’ [Citation.] ‘[The] adequacy of notice should be determined on a case-by-case basis to satisfy basic due process requirements. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70 (Barrientos).) Lane first argues that notice was inadequate because the minute order advising her that the court was considering dismissal as a sanction did not comply with Code of Civil Procedure sections 1005 and 1010 and with rule 3.1110 requiring specific formatting and information be included in a notice to a party whose rights may be affected.
(See Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 [appellate court may "treat [an] issue as abandoned" where a party makes a "conclusory presentation, without pertinent argument or an attempt to apply the law to the circumstances of this case"].) Seiden instead relies on Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, but the court in that case did not consider what type of hearing is required before a court can impose sanctions. Barrientos reversed an order imposing sanctions because the trial court did not give notice of its intent to impose sanctions or any opportunity to respond before issuing its sanctions order.
The same requirements of notice and an objective hearing must be met when the trial court raises the issue of sanctions on its own motion. (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70 (Barrientos).)
That 'notice must be given before findings are made and at a time preceding the trial judge's decision whether, in fact, to impose sanctions.'" (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70 (Barrientos).) The notice must specify the authority for imposing sanctions and "the specific grounds and conduct on which sanctions are to be based."
[Citations.] It therefore follows that the trial court may not use the threat of sanctions . . . to coerce the parties to reach a settlement." (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 72 (Barrientos), fn. omitted.) Thus, it is improper for a court to use its power to impose monetary sanctions as a tool to coerce a settlement.
Rather, the trial court issued the injunction sua sponte, without giving notice to the parties that it was considering such an injunction or hearing argument on whether it was appropriate to do so. This, too, was an abuse of discretion because "[d]ue process mandates adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of sanctions." (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70.) A trial court imposing sanctions "must keep in mind an immutable principle that cuts across all areas of the law: sanctions may not be summarily imposed.
(Mezzetti v. Superior Court (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 987, 991 (Mezzetti).) Plaintiff also cites the following excerpt from Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 71-72 (Barrientos): "This record therefore establishes that the court used its power to impose monetary sanctions on counsel as a tool to coerce a settlement. . . . [T]he trial court may not use the threat of sanctions against their counsel to coerce the parties to reach a settlement.
The act or circumstances giving rise to the imposition of expenses must be considered together with the potential dollar amount.’ ” (Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70.) In Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th 63, the appellants were attorneys representing both sides of a civil liability lawsuit.
' [Citation.]" ( Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 70 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 520].) The oral and written orders to show cause lacked any such specific references to the underlying order said to be violated.
Failure to comply with rule 222 may result in the imposition of sanctions under rule 227. ( Barrientos v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 63, 71, fn. 7 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 520]; Sigala v. Anaheim City School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 661, 674 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 38].) At oral argument, counsel for the HOA asserted that neither Stites nor the State Farm adjuster had authority to settle at the mandatory settlement conference.