Opinion
A-14114 0368
04-24-2024
JACOB SAMUEL BARTMAN SR., Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Jacob S. Bartman Sr., in propria persona, Anchorage, Appellant. Kimberly Del Frate, Assistant District Attorney, Palmer, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, Kari C. Kristiansen, Judge Trial Court No. 3PA-20-02037 CR.
Jacob S. Bartman Sr., in propria persona, Anchorage, Appellant.
Kimberly Del Frate, Assistant District Attorney, Palmer, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Jacob Samuel Bartman Sr. pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence and received a sentence of 3 years to serve. After he was sentenced, Bartman filed a pro se motion seeking 549 days of credit against his sentence for time he spent, while on bail release, under electronic monitoring to detect alcohol and participating in intensive outpatient treatment during part of that time.
AS 28.35.030(n).
The superior court denied Bartman's motion as untimely. The court further ruled that Bartman was not entitled to credit because, although he was on pretrial electronic monitoring, he was not ordered to be on house arrest, nor was he court-ordered to attend treatment. Bartman now appeals.
Alaska Statute 12.55.027 governs credit against a sentence of imprisonment for time spent under electronic monitoring or in a treatment program. Under subsection (d), a court may grant credit against a defendant's sentence of imprisonment "for time spent under electronic monitoring if the person has not committed a criminal offense while under electronic monitoring." Bartman argues he met this requirement.
But AS 12.55.027(d) has an additional requirement: the court must have imposed restrictions on the defendant's freedom of movement and behavior while under electronic monitoring, "including requiring the person to be confined to a residence" (except for certain passes). Because Bartman's bail conditions did not restrict him to a residence, the superior court properly found that he does not qualify for credit under AS 12.55.027(d) for his time spent under electronic monitoring.
See Baker v. State, 538 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Alaska App. 2023) (explaining that a defendant may only qualify for sentencing credit under AS 12.55.027(d) if they are "on electronic monitoring" and "confined to their residence" except for specific statutory exceptions).
Under subsections (a)-(b) of AS 12.55.027, a court may grant day-for-day credit toward a defendant's sentence of imprisonment for time spent in certain treatment programs. But a defendant is only entitled to credit for participation in a treatment program if, among other things, their participation in that program was ordered by the court. We agree with the superior court that, because the court did not order Bartman to attend a treatment program as a condition of his pretrial release, he is precluded from receiving credit under AS 12.55.027.
AS 12.55.027(b)(2). We note that the court must also find that the treatment program "places a substantial restriction on the defendant's freedom of movement and behavior" - a question the court did not reach here. AS 12.55.027(a), (c).
Because Bartman is not entitled to credit for his time under electronic monitoring or his time attending treatment, we need not reach the superior court's ruling that Bartman's motion was untimely.
The order of the superior court is AFFIRMED.