find that no traffic congestion would result from the proposed change. Furthermore, both parking and access to public highways on the proposed site are to be carefully supervised by the board and are subject to its final approval.