Opinion
Case No. 1:04 CV 1290.
May 17, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Nancy A. Vecchiarelli. The Report and Recommendation (Document # 48), submitted on March 29, 2005, recommending that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED is hereby ADOPTED by this Court.
Procedural and Factual Background
Plaintiff was hired by TRW, Inc. ("the Company") on or around September 13, 1966. In 1982, Plaintiff was injured during the course of his employment and developed tinnitus, ringing in the ears. (Document #34, Second Amended Complaint.)
TRW, Inc. was subsequently acquired by Defendant Northrop Gruman Corp.
On September 23, 1990, Plaintiff requested a leave of absence retroactive from September 17, 1990 to March 17, 1991 due to his tinnitus. On September 25, 1990, the Company informed Plaintiff that he exceeded his leave of absence under the applicable labor agreement. (Document #36, Exhibit A to Hromada Affidavit.) Due to Plaintiff's length of service for the Company, the Company granted Plaintiff additional time to provide medical documentation for his absence since September 17, 1990. ( Id.) On January 24, 1991, because Plaintiff did not timely provide such documentation, the Company informed Plaintiff that his "seniority rights and rights of employment . . . ceased as of September 17, 1990." ( Id.) The Union grieved Plaintiff's termination on his behalf through arbitration. (Document #36, Hromada Affidavit at ¶ 7.) On October 24, 1991, an arbitrator upheld the Company's termination of Plaintiff. ( Id.) Plaintiff did not appeal the arbitrator's decision, but unsuccessfully pursued related claims with the National Labor Relations Board. ( Id. at ¶ 8.)
On November 13, 1991, the Company's Hourly Pension Plan Committee ("the Committee") convened to calculate Plaintiff's pension. (Document #36, Exhibit H to Spreng Affidavit.) In a November 1991 letter, the Committee informed Plaintiff that he was entitled to a deferred vested pension upon reaching the age of sixty-five based upon his 289 months of service for the Company. (Document #36, Exhibit I to Spreng Affidavit.) The Committee also informed Plaintiff that his entitlement to other benefits (life insurance, retiree medical insurance, pension death benefits) ceased with his termination. ( Id.)
In an October 22, 1996 letter, Plaintiff, through Counsel, claimed he was entitled to disability pension benefits pursuant to the Company's plan because he is permanently and totally disabled. (Document #36, Exhibit A to Spreng Affidavit.) The Company stated that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because the Committee previously found that he did not meet the requirement of being terminated due to an unavoidable permanent and total disability. (Document #36, Exhibit B to Spreng Affidavit.) The Company stated that at the time Plaintiff was terminated, he claimed he was "ready, willing, and able" to return to work and his doctor stated that he would be able to work despite persistent high tone hearing loss; and, after his termination, his wage statements showed that he had been employed as a driver who was able to work as many as five days per week. ( Id.) In September 2001, Plaintiff began receiving vested pension plan benefits, paid retroactive to March 1, 2000, and still receives such benefits to the present date. (Document #36, Exhibits C and D to Spreng Affidavit.)
In 2003, Plaintiff, through Counsel, again claimed he was entitled to disability benefits and alternatively argued that he was entitled to retirement benefits. (Document #36, Spreng Affidavit at ¶ 6.) The Company repeated the reasoning by which it denied Plaintiff's disability pension benefits and stated that he was not entitled to the insurance benefits for retirees pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("the Agreement") because he did not retire under the terms of the Agreement. (Document #36, Exhibits E, F, and G to the Spreng Affidavit.)
On August 14, 2003, Plaintiff filed an action in State court identical to this lawsuit. (Document #36, Jeffrey Wedel Certification at ¶ 3; Exhibit A to Wedel Certification.) On December 22, 2003, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the State court action without prejudice. ( Id. at ¶ 5.) On July 9, 2004, Plaintiff, pro se, refiled the action in this Court, alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, naming Northrop Grumann, Corp., Donald Kobylarz, Ed Hromada, the Union Pension Committee, and I.A.M.A. as defendants. (Document #1.) On October 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, stating only that he was adding Ohio Tort Recovery as a plaintiff in the action. (Document #18.) On November 23 and 24, 2004, Defendants filed motions to dismiss the case. (Document #28 and #31.) On November 30, 2004, the Court held a case management conference, directing Plaintiff to file a second amended complaint that identified the parties and clarified his claims. At that time the Court denied Defendants' motions to dismiss without prejudice. (Document #33.) On December 14, 2004, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, naming Northrop Grumann Corp., the Employee Welfare Benefits Committee, the Union Pension Committee, and Robert Byrne as Defendants. (Document #34.) Plaintiff claimed that he is entitled to participate in the insurance plan for retirees under Section 133B of the pension plan. Further, although unclear, it appears Plaintiff challenges his termination. On January 7, 2005, Defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment. (Document #36.)
On March 29, 2005, Magistrate Judge Nancy A. Vecchiarelli issued her Report and Recommendation. (Document #48.) Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli recommended that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. Although the Magistrate determined Plaintiff had standing to bring an ERISA claim against Defendants, as he was a "participant" under the terms of the Company's pension plan ("the Plan"), the Magistrate found that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Plan. Therefore, the Magistrate determined that Plaintiff's ERISA claims should be dismissed. The Magistrate went on to note that even had Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies under the Plan, he did not set forth a genuine issue of material fact on the merits of his claim. The Magistrate found that the Committee's decision was rational in light of the Plan's provisions and that the Committee specifically relied upon the arbitrator's decision upholding the Company's termination of Plaintiff for exceeded leave, not a disability. Further, the Magistrate found that Plaintiff's request to vacate the arbitrator's decision upholding Plaintiff's termination lacked merit; was time-barred; and, that the arbitrator's decision barred the re-litigation of Plaintiff's termination.
On November 17, 2004, this Case was referred to Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli for pretrial supervision. (Document # 24.)
On April 5, 2005, Plaintiff filed his Objections to the Report and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate (Document #50), arguing that numerous issues of fact are in dispute. On April 21, 2005, Defendants filed their Joint Response to Plaintiff's Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. (Document #51.) Defendants set forth the undisputed facts which support the Magistrate's determination that summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate. On April 25, 2005, Plaintiff filed his Answer to Defendants' Joint Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to the Report and Recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. (Document #52.)
Standard of Review for a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
The applicable district court standard of review for a magistrate's report and recommendation depends upon whether objections were made to that report. When objections are made to a report and recommendation of a magistrate judge, the district court reviews the case de novo. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b) provides this standard of review. It states, in pertinent part, the following:
The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Accordingly, this Court will review the Report and Recommendation, to which timely objections have been filed, de novo. See Dacas Nursing Support Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 7 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 1993).
Conclusion
The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli de novo. See Massey v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.3d 506 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court has also considered all of the pleadings, affidavits, motions, and filings of the parties. After careful evaluation of the record, the Report and Recommendation, and the objections filed by Plaintiff, this Court finds the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli to be correct.Accordingly, the Court hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Vecchiarelli. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.