Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-8216.
May 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Keith Bartell is an inmate at SCI Dallas. In 1998, the Philadelphia Prison System ("PPS") deemed him an "escape risk" and placed him in administrative segregation during three periods of incarceration at Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility ("CFCF") between 1998 and 2001. Bartell persistently contested his designation as an escape risk, and on October 18, 2001, the Warden of CFCF, defendant Walter Dunleavy, restored him to the status of an ordinary inmate.
Bartell subsequently initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and with the assistance of appointed counsel, he filed an amended complaint asserting that the defendants violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in their individual and official capacities.
We thank Matthew Hubbard, Esq., for accepting the appointment and for his unfailingly courteous and constructive participation in this matter.
Before us is the defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons provided below, we grant the motion and enter judgment in the defendants' favor.
Factual Background
According to the record, Bartell was on writ from SCI Dallas in late 1998 when guards discovered that he had $200 in cash and a phone card. They also received information that Bartell was asking around his pod for tools he could use to carry out an escape and that he had a "prior escape charge." Def.'s Ex. 4.B. Based on this information, PPS deemed Bartell an escape risk. Pursuant to PPS's written policy concerning prisoners who are designated as escape risks, CFCF officials placed him in administrative segregation from December 3, 1998 to March 29, 1999, when he apparently returned to SCI Dallas. He was again designated an escape risk from August 7, 2001 to August 14, 2001 and from October 2, 2001 to October 16, 2001.
Bartell challenged his first period of administrative segregation by filing grievance slips and by attempting to show prison officials a court order dismissing the escape charge.See Pl.'s Dep. at 21:18-23, 29:3-30:12. He has testified that Lieutenant Slocum denied his requests for grievance slips during his week's stay at CFCF in August of 2001. Id. at 42:5-12. CFCF officials convened a status hearing immediately upon Bartell's return to the facility on October 2, 2001, and they again placed him in administrative segregation after concluding that he was an escape risk and, in any event, was "in transfer status to a higher security facility." Defs.' Ex. 4.G. On October 18th, however, Warden Walter Dunleavy reviewed Bartell's status and removed the escape risk designation from his record. Id. Discussion
The defendants' motion argues that Bartell's claims arising from his 1998-1999 stint at CFCF are barred by the statute of limitations. As to the two periods of administrative segregation in 2001, the defendants contend that Bartell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies in August, that they cannot be liable for any deprivation of Bartell's rights in 2001 because there is no evidence of their personal involvement in his treatment, see Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988), and that, in any event, the doctrine of qualified immunity shields them.
Bartell acknowledges that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on his claims arising from the 1998-1999 period, and he concedes that he lacks sufficient evidence of the defendants' personal involvement in his treatment at CFCF in 2001 to pursue his claims against them in their individual capacities. However, Bartell notes that the complaint also names the defendants in their official capacities and argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants are liable under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See Pl.'s Resp. at 4;see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55 ("Since official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent . . . local government officials sued in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983 in those cases in which . . . a local government would be suable in its own name.").
As Bartell notes, his concession concerning the defendants' individual liability moots the issue of qualified immunity.
To establish the defendants' liability in their official capacities, Bartell must show that the violation of his rights was caused by either a policy or a custom of the municipality.Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir.). A policy is an "official proclamation, policy, or edict" made by a decisionmaker with final authority to establish municipal policy.Id. Customs are "practices of state officials . . . so permanent and well settled as to virtually constitute law." Id.
Here, Bartell argues that a jury could infer from the PPS officials' disposition of his complaints that they were deliberately indifferent to his rights and that their treatment of his grievances "rose to a customary level of depriving Plaintiff of his right to grieve improper prison conditions and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment during his detention at CFCF." Pl.'s Resp. at 4.
This argument does not withstand scrutiny. Bartell has not come forward with evidence showing that PPS officials ignored other prisoners' complaints regarding their confinement in administrative segregation at CFCF or designation as escape risks.
As to Bartell's own periods of confinement, his treatment does not support the inference that PPS had a custom of ignoring the grievances of prisoners who complain about administrative segregation or retaliating against them for speaking out. Even if PPS officials ignored his efforts in 1998-1999 to prove that his prior escape charge had been dismissed, they considered his complaints and cannot be faulted for deeming him an escape risk in view of their findings concerning his conduct in December. Moreover, their treatment of Bartell's grievances in October of 2001 are hardly evidence of a custom because he, in fact, prevailed when Warden Dunleavy reviewed his status on October 18th.
The only conduct, then, from which a jury could infer the existence of a custom would be Lieutenant Slocum's refusal to give Bartell grievance slips during his week at CFCF in August of 2001. However, as Justice Brennan has noted, a single incident of misbehavior by a single official cannot be the sole support for an inference that a municipal custom caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 832 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Bartell and drawing all inferences in his favor, there is no evidence here from which a jury could infer the existence of a municipal custom of deliberate indifference to the rights of prisoners in administrative segregation. We therefore conclude that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on all claims against them in their official capacities.
Having reached this conclusion, we need not determine whether Bartell exhausted his claims arising from his treatment in August of 2001.
It is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of May, 2004, defendants having requested that the Court amend the caption of this case to reflect the fact that plaintiff's surname is actually Bartell,see Defs.' Mem. (Mot. S.J.) at 2 n. 1, citing Pl.'s Dep. at 6:4-24, it is hereby ORDERED that:1. The request is GRANTED; and
2. The Clerk of Court shall SUBSTITUTE "Keith Bartell" as the plaintiff in this action.