Opinion
No. 40024.
Filed December 4, 1975.
Intoxicating Liquors: Motor Vehicles: Licenses and Permits. On appeal to the District Court under section 60-420, R.R.S. 1943, from an order of the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles made under section 39-669.16, R.R.S. 1943, revoking a motor vehicle operator's license, the burden of proof is on the licensee to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the ground for reversal.
Appeal from the District Court for Dodge County: ROBERT L. FLORY, Judge. Affirmed.
William G. Line of Kerrigan, Line, Martin Hanson, for appellant.
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and Steven C. Smith, for appellee.
Heard before WHITE, C. J., McCOWN, NEWTON, and CLINTON, JJ., and WINDRUM, District Judge.
This is an appeal from an order revoking the driver's license of defendant. Defendant contends that her refusal to take any tests for alcohol under the implied consent law was due to her being confused as to her rights by the reading to her of the Miranda warnings and the implied consent law provisions. We affirm the judgment of the District Court.
The defendant relies on the case of Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W.2d 906, which holds that if such confusion is present it may void a refusal under the implied consent law. The case is not applicable here. The record is entirely devoid of any evidence supporting a claim of confusion. "On appeal to the District Court under section 60-420, R.R.S. 1943, from an order of the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles made under section 39-669.16, R.R.S. 1943, revoking a motor vehicle operator's license, the burden of proof is on the licensee to establish by a preponderance of the evidence the ground for reversal." Mackey v. Director of Department of Motor Vehicles, ante p. 707, 235 N.W.2d 394.
Defendant has failed to maintain her burden of proof and the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.