Opinion
Civil No. 03-1069 (PAM/RLE)
May 18, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion is denied and Defendant's Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
This is an action under ERISA for benefits allegedly due to Plaintiff Kenneth J. Barrieau under his employer's pension plan. Barrieau worked for NSP, n/k/a Defendant Xcel Energy, Inc. ("Xcel"), from 1962 to 1979, as an electrician mechanic. From 1972 to 1978, Barrieau suffered minor injuries on various occasions. Barrieau was eventually granted a leave of absence and workers' compensation benefits on January 3, 1979. Based on a physician's recommendation, Xcel concluded that Barrieau could return to work on February 19, 1979. Although Barrieau went to work on February 19, 1979, as ordered, he claimed he couldn't work. (Ellingboe Aff. Ex. B. at 105.) Xcel then removed Barrieau from its payroll, and subsequently terminated him on March 5, 1979, for failure to report for work. (Id. at 105, 109.)
Barrieau sought assistance from both union representatives and an attorney to pursue claims against Xcel. He filed a disability discrimination claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and sought disability retirement benefits from Xcel. (Id. at 125, 128.) Barrieau settled his discrimination claim for $3,500 on March 18, 1980. Id. at 136.) However, Xcel continued to deny his claim for disability retirement benefits. (Id. at 115, 119, 121, 122.) In January 1982, Xcel agreed to pay permanent partial disability to Barrieau, but again denied his request for disability retirement benefits. (Id. at 127, 177-79.) On October 8, 1982, Xcel sent a letter to Barrieau finally denying his request for disability retirement benefits. (Id. at 413.)
In July 1986, Barrieau and Xcel entered into a final settlement agreement regarding Barrieau's workers' compensation injuries. (Id. at 81.) The agreement stated that it represented a "full, final and complete settlement and forever closing out any and all past, present and future claims . . . for temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, permanent total disability, permanent partial disability, and retraining benefits." (Id. at 84.) Barrieau received his last workers' compensation payment on April 1, 2001. (Id.)
In August 2001, Barrieau again requested disability retirement benefits and also early retirement benefits under Xcel's pension plan. Beginning in January 2002, Barrieau's counsel contacted Xcel on four different occasions, seeking payment of these benefits, and Xcel responded each time with an explanation to support its denial of his claims. (See id. at 80, 85-94; Ex. E-F.) Xcel denied Barrieau's claim for disability retirement benefits on statute of limitations grounds. Xcel also denied Barrieau's claim for early retirement benefits because Barrieau failed to provide 20 years of service to Xcel, as required by Xcel's pension plan. Barrieau filed this lawsuit in February 2003, seeking an award of disability retirement benefits and an award of early retirement benefits. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary Judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. The burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact rests on the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party has carried its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
B. Disability Retirement Benefits
Xcel contends that Barrieau's claim in 2002 for disability benefits is untimely. The parties agree that Minnesota's 2-year statute of limitations applies. Cavegn v. Twin City Pipe Trade Pension Plan, 223 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 2000). However, they dispute when Barrieau's claims accrued. Generally, an ERISA action accrues after a claim for benefits has been formally denied. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Beckham, 138 F.3d 325, 330 (8th Cir. 1998). Barrieau claims that Xcel failed to formally consider and formally deny his claim for benefits. Barrieau alternatively contends that his February 2002 application for benefits should be treated as a new application, and thus timely. Xcel asserts that Barrieau's claim accrued in 1982, and that Barrieau's February 2002 application does not renew the limitations period.
The Eighth Circuit recognizes that an ERISA claim can accrue even before a formal denial and even before a claim for benefits is made, "when there has been a repudiation by the fiduciary which is clear and made known to the beneficiar[y]." Beckham, 138 F.3d at 330. In October 1982, Xcel responded to Barrieau's request for an explanation for Xcel's denial of disability retirement benefits. (Ellingboe Aff. Ex. B at 413.) This letter set forth four different reasons for Xcel's denial: (1) Barrieau was no longer an employee at the time he applied for disability benefits, as required under the plan; (2) Barrieau failed to exhaust his administrative remedies after Xcel's denial in 1979; (3) Barrieau settled and released his benefits claim when he settled his employment discrimination in 1979; and (4) Xcel's disability committee determined that Barrieau was not totally and permanently disabled as required by the terms of the pension plan. (Id. at 413-14.) This October 1982 letter contained a clear repudiation of Barrieau's right to benefits and made this repudiation known to Barrieau. Even as Barrieau received his worker's compensation benefits, Xcel continued to notify Barrieau that his claims for disability retirement benefits were denied. In fact, Xcel never indicated to Barrieau that his claim for disability retirement benefits was anything but denied. Thus, Xcel sufficiently repudiated Barrieau's claims for disability retirement in the October 1982 letter, and at that point, his ERISA claim accrued. See also Wolfe v. 3M Short-Term Disability Plan, 176 F. Supp.2d 911, 912, 916 (D. Minn. 2001) (Tunheim, J.). (determining that "[b]ecause you are no longer a 3M employee, and as such, not entitled to these benefits, we cannot comply with your request" constituted sufficient repudiation, thus triggering statute of limitations).
Barrieau alternatively insists that his claim is timely because he reasserted his claim for disability retirement benefits in February 2002. However, a claimant cannot revive a stale claim by simply seeking review of a decision after the limitations period has expired. Mason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 662, 664 (8th Cir. 1990). Barrieau submits no evidence to support that he submitted a new application for benefits in 2002. Rather, all correspondence between his counsel and Xcel relates to the original denial in 1982 and fails to indicate in any way that Barrieau or Xcel considered it a new application. The Court finds that Barrieau's 2002 application was neither different nor separate from his previous request for disability retirement benefits, and as a matter of law, cannot trigger a new statute of limitations period. C.f. Cavegn v. Twin City Pipe Trades Pension Plan, 223 F.3d at 830 (triggering new statute of limitations period because the plan administrator indicated to the employee that the subsequent application was a "new" application for benefits). Therefore, Barrieau's claim for disability retirement benefits is barred by the statute of limitations.
C. Early Retirement Benefits
Barrieau first applied for early retirement benefits in February 2002. Xcel denied his request, contending that Barrieau lacked the necessary years of credited service. Barrieau sent a follow-up letter in April 2002, and Xcel again promptly denied his request for benefits. Barrieau submitted another letter in August 2002 to Xcel, which Xcel construed as an appeal and further denied. Barrieau contends that he was employed at Xcel through 1986, thus providing the requisite 20 years of credited service to Xcel. Xcel disagrees and asserts that Barrieau's employment was terminated in 1979 and that he only had 17 years of credited service with Xcel. Alternatively, even if he worked until 1986, Xcel maintains that Barrieau failed to satisfy other terms of the pension plan.
Firestone Rubber Co. v. Bruch requires the Court to conduct a de novo review of an ERISA plan administrator's denial of benefits, unless the benefit plan gives the plan administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to interpret the plan terms. 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). The parties dispute the standard of review appropriate in this case. Xcel contends that the Court must review the plan administrator's denial for abuse of discretion, while Barrieau claims that a de novo review is warranted. Regardless of the standard of review, Barrieau's claim fails.
In its denial of early retirement benefits, Xcel explained that Barrieau did not have the requisite vested service required to invoke early retirement benefits. According to the plan, Barrieau must have 20 years of credited service. Xcel contends that because Barrieau's employment with Xcel ceased in 1979, he had only 17 years of service. Barrieau maintains that the 1986 settlement agreement, which awarded him worker's compensation and some disability, conceded that he was an employee through 1986. The relevant language of that agreement states:
That at all times material herein, the Employee, Kenneth J. Barrieau was in the employ of Northern States Power working a full time 40 hour work week and earning average weekly wages entitling the Employee to the maximum compensation rate allowed by law.
(Ellingboe Aff. Ex. B at 81.) Barrieau asserts that "all times material herein" should be construed to mean that Barrieau was a full time employee through the date of the agreement, in 1986. The Court disagrees with Barrieau's interpretation. Under the terms of the policy, workers' compensation can only be awarded to individuals who are employees at the time of the injury. This settlement agreement awarded Barrieau workers' compensation as a result of an injury he sustained as an employee on the job in 1979. Thus, "all times material herein" refers to the time of the injury for which workers' compensation is due, not through 1986 as Barrieau proposes. Therefore, Barrieau was employed at Xcel from 1962 to 1979. Under the terms of the policy, this is insufficient to invoke payment of early retirement benefits.
Barrieau alternatively contends that even if he was not an employee through 1986, he had the requisite hours of service under the pension plan. The early retirement plan provides that any employee between the ages of 57 and 62 who has 20 years of vested service may request the vested benefit of early retirement. (Ellingboe Aff. Ex. B at 22.) Vested service is defined as service credited toward the requirements necessary to receive a vested benefit. (Id. at 19.) A year of service is defined as any anniversary year or other applicable twelve month computation period during which an employee completes at least 1,000 hours of service. (Id.) An hour of service is "an hour for which an employee is directly or indirectly paid, or entitled to payment, by the Company prior to termination of service, even if paid after termination of service." (Id. at 18.)
Barrieau claims that because he was receiving worker's compensation payments from Xcel between 1979 and 1986, he had the requisite hours of service. Xcel contends that the payment of worker's compensation cannot constitute an "hour of service" because these payments occurred after Barrieau's termination. The plain language of the plan states that any payment from Xcel must actually be for service prior to termination. Because Barrieau was terminated in 1979 and never re-hired, workers' compensation benefits are not "payments" to constitute an hour of service as defined by the plan. Under the terms of the policy, Barrieau's claim for early retirement benefits fails as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 14) is DENIED; and
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED.LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.