Opinion
CIVIL ACTION L-03-113
January 22, 2004
U.S. CIRCUIT JUDGE PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE GEORGE P. KAZEN, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE LEE H. ROSENTHAL
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Still pending is Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint. (Docket No. 13) The proposed amended complaint was intended to address fines and other sanctions threatened and/or imposed against the plaintiff Senators at a time when they were deliberately absenting themselves from the Second Special Session of 2003. The amendment first alleged that these sanctions imposed "new qualifications and requirements for holders of elected office," in violation of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs also alleged that the threats violated the due process, equal protection, ex post facto, and bill of attainder clauses of the federal Constitution, as well as the First Amendment. On November 4, 2003, the Court issued a Memorandum seeking comment from the parties on whether subsequent events and litigation had rendered this motion moot (Docket No. 37). Both Plaintiffs (Docket No. 38) and Defendants (Docket No. 39) responded.
On September 18, 2003, the Texas Senate revoked sanctions, including a substantial fine and loss of parking privileges, previously imposed on the Plaintiff senators. Instead, Plaintiffs were placed on probation for a period terminating on January 11, 2005, conditioned on compliance with a "72 hour rule" limiting the senators' ability to absent themselves "without sufficient excuse" from any future proceedings. Although this probationary period remains in effect, the 78th term of the Texas State Senate has closed, and there are no currently scheduled special sessions.
Where plaintiffs have suffered no injury and the challenged provision's "future effect remains wholly speculative," the claims will be dismissed for lack of ripeness. Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 92 S.Ct. 1716, 1720 (1972). Courts deciding ripeness of a particular claim consider both the "fitness of issues for judicial decision" and the "hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration." Monk v. Huston, 340 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). These considerations suggest that Plaintiffs' proposed claims in this case are not ripe.
"A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Texas v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 1259 (1998) (internal citations omitted). Given that the Senate has been adjourned until the 2005 session, Plaintiffs are currently facing no hardship. Plaintiffs ask the Court to analogize their penalty to one imposed in a criminal context. Undeniably, criminal defendants may challenge the terms of their supervised release or probation. See, e.g., U.S. v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001). However, courts have often refused to adjudicate claims arising out of conditions which would not be imposed until some distant date in the future. U.S. v. Thomas, 198 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding unripe challenge to release condition that defendant not associate with gang members where defendant had not yet served prison term); U.S. v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 989-990 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding challenge to condition of release unripe where it would take effect only if appellant was released from in-patient facility); U.S. v. Dixon, 538 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding unripe claim challenging potential extension of prison term if appellant were unable to pay fines in the future).
Media reports indicate that another special session might be called this year to address the issue of school financing. Even if that happens, Plaintiffs' claims would not automatically "ripen." Again, analogizing to the criminal context, the Supreme Court has suggested that courts should consider the "likelihood that the complainant will disobey the law, the certainty that such disobedience will take a particular form, any present injury occasioned by the threat of prosecution, and the likelihood that a prosecution will actually ensue." Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corps., 95 S.Ct. 335, 358, n. 29 (1974). It is highly speculative that the school-financing issue would provoke another deliberate quorum-breaking exodus sufficient to trigger the suspended penalties. So long as a quorum existed, the absence of some senators would not likely concern the majority, which would only be strengthened by the absences.
"Unnecessary decisions dissipate judicial energies better conserved for litigants who have a real need for official assistance." 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3521.1 at 114. (2d ed. 1984). This admonition is especially pertinent here, considering the novel nature of Plaintiffs' federal theories, which are based on possible actions of a state governmental body, the validity of which have not even been tested in state courts. See Texas v. United States, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 1260 (1998) (". . . . the remoteness and abstraction [of the issues] are increased by the fact that [the challenged provision] has yet to be interpreted by the Texas courts.").
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the Complaint is DENIED. This case shall now be deemed CLOSED.