The issue of when the Mother discovered or should have discovered any alleged misappropriation of fraud presents a question for the trier of fact. Barrington v. Hembree , 193 Okla. 340, 143 P.2d 614, 616 (1943) (“[T]he question of whether an action is barred by the statute limitations in any particular case is one of fact where the facts are in dispute.”). Not knowing when the Defendant's alleged misdeeds should have been discovered, this Court cannot say at this time when the applicable statute limitations began to run or expired.

"[T]he question of whether an action is barred by the statute of limitations in any particular case is one of fact where the facts are in dispute." Barrington v. Hembree, 193 Okla. 340, 341, 143 P.2d 614, 616 (1943). The fact question disputed in this matter is when Lovelace acquired "sufficient information which, if pursued, would lead to the true condition of things . . . to start the running of the statute of limitations."

Plaintiff next contends that the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence, but is contrary to the weight of the evidence. The action was originally brought to recover the balance due on the contract, and to foreclose a lien upon the property, but when the case came on for trial plaintiff withdrew his application to foreclose the lien, and the case proceeded as one for the recovery of money due. As originally brought the case was a jury case, since there was an issue as to the indebtedness due. Jones v. Benson, 158 Okla. 25, 12 P.2d 202; Barrington v. Hembree, 193 Okla. 340, 143 P.2d 614. As finally tried it was simply an action on a money demand, a jury case tried to the court without the intervention of a jury. The evidence was conflicting, and in such case, if there was any evidence tending to support the judgment of the trial court, this court will not reverse for insufficient evidence.

The plaintiff is asking for a personal judgment and foreclosure of mortgage and defendants claim satisfaction of the debt. In Barrington v. Hembree, 193 Okla. 340, 143 P.2d 614, in connection with 12 O. S. 1941 § 556, we said in the first paragraph of the syllabus: "A suit to recover a personal judgment upon a promissory note and to foreclose a mortgage securing the same is not an action of equitable cognizance, but one for the recovery of money, wherein the parties are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right on the question as to recovery of money."

The record demonstrates the present action is a suit on a note for a personal money judgment and foreclosure of the mortgage securing it, with a counterclaim for damages. A suit to recover a personal money judgment upon a note and to foreclose a mortgage securing it is not an action of equitable cognizance, but one for the recovery of money in which both parties are entitled to a jury trial as a matter of statutory right. Frame v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office, 196 Okla. 292, 164 P.2d 865 (1946); Barrington v. Hembree, 193 Okla. 340, 143 P.2d 614 (1944); Philbrick v. Puritan Corp., 178 Okla. 489, 63 P.2d 38 (1936); Collins v. Industrial Sav. Society, 78 Okla. 319, 190 P. 670 (1920). The denial of a jury trial where required by statute is a clear violation of statutory right for which a new trial should be ordered.