Opinion
1 CA-SA 24-0106
12-17-2024
RONALD BARTLETT JR., Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE BRUCE COHEN, Judge of the SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of MARICOPA, Respondent Judge, STATE OF ARIZONA, Real Party in Interest.
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Nicole Ashley Sordello Counsel for Petitioner Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Quinton S. Gregory Counsel for Real Party in Interest
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court.
Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No. CR2018-001182-001 The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix By Nicole Ashley Sordello Counsel for Petitioner
Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix By Quinton S. Gregory Counsel for Real Party in Interest
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Andrew M. Jacobs, Judge
¶1 Ronald Bartlett Jr. asks us to exercise our discretionary special action jurisdiction to review the superior court's grant of the State's request for restitution from him. In January 2021, the superior court terminated Bartlett's probation in an order stating he owed no court-ordered payments. Bartlett is right that under A.R.S. § 13-805(A), the court's order terminating his probation in January 2021 foreclosed the court from ordering, for the first time in August 2023, that he pay restitution. We thus accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 In 2018, after throwing a jar in his then-girlfriend's face, Bartlett pled guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2), and domestic violence, A.R.S. §§ 13-3601, -702. Thereafter, Bartlett was sentenced to five years of supervised probation. The sentencing order stated that the court retained jurisdiction over restitution and ordered restitution would remain open for five years, until August 9, 2023.
¶3 After completing approximately half of his probation term, Bartlett moved to terminate his probation in December 2020. The State and the victim opposed this early termination because of the violent nature of Bartlett's offense. Although the Maricopa County Attorney's Office Victim Compensation Bureau ("Victim Compensation") agreed to pay $4,687.82 to Bartlett's victim before he filed the motion, the State filed no requests for restitution nor did the State voice any intent to seek restitution in response to Bartlett's motion.
¶4 In January 2021, the superior court discharged Bartlett from probation. The court found that, as of the date of Bartlett's motion to terminate probation, there was no balance on his court-ordered financial obligations.
¶5 More than two years passed. On August 7, 2023, the State filed: (1) a Motion to Extend Restitution Deadline and (2) a Motion to Appoint Counsel and Set a Non-Witness Restitution Hearing. The State stated in its motions that, from August 2020 to September 2023, Victim Compensation paid Bartlett's victim $7,789.94, for which the State sought restitution from Bartlett. The superior court granted both motions, ordering the period for restitution open for an additional year, so that the State eventually requested restitution totaling $8,603.96.
¶6 Bartlett filed a Motion to Deny Restitution Request. Citing A.R.S. § 13-805(A), Bartlett argued the superior court lacked jurisdiction over restitution given his discharge from probation with no court-ordered funds owed. The State argued that under Bartlett's 2018 sentencing order, the court retained jurisdiction over restitution until August 9, 2023, despite his probation ending in January 2021.
¶7 The superior court denied Bartlett's motion in part, ruling that the end of his sentence did not divest the court of jurisdiction over restitution. Bartlett's petition for special action followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
¶8 Special action jurisdiction is discretionary. See Potter v. Vanderpool, 225 Ariz. 495, 498 ¶ 6 (App. 2010). Here, the superior court asserted jurisdiction to issue restitution orders years after its order terminating Bartlett's sentence. Because the court lacked jurisdiction to do so, we have special action jurisdiction. Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 3(b) (allowing exercise of jurisdiction when "the defendant has proceeded or is threatening to proceed in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority"); A.R.S. § 12-120.21(4). Whether the superior court had the authority in August 2023 to order restitution from Bartlett is a pure question of law requiring us to interpret A.R.S. § 13-805(A). See Arpaio v. Steinle, 201 Ariz. 353, 354 ¶ 3 (App. 2001) (accepting special action jurisdiction because statutory interpretation raises a pure question of law). Given that the court has not yet issued its contemplated restitution orders, Bartlett lacks an equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by way of appeal. Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 1(a). We thus exercise our discretion and accept jurisdiction.
¶9 We review issues involving statutory construction de novo. Shifflette v. Marner, 255 Ariz. 538, 540 ¶ 6 (App. 2023).
II. Under A.R.S. § 13-805(A), Terminating Bartlett's Probation While Determining That He Owed No Court-Ordered Payments Divested the Superior Court of Jurisdiction over Restitution.
¶10 The State argues A.R.S. § 13-805(A) allowed it to seek restitution from Bartlett in August 2023, despite the January 2021 order ending his probation and finding he owed no court-ordered sums, citing State v. Pinto, 179 Ariz. 593 (App. 1994). The State further argues that Pinto allows it to move for restitution for a reasonable period of time after Bartlett's sentence ends, and that two and one-half years is reasonable delay. Bartlett argues the plain language of A.R.S. § 13-805(A) extinguished the court's jurisdiction to order restitution when his sentence ended, and that even if some delay was allowed, as a matter of law, two and one-half years is an unreasonable, and thus impermissible, delay. As we next explain, we reject the State's position and grant Bartlett the relief he requests.
¶11 The legislature granted the superior court jurisdiction "for purposes of ordering, modifying and enforcing the manner in which court-ordered [restitution] payments are made[.]" A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1). This grant of authority is broad - the superior court retains jurisdiction to make such orders "until [they are] paid in full or until the defendant's sentence expires." Id.
¶12 We have previously rejected Bartlett's argument that the superior court's jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1) expires simply because a defendant's sentence ends, as Bartlett's did here. Pinto, 179 Ariz. at 596. Nor does the superior court's jurisdiction expire simply because restitution is "paid in full." Id. To the contrary, the superior court's jurisdiction survives until both court-ordered restitution has been paid, and the defendant's sentence is served. Id. (holding that the superior "court retains jurisdiction to modify the manner in which court-ordered payments are made until such time that the amount has been paid in full, or defendant's sentence expires, whichever occurs last[]") (emphasis altered).
¶13 The problem with the State's position is that despite the generous grant of jurisdiction in A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1), both of those events (the end of Bartlett's sentence and recognition that he owed no court-ordered sums) occurred in January 2021. That was more than two and one-half years before the State sought an order for restitution in August 2023. Accordingly, the January 2021 order terminating Bartlett's sentence and determining he owed nothing foreclosed the superior court's jurisdiction to enter later restitution orders. Pinto, 179 Ariz. at 596.
¶14 The plain language of A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1) reinforces this conclusion. The grant of jurisdiction, that expired here in January 2021, was jurisdiction to "order[], modify[] and enforc[e] the manner in which court-ordered [restitution] payments are made." A.R.S. 13-805(A)(I). But the State did not seek restitution by that time, so there was no "court-ordered payment[]" to order, modify, or enforce. See id. Though it had paid some restitution to Bartlett's victim in August 2020, the State did not tell the court about the payment. To the contrary, neither the State nor the victim objected to the early termination of Bartlett's sentence of probation on the ground that he owed, or might later owe, restitution. The court thus made the findings that terminate jurisdiction - Bartlett owed no court-ordered sums, and his sentence was at an end.
¶15 The State argues it could seek restitution two and one-half years after Bartlett's sentence ended because, under Pinto, "the trial court may consider a petition for entry of civil judgment which is filed within a reasonable time after the period of probation is completed." 179 Ariz. at 596. But this misreads both Pinto and A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1). Pinto was a case in which there was still unpaid court-ordered restitution when the sentence ended. We held that in such a case, a court may fashion additional orders to enforce a victim's rights to restitution - which is what A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1) says. But we did not hold that, after a sentence ended with no restitution owed, the court could issue new restitution orders years later. Nor does A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1) authorize such a practice.
¶16 Moreover, even if A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1) authorized that practice - and it does not - we explained in Pinto that post-sentence petitions to modify orders concerning unpaid restitution had to be filed "within a reasonable time after the period of probation is completed." 179 Ariz. at 596. Without determining precisely what a "reasonable time" is to wait before bringing forward a request for restitution, we reject the State's argument that two and one-half years after probation ended could be such a "reasonable time." The State here paid the victim restitutionary funds in August 2020 and waited to come forward to seek reimbursement for three years. As a matter of law, the delay here was not for a "reasonable time."
¶17 The State's reliance on our unpublished decision in State v. Cervantes is likewise unavailing. No. 1 CA-CR 18-0224, 2019 WL 3424978 (Ariz. App. July 30, 2019) (mem. decision). There, as in Pinto, an incarcerated defendant argued that when the superior court sentenced him to imprisonment, A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1) divested the superior court of jurisdiction to modify any then-unpaid award of restitution. Id. at *1 ¶ 5. As in Pinto, we rejected that defendant's cramped reading of A.R.S. § 13-805(A)(1) and reaffirmed that "the legislature provided the court continuing jurisdiction to regulate the payment of restitution until a defendant has: (1) satisfied the debt; (2) completed his incarceration or probation; or (3) absconded from supervision entirely." Id. at *2 ¶ 8. Cervantes thus reaffirms that A.R.S. § 13-805(A) means what it says. The superior court had jurisdiction over Bartlett until both his court-ordered payments were made and he had completed his sentence. Here, those two conditions were present in January 2021. Accordingly, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter restitution orders in August 2023.
¶18 Finally, we reject the State's argument that the superior court's 2018 sentencing order stating that restitution would remain open for the five-year period of Bartlett's sentence conferred jurisdiction on the court to enter new restitution orders up until August 9, 2023. The order does not modify A.R.S. § 13-805(A), which gives the State until the end of a sentence or the payment of any court-ordered obligations to make a request for restitution. The order is merely consistent with the requirement of A.R.S. § 13-805(A), that restitution be permitted until at least the end of a sentence. Here, the superior court modified Bartlett's sentence in 2021. The State knew it had advanced sums to the victim for restitution, but inexplicably failed to advise the court. The State, likewise, failed to object to the termination of probation on the grounds of pending or anticipated restitution. It is not for us to rewrite the statute to allow the State, years later, to recover from Bartlett what it has already paid the victim.
CONCLUSION
¶19 For the reasons stated, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief. The superior court shall issue an order declining jurisdiction over the State's requests for restitution.