Barton v. Skelly Oil Co.

13 Citing cases

  1. Schrader v. Monarch Mills et al

    215 S.C. 357 (S.C. 1949)   Cited 28 times
    Affirming finding that claimant's injuries arose out of his employment where claimant was bitten by a black widow spider

    Messrs. Osborne, Butler Moore, of Spartanburg, forAppellants, cite: As to claimant's injury not being caused"by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment": 205 S.C. 423, 32 S.E.2d 240; 197 S.C. 21, 14 S.E.2d 367; 201 S.C. 257, 22 S.E.2d 715; 211 S.C. 370, 45 S.E.2d 591; 204 S.C. 481, 30 S.E.2d 73; 208 S.C. 545, 38 S.E.2d 761; 208 S.C. 139, 37 S.E.2d 286; 208 S.C. 86, 37 S.E.2d 291; 207 S.C. 258, 37 S.E.2d 838; 205 S.C. 353, 32 S.E.2d 1; 214 S.C. 162, 51 S.E.2d 510; 202 S.C. 88, 24 S.E.2d 109; 59 F.2d 595; 195 S.C. 346, 11 S.E.2d 376; 209 S.C. 411, 40 S.E.2d 626; 212 S.C. 514, 48 S.E.2d 497; 71 C.J. 760, Sec. 476; 202 S.C. 189, 24 S.E.2d 272; 199 Cal. 596, 250 P. 864, 49 A.L.R. 446; 21 Pa.2d 911; 6 Pa.2d 860; 138 Pa.2d 263; 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 371. As to whenonly one reasonable inference can be deduced from the evidence,it becomes a question of law for the court, and nota question of fact for the jury: 205 S.C. 72, 30 S.E.2d 841.

  2. Shannon v. Sandia Corporation

    447 P.2d 514 (N.M. 1968)   Cited 3 times

    In Berry v. J. C. Penney Co., 74 N.M. 484, 394 P.2d 996, we interpreted the language "arising out of employment" to require proof that the injury was caused by "a peculiar or increased risk to which claimant, as distinguished from the general public, was subjected by his employment." See also Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Co., 72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885; Martinez v. Fidel, 61 N.M. 6, 293 P.2d 654; Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263; Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 204 P. 72, 74. It is quite clear that under the facts of this case the claimant's injury, just as in Berry, arose out of risks or a condition personal to the claimant and not out of a risk peculiar to the employment.

  3. Ensley v. Grace

    76 N.M. 691 (N.M. 1966)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that where an employee is fatally injured in an unexplained assault there is a rebuttable presumption that the employee's death arose out of the employment

    It must `arise out of' as well as `in the course of' the employment. Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263; Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 204 P. 72, 74; Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Co., 72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885. There must not only have been a causal connection between the employment and the accident, but the accident must result from a risk incident to the work itself.

  4. Brundage v. K.L. House Construction Company

    74 N.M. 613 (N.M. 1964)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that an ultimate and necessarily determined fact is one "upon which the court's conclusion rests and without which ... the judgment would lack support in an essential particular"

    But it must "arise out of" as well as "in the course of" the employment. Berry v. J.C. Penney Co., 74 N.M. 484, 394 P.2d 996; Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263; Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Company, 72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885. We think that the ultimate facts to be determined by the trial court as a basis for the conclusion as to whether the claim is a compensable one are whether an injury sustained by a workman arose out of and in the course of his employment.

  5. Berry v. J.C. Penney Co.

    394 P.2d 996 (N.M. 1964)   Cited 20 times
    In Berry v. J. C. Penney Co., 74 N.M. 484, 394 P.2d 996, we interpreted the language "arising out of employment" to require proof that the injury was caused by "a peculiar or increased risk to which claimant, as distinguished from the general public, was subjected by his employment."

    It must "arise out of" as well as "in the course of" the employment. Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263; Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 204 P. 72, 74; Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Co., 72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885. There must not only have been a causal connection between the employment and the accident, but the accident must result from a risk incident to the work itself. When the employee, as in this case, solely because of a non-occupational, pre-existing physical condition, suffered a muscle spasm of the lower back, the question arises whether the muscle injury is one arising out of the employment.

  6. Luvaul v. A. Ray Barker Motor Company

    72 N.M. 447 (N.M. 1963)   Cited 18 times
    Affirming denial of an automobile mechanic’s workers’ compensation claim on grounds that his fall and resulting injury after becoming dizzy while on the job did not arise out of his employment where the evidence showed that the injury arose from risks personal to him—he had suffered from dizzy spells and fainting feelings for years, as well as had a history of acute brain syndrome possibly due to secondary intoxication

    In Gilbert v. E.B. Law Son, Inc., 60 N.M. 101, 287 P.2d 992, we held that before an injury may be said to be compensable as "arising out of employment," the accident causing the injury must result from a risk reasonably incident to the employment; a risk common to the public generally and not increased in any way by the circumstances of the employment is not covered by our Act. In Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263, it is said: "`* * * the employment must have had some causal connection with the accident; the accident must result from a risk reasonably incident to the employment, or the injury cannot be said to arise out of it.

  7. Lucero v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co.

    71 N.M. 11 (N.M. 1962)   Cited 12 times

    This evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of accidental injury in the course of employment within many decisions of this court. Christensen v. Dysart, 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1; Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 45 N.M. 354, 115 P.2d 342; Webb v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333, 148 A.L.R. 1002; Clower v. Grossman, 55 N.M. 546, 237 P.2d 353; Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263; Henderson v. Texas-New Mexico Pipe Line Co., 46 N.M. 458, 131 P.2d 269; Gilbert v. E.B. Law Son, Inc., 60 N.M. 101, 287 P.2d 992. The undisputed evidence in the case shows that the claimant in his early life suffered from tuberculosis resulting in a Ghon tubercle, which is defined as "primary lesion in juvenile pulmonary tuberculosis."

  8. Sanchez v. Board of County Commissioners

    313 P.2d 1055 (N.M. 1957)   Cited 18 times

    "* * * It is not necessary that a workman be subjected to an unusual or extraordinary condition, not usual to his employment, for an injury sustained to be termed an accidental one under our law. Webb v. N.M. Pub. Co. and Barton v. Skelly Oil Co. [ 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263], both supra."

  9. Martinez v. Fidel

    61 N.M. 6 (N.M. 1956)   Cited 13 times
    Concluding that slipping on ice while taking one of many possible routes between the office and the employer's parking lot was not an accident incurred in travel "peculiar to [plaintiff's] work"

    The risk of slipping upon the icy pavement was common to the public generally who had occasion to pass over it on foot. Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263. It was a danger due to climatic conditions to which persons in the vicinity, however employed, or if not employed at all, were equally exposed.

  10. Gilbert v. E.B. Law and Son, Inc.

    287 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1955)   Cited 30 times
    Affirming the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that a worker's preexisting condition "would inevitably have caused his death" because such an instruction "does not correctly state the law in that it ignores the proposition that [a preexisting condition] may have been materially aggravated and death accelerated by reason of [a work-related accidental injury]"

    As noted heretofore, counsel for both sides in this case have re-argued the question considered at length in the case of Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 1941, 45 N.M. 354, 115 P.2d 342, whether recovery under our Workmen's Compensation Law may be predicated upon injury without antecedent or distinguishable accident to the workman. While many cases in this jurisdiction have raised facts almost necessitating the resolution of this question, in each of them, as in this case, there was some unlooked for or untoward event distinguishable from the injury. These cases are: Hathaway v. New Mexico State Police, 1953, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P.2d 690; Aranbula v. Banner Min. Co., 1945, 49 N.M. 253, 161 P.2d 867; Webb v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 1943, 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333, 148 A.L.R. 1002; Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 1943, 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263; Henderson v. Texas-New Mexico Pipe Line Co., 1942, 46 N.M. 458, 131 P.2d 269; Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., supra; Christensen v. Dysart, 1938, 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1. We said in the Aranbula case [ 49 N.M. 253, 161 P.2d 869]: