Opinion
Supreme Court No. S-12053.
December 12, 2007.
Appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, John Suddock, Judge, Superior Court No. 3AN-04-4414 CI.
Herman G. Walker, Jr., and Lynda A. Limón, Lynda A. Limón, Attorneys at Law, Anchorage, for Appellant. Denise M. Ingebo, pro se, The Dalles, Oregon.
Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Matthews, Eastaugh, Bryner, and Carpeneti, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
Entered pursuant to Appellate Rule 214.
I. INTRODUCTION
When Denise Ingebo and Gerald Barth began their relationship, both earned good incomes, Ingebo owned a valuable home encumbered with one mortgage of about $40,000, and Barth had essentially no assets. When they separated, Barth's annual cash flow approached $100,000, illness had significantly diminished Ingebo's earning capacity, and Ingebo's mortgages on her house had grown to more than $300,000. The superior court found substantial disparity in the parties' economic circumstances, awarded the small marital estate to Ingebo, and concluded that equity warranted requiring Barth to make monthly payments to Ingebo from his pension proceeds to meet her reasonable needs and compensate her for the mortgages she took out to support the family during the relationship. We conclude that the findings underlying this result were not clearly erroneous and that the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Barth to make payments totaling $55,000 from his separate property. We therefore affirm.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Factual History
Denise Ingebo and Gerald Barth began a relationship in 1989 and by 1991 or 1992 were living together and acting as a marital unit. They married in 1997, separated in late 2003 or early 2004, and divorced in 2005.
Although this appeal is captioned Barth v. Barth, the superior court granted Ingebo's request to restore her maiden name.
When the parties met, Ingebo lived with her son and daughter (born in 1980 and 1984, respectively) from a previous marriage. Ingebo owned a Washington state home, valued at the time of trial at more than $400,000, that she bought in 1986 and that was subject to a mortgage of about $40,000 as of the early 1990s. Ingebo viewed the house as "her nest egg." When their relationship began Barth had no assets; he had declared bankruptcy in 1989 or 1990. Both parties worked on the North Slope and earned good incomes.
It is unclear what value the home had in the early 1990s, when Barth and Ingebo began functioning as a marital unit.
Ingebo moved from Washington to Alaska and began living with Barth in his mother's home in the early nineties. From then on the couple appears to have acted as a financial and familial unit. Ingebo testified that she paid off Barth's student loans in 1992. She also testified that around that time Barth accompanied Ingebo on a trip to Portland, Oregon, to deal with Ingebo's former husband on issues such as child support. Ingebo also testified that Barth listed her son as his dependent on his tax return for 1996. The couple married in August 1997.
Barth became eligible in about 1998 to start drawing on his operating engineers pension, which he had earned before he married Ingebo. He declined to add Ingebo as a survivor, so she has no rights to that pension. Barth did not pay taxes on his pension payments, so he began accruing penalties and interest, apparently causing Ingebo to file separate tax returns from 2001 forward.
Ingebo was injured in a 1998 auto accident that led to a condition called reflex sympathetic dystrophy (RSD). Ingebo's physician explained that RSD is "a regional pain syndrome that usually develops after tissue trauma." She testified that Ingebo's daily activities will continue to be impaired and that she will have to be on high doses of narcotic drugs for the rest of her life.
Ingebo refinanced the Washington house in 1998, and the couple bought a townhouse in Kenai around that time. Ingebo made the townhouse down payment with settlement proceeds from an unrelated prior lawsuit. She put the Kenai townhouse in Barth's name only to help him establish a credit record after his bankruptcy.
In early 2001 Ingebo moved her daughter to Washington because Ingebo and Barth were working on the North Slope. Ingebo moved to Washington soon after and commuted to the North Slope, but moved back to Alaska in the summer of 2002. Barth did not support the family from early 2001 until June of 2002 because Ingebo was in Washington. In 2002 and 2003 Ingebo again refinanced the Washington home to pay off credit card accounts and bills.
The couple separated in late 2003 or early 2004. Ingebo has tried to find work, either in her prior field or otherwise, but, except for a job as a waitress, her RSD and other factors have prevented her from finding work. She again refinanced the house in 2004. The superior court estimated Ingebo's earning capacity at the time of trial at about $22,000 per year, and estimated Barth's earning capacity at the time of trial at about $100,000 per year, including his pension. As a result of mortgages Ingebo took out before, during, and after the marriage, the total debt on the Washington house exceeded $300,000 at the time of trial.
B. Procedural History
Barth filed for divorce in February 2004. The trial to divide the parties' property began in August 2004; both parties had counsel. After two days of trial, the court issued preliminary findings from the bench, chastised the parties for failing to put together a coherent case, instructed them how to proceed, and scheduled recommencement of the trial in two months. The court specifically advised the parties to treat the Washington house as Ingebo's separate property, to hire a bookkeeper to track the parties' income and expenses, and to treat the case as a tracing case in which Ingebo was to show how much money from the Washington house mortgages went towards marital expenses.
Trial resumed for one day in December 2004 and was to begin again in March 2005. On March 4, 2005 Ingebo's attorney moved to withdraw, citing lack of payment and problems communicating and working with Ingebo. The superior court granted the motion and when trial resumed, Ingebo represented herself pro se. On June 27 the court put its decision on record from the bench and also issued an abbreviated written "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce."
The court ruled that Barth was obligated to support Ingebo's children until they reached the age of majority. The court also found that about $100,000 from the Washington house mortgages had been spent on marital expenses. After valuing the couple's assets and liabilities, the court awarded Ingebo marital property of about $10,000.
The court noted a great disparity in earning capacity between the parties, finding Ingebo's earning capacity to be about $22,000 a year and Barth's to be $100,000 a year. Based on this disparity and other equitable considerations, the court invaded Barth's separate property (the monthly payments on his pension and his future earnings) to award Ingebo an additional $55,000. The court reached this figure by first subtracting from the amount it found Ingebo had spent from the house mortgages on marital expenses ($100,000) the amount of marital property it had awarded Ingebo ($10,000) and then awarding her about sixty percent of the resulting $90,000. The court ordered Barth to discharge the resulting $55,000 obligation by paying Ingebo $1,350 per month for forty-one months from his future earnings and pension payments.
Barth objected to the findings and the award. The court did not reconsider its findings, but clarified them at a September 2005 hearing. Barth appeals.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
The equitable division of marital assets involves three steps: (1) characterization of property as either separate or marital; (2) valuation of the marital property; and (3) equitable allocation of the marital property between the parties. The superior court has broad discretion in fashioning a property division in a divorce action. The court's characterization of property as marital or separate can involve both questions of fact and questions of law. We review findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard, and rulings on questions of law under the de novo standard. We review valuation of property for clear error. Distribution of assets is reviewed for abuse of discretion; we will overturn a distribution only if it is clearly unjust. Whether the equities of a case require invasion of a spouse's separate assets is reviewed for abuse of discretion. B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Awarding Ingebo $55,000 from the Monthly Payments on Barth's Separate Pension.
Rodvik v. Rodvik, 151 P.3d 338, 343 (Alaska 2006) (citing Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 570 (Alaska 1983)); Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 330 (Alaska 2006).
Odom, 141 P.3d at 330.
Id.
Id.
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 88 P.3d 1116, 1122 (Alaska 2004).
Odom, 141 P.3d at 330.
Id.
1. Characterization, valuation, and division of property
Per the first step, the superior court found that two significant assets were the parties' separate property: Ingebo's Washington house and Barth's operating engineers pension. After valuing the marital assets per step two, including the Kenai townhouse and the parties' automobiles, the court found marital equity of about $10,000. The court's allocation of the various marital assets and debts in step three left Ingebo with about $10,000 and Barth with-$413.
The court found that a substantial marital estate would have warranted a sixty-forty division of marital assets in Ingebo's favor. But because there was such a small marital estate, the court determined that balancing the equities required invasion of Barth's separate property (his future payments on his pension and future earnings) to award Ingebo $55,000. As noted above, it reached this figure by approximating sixty percent of $90,000. The court calculated the $100,000 in marital expenses by starting with the then-current debt on the home: $300,000. It then subtracted "the $40,000 [mortgage] that existed at the time of the marriage" and the $27,000 post-separation mortgage. The court also subtracted several nonmarital expenses: $50,000 Ingebo lost in the stock market, $50,000 Ingebo spent on a year of college for each of her children, and about $30,000 for "money expended after the children became 18 years old and . . . odds and ends for the Washington house." This left the court with a "ball park" figure of $100,000 "from the refinances [that] went into the marriage."
2. Marital debt
We note initially that the superior court would have been well within its discretion to categorize as marital any debt (including the loans on the Washington house) accumulated while the parties were legally married, and to divide it between the parties. Absent any showing that the parties intended it to be separate, a debt incurred during the marriage is presumptively marital. This is so regardless of whether the debt was secured with separate property, or whether only one spouse's name appears on the loan documents. In Alaska "the burden is on the nonincurring spouse to prove that the debt is nonmarital." Thus it would have been within the superior court's discretion in step one to categorize as marital the Washington house debt incurred during the marriage and to divide the debt under step three.
Ginn-Williams v. Williams, 143 P.3d 949, 956 (Alaska 2006) (citing Veselsky v. Veselsky, 113 P.3d 629, 636 (Alaska 2005)) (holding that auto loan and second mortgage were marital debts even though wife's name was not on either loan).
See 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 6:97, at 502-03 (3d ed. 2005).
Id. at 501-02 (citing Coffland v. Coffland, 4 P.3d 317 (Alaska 2000)).
3. Debt incurred during premarital cohabitation
A substantial proportion of the debt the superior court included in its calculations was incurred during the period of premarital cohabitation. Ingebo owed about $40,000 on the Washington house as of 1993, about the time the parties began their familial relationship, but by the time they married in August 1997 Ingebo owed about $114,000 on the house. Thus, the $40,000 figure the court cites as the mortgage at the time of marriage predates the formal marriage by four years.
Barth cites Harrelson v. Harrelson for the proposition that Alaska law does not permit the court to include in the division of property those assets and debts accumulated during premarital cohabitation time. What the Harrelson court actually held was that if the superior court determines that equity requires an invasion of premarital property, it must do so under AS 25.24.160. In Harrelson the superior court had incorrectly found that the marriage lasted eight years, when it had actually lasted approximately two and a half years, with several years of a marriage-like relationship before the actual marriage. We reversed and remanded because we were unable to determine "to what extent the court's treatment of the duration of the marriage influenced the property division." We noted that "[o]n remand, the court is free to consider the parties' premarital cohabitation as long as it makes the proper property distinction mandated by Murray and AS 25.24.160(a)(4)."
Harrelson v. Harrelson, 932 P.2d 247, 250-51 (Alaska 1997) (noting that superior court may consider premarital cohabitation in its equitable weighing but that it must "observe the distinction . . . between assets acquired prior to and during coverture" (quoting Murray v. Murray, 788 P.2d 41, 42 (Alaska 1990))).
Harrelson, 932 P.2d at 251.
Id. at 249-50.
Id. at 251.
Id; see also AS 25.24.160(a)(4) (providing "for the division between the parties of their property . . . acquired only during marriage" but allowing for the invasion of separate property when fairness requires).
Similarly, in Murray v. Murray we held that
so long as the parties do marry, the trial court is free to consider the parties' entire relationship, including any period(s) of premarital cohabitation, in making its property division under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), so long as the court observes the distinction which AS 25.24.160(a)(4) draws between assets acquired prior to and during coverture.
Murray v. Murray, 788 P.2d 41, 42 (Alaska 1990) (footnote omitted) (remanding to "superior court to distinguish separate from marital assets; to assess whether the equities require invasion of separate assets under AS 25.24.160(a)(4); and if so, then to enter explicit findings to that effect").
More recently, in Chase v. Chase we held that the superior court properly categorized properties as marital even though they had been acquired during the period of premarital cohabitation. We concluded that "[u]nder the rule articulated in Murray and Faulkner, the superior court appropriately deemed these properties marital by virtue of the fact that the parties lived together and later married."
Chase v. Chase, 109 P.3d 942, 947 (Alaska 2005).
Id. (citing Murray, 788 P.2d at 42 and Faulkner v. Goldfuss, 46 P.3d 993, 1003 (Alaska 2002) (holding that superior court erred in basing marital share of wife's pension on duration of marriage rather than duration of cohabitation)).
Because the superior court here found that there was a continuous relationship that began in 1991 or 1992 and led to marriage, it is at least arguable that Chase would have permitted the superior court to treat all of the post-1992 Washington house debt as marital.
But we do not need to decide here whether the court should have done so because it instead chose to treat the loan proceeds as if they were separate property that was largely spent for the mutual benefit of the family during the entire period of the relationship. The court stated that the money that came out of the Washington house to defray marital expenses was "not literally a loan to the marriage that is now a liability of the marriage, but it's a decided[ly] equitable consideration for the Court to deal with."
4. Balancing the equities under AS 25.24.160(a)(4)
Under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), after defining the marital property, valuing it, and dividing it, the court may invade the separate property of either spouse "when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it." Alaska Statute 25.24.160 provides in part:
(a) In a judgment in an action for divorce or action declaring a marriage void or at any time after judgment, the court may provide
. . . .
(4) for the division between the parties of their property, including retirement benefits, whether joint or separate, acquired only during marriage, in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault; however, the court, in making the division, may invade the property, including retirement benefits, of either spouse acquired before marriage when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it; and to accomplish this end the judgment may require that one or both of the parties assign, deliver, or convey any of their real or personal property, including retirement benefits, to the other party; the division of property must fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce by being based on consideration of the following factors:
(A) the length of the marriage and station in life of the parties during the marriage;
(B) the age and health of the parties;
(C) the earning capacity of the parties, including their educational backgrounds, training, employment skills, work experiences, length of absence from the job market, and custodial responsibilities for children during the marriage;
(D) the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance;
(E) the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets;
(F) the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live in it for a reasonable period of time, to the party who has primary physical custody of children;
(G) the circumstances and necessities of each party;
(H) the time and manner of acquisition of the property in question; and
(I) the income-producing capacity of the property and the value of the property at the time of division.
Here the superior court explicitly invaded Barth's separate pension to repay Ingebo for some of the marital expenses she had paid with the proceeds of loans on her Washington house. In finding that an invasion of Barth's pension was necessary, the superior court noted that it was relying on the Merrill factors, which are the equitable factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4):
Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 548 n. 4 (Alaska 1962) (remanding divorce award of $35,000 so superior court could make appropriate findings of fact regarding its property division, and naming principal factors the court should consider in dividing property).
When you look at this deal, they've got a dramatically different earning capacity. He makes approximately $95,000 a year between his earned income and his pension. She's been out of work for a substantial period of time, is in questionable health, has depreciated skills — I think as a [$]20,000, $22,000 a year person.
So she's got a significant health problem which Mr. Barth wants to wash his hands of, takes no continuing responsibility for, but she's got to take continuing responsibility for it. It occurred during the marriage. It's a long relationship. They lived together for — or cohabited for about . . . six years before they were actually married and it's about a six-year marriage. You're talking about order of magnitude 12-year involvement here.
The superior court should only invade separate property if it is unable to "use the marital estate to balance the equities between the parties in light of the parties' reasonable needs." There was ample evidence here that "the reasonable needs of the parties" required an award exceeding the available $10,000. The parties began functioning as a unit long before they were married. Ingebo came to the relationship with a valuable home on which she owed only about $40,000 and a career as a safety engineer. She left the relationship with little or no equity and a vastly reduced earning capacity. Barth, on the other hand, came to the relationship with no assets and what the superior court characterized as "a stellar earning capacity and a pension," and he left with the same.
Odom v. Odom, 141 P.3d 324, 340 (Alaska 2006).
Id. at 341.
The superior court made extensive findings regarding the disparity between Ingebo's expenses and earning capacity and Barth's. His earning capacity is almost $100,000, while hers is approximately $22,000. He is in good health, while she suffers from a debilitating disease contracted during the marriage. Ingebo's medication costs $800 to $1,000 per month. She is basically destitute: during trial her telephone service was shut off, and her lawyer was permitted to withdraw, in part because she could not pay him. Her house is now mortgaged for more than $300,000, a $260,000 increase since their relationship began. The superior court did not clearly err in finding that she would suffer true economic hardship if it did not invade Barth's separate assets.
See 2 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 8:33, at 942 n. 6 (3d ed. 2005) (acknowledging that although this court has often given AS 25.24.160 a narrow reading, but supposing we have done so because we have "not faced, in the past few years, a case in which true economic hardship was present").
The court reasoned that equity required invasion of Barth's separate assets to reflect the change in Ingebo's financial status as a result of their relationship. In effect, the court treated the amounts Ingebo spent on the marriage from the mortgage as a loan and chose to remedy the decline in Ingebo's finances by invading Barth's right to receive his pension and future earnings. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court abused its discretion.
5. Barth's arguments
Washington house mortgage. Barth raises a number of objections to the superior court's findings and methodology. He first argues that it was error for the court to find that the Washington house mortgage as of the date of the marriage was $40,000. As noted above, it is arguable that under Chase the superior court could have classified the debts incurred by the parties during premarital cohabitation as marital in nature. But here, although the court attempted to value the Washington home for purposes of dividing the debt, it did so as an equitable consideration under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), rather than as part of the initial steps of defining property as marital and valuing it. The equitable factors cited by the court adequately support its decision to invade Barth's pension and future earnings to repay Ingebo for a portion of the money she spent on the relationship and to provide for her reasonable needs. It was thus not reversible error for the court to describe the $40,000 mortgage as existing as of the date of marriage because the court used this mortgage figure in the balancing-of-the-equities phase, rather than in the characterization-or valuation-of-marital-assets phase.
Chase, 109 P.3d at 947.
Cf. Odom, 141 P.3d at 339. In Odom we reversed the superior court's invasion of separate assets because the superior court had resorted to invasion before adequately considering the option of unequally dividing the marital estate. Id. We instructed the lower court to consider the Merrill factors, with a particular emphasis on the length of the marriage, the conduct of the parties during marriage, "the manner of acquisition of the property, its value at the time of acquisition and at the time of the property division, and any other factors bearing on whether the equities dictate that the other spouse is entitled to share in that property." Id. at 339-41 (quoting Sampson v. Sampson, 14 P.3d 272, 278 (Alaska 2000)).
Rough estimates. Barth next objects that the court used "speculative estimations" to determine how much of the Washington house loans were spent on marital expenses. The superior court has broad discretion in fashioning a property division in a divorce action. Here the court made a number of attempts to induce the parties to provide more specific evidence. After several failed attempts at clarifying the financial situation, the court decided that its "attempts to get crystal clarity were beyond the power . . . of the parties to produce in this litigation or at least [the court's] power to induce them to produce." Given the lack of clear evidence produced by the parties, and the court's attempts at clarification, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in using rough estimates in its calculations.
Rodvik v. Rodvik, 151 P.3d 338, 343 (Alaska 2006).
Most notably, the court asked the parties to retain a bookkeeper to collect, organize and present the mass of confusing financial information in the case. The court noted that "[i]nstead what [it] got was an undigested presentation by a witness who had been directed to utilize some non-standard accounting techniques."
Furthermore, the amounts the court estimated and subtracted from the debt as nonmarital expenses were not de minimis. It reduced the "marital" portion of the debt by $50,000 for Ingebo's stock market expenditures, $50,000 for her children's college education expenditures, and approximately $30,000 for home expenses and post-majority expenses for the children. These substantial deductions were likely to have captured many of Ingebo's largest separate expenses.
Finally, the court's calculations were all aimed at estimating a reasonably fair amount to award Ingebo under the equitable considerations of AS 25.24.160(a)(4). The superior court therefore did not abuse its discretion in basing its calculations on rough estimates.
Burden of proof. Barth next argues that the superior court effectively reversed the burden of proof by requiring Barth to prove nonmarital expenses rather than requiring Ingebo to show marital expenses. We disagree. Although the court started with a "marital" figure from which it subtracted nonmarital expenses, it did so out of necessity, not to impose the burden of proof on Barth. The record does not show that the court imposed the burden on Barth to prove that particular expenses were nonmarital. The court did not state that Barth had failed to meet his burden to show that particular expenses were nonmarital. Rather, the court repeatedly used the phrase "there was testimony that" in explaining its estimate of marital expenses. Moreover, marital expenses, by their sheer quantity, are potentially harder to track than nonmarital expenses. They include all of the minor and routine expenses of daily life. Especially given the lack of clear financial evidence in this case, there would have been no realistic way for the court to add up marital expenses that Ingebo paid with the proceeds of her mortgages.
See T URNER, supra note 24, § 6:107, at 577-78 (noting that living expenses, including food, clothing, housing, transportation, and medical costs are valid marital expenses).
Due Process. Barth next contends that he was denied due process because the superior court's estimating procedure denied him the opportunity to challenge the reasonableness and character of Ingebo's marital expenses. Ingebo asserts that this argument is missing from her copy of Barth's brief.
Regardless of whether Barth might have waived this argument by allegedly failing to properly serve Ingebo, his argument is unconvincing. Barth admits that both parties had the opportunity at trial to present extensive evidence regarding finances. The superior court stated that it was relying on "the testimony of [Barth and Ingebo] and . . . the various accountants or bookkeepers that have testified" in estimating marital expenses. The court's finding that Ingebo was more credible than Barth on a number of points was well within its discretion. The superior court did not deny Barth due process. Ingebo's children. Finally, Barth contends that it was error for the superior court to allow the costs of supporting Ingebo's children from a prior marriage to be calculated as marital expenses. The superior court found that Barth agreed to be the children's stepfather and support them, and that he was therefore obligated to support them for the duration of the marriage, or until they turned eighteen. It therefore declined to treat those expenses as non-marital and to deduct them when it calculated what part of the mortgage proceeds Ingebo had spent on the family in the equitable balancing phase of the case.
See Hicks v. Pleasants, 158 P.3d 817, 826 (Alaska 2007) (noting that "[i]t is plainly within the trial court's province to make factual determinations based on witness credibility").
We first note that Barth is not raising a child support issue. Barth does not assert that the superior court erroneously required him to pay child support for Ingebo's children. His contention is instead that the court did not properly deduct the children's expenses in calculating its property division.
Barth argues that absent an express agreement, a stepparent in Alaska is not obligated to support stepchildren. Because he entered into no such agreement, he argues that the court should have subtracted costs of supporting the children from what Barth must repay Ingebo for marital expenses.
"At common law, a stepparent-stepchild relationship imposes no obligations and confers no benefits on either the stepparent or the child." Some states have departed from the common law and require stepparents to support stepchildren for the duration of the marriage, but Alaska imposes no such requirement. We nonetheless conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Barth accepted as marital expenses the costs of supporting Ingebo's children before and during the marriage.
Dewey v. Dewey, 886 P.2d 623, 625 (Alaska 1994) (quoting Burgess v. Burgess, 710 P.2d 417, 422 (Alaska 1985)).
Id.
This finding does not include the children's college education costs, which the superior court explicitly counted as Ingebo's separate expense.
At trial, the parties disputed whether Barth had agreed to support Ingebo's children. The superior court found Ingebo to be more credible as to this issue, and therefore determined that Barth was "obligated to support the children until they become 18." The court noted that Barth had "testified that as of the date of the marriage he considered himself the stepfather of the children." It further relied on Ingebo's testimony that before the couple married, when Ingebo's daughter was young, Barth accompanied Ingebo on a trip to Portland to work out child support issues with her former husband. The court noted that Barth "talked [Ingebo] out of pursuing child support from her former husband and at the end, she waived that and did not get it." The superior court found that Barth's conduct in persuading Ingebo not to pursue child support "only makes sense in the context of their relationship and his commitment to substitute in as willing to help support these children."
Thus, even if, as Barth argues, he did not explicitly agree to support Ingebo's children, given the court's findings, the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to deduct the children's pre-majority expenses from its calculation of marital expenses.
IV. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment below.