On the few occasions when the Missouri courts have faced the issue of what is proper rebuttal under circumstances in which defendant has argued damages in defendant's closing argument, the courts have referred to this circumstance as a waiver of the general rule that looks to plaintiff's initial closing argument to determine what is proper rebuttal. See Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Mo.App. 1973); Weinbauer v. Berberich, 610 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Mo.App. 1980). It is more accurate and helpful to state the complete rule in the affirmative, i.e., in the final portion of the closing argument a plaintiff can argue anything that plaintiff argued in the initial portion of the closing argument and rebut anything that the defendant argued in defendant's portion of the closing argument.

Finally, and crucially, when defense counsel argued — however weakly — that Hall's alibi was worthy of the jury's acceptance, he opened the door for the prosecutor's response. See Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 104-105 (Mo.App. 1973). Had defense counsel said nothing at all about the alibi, this would be a different case, but on the record before us we find no basis for reversal.Affirmed.

A slight expansion of this rule which also enjoys fairly wide support involves asking not only whether prospective jurors have a financial interest or connection in the insurance business as stockholders or employees, but also whether they are insurance policyholders in a particular company themselves. E.g., Fowler v. Burks (1974), 42 Ala. App. 14, 288 So.2d 798, 799; Kath v. Brodie (1955), 132 Colo. 338, 287 P.2d 957, 958; Haston v. Hightower (1965), 111 Ga. App. 87, 140 S.E.2d 525, 526; Barrett v. Morris (Mo.App. 1973), 495 S.W.2d 100, 103. This latter expansion generally applies only if the insurance company is a named party or is a mutual insurance company in which member policyholders' premiums are determined directly by the amount of damages paid.

Since he did, the rule established in Shaw v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n., 344 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Mo. 1961), to the effect that a plaintiff may not completely withhold all argument on the subject of damages from the opening portion of his argument and concentrate all argument on the subject in the closing portion does not apply. See Hart v. Forbes, 633 S.W.2d 90, 95 (Mo.App. 1982); Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 105 (Mo.App. 1973). The point is denied.

In Votrain v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., Mo.Sup., 268 S.W.2d 838, 844, we said: `Generally, the purpose of closing argument by counsel for the party having "the burden of the issues" is to answer the argument of counsel for the other party, the one "holding the negative."'" See also Shaw v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis, 344 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Mo. 1961); Midwest Library Serv. v. Structural Systems, 566 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Mo.App. 1978); Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 104 (Mo.App. 1973). From Goldstein, it is obvious that the matter of final argument is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, but there is a prohibition against plaintiff's counsel arguing a dollar amount in the final portion of closing argument (absent reference in the initial phase and/or comment relative thereto by defense counsel) on the basis of fairness to both parties.

Counsel for Weinbauer on voir dire stated he was suing for $50,000. Furthermore, in the present case, Berberich's counsel's closing argument dealt extensively with the subjects of injuries and damages, which constituted a waiver of any objection to Weinbauer's concluding argument by opening the door to rebuttal to the Berberich arguments. See Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 104-105[7, 8] (Mo.App. 1973), and Midwest Library Service, Inc. v. Structural Systems, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 249, 251-252[1, 2] (Mo.App. 1978) upon which Berberich also relies. In Midwest Library Service, Inc., plaintiff's counsel discussed only liability in the first part of closing argument.

During this conference counsel should request the court to rule on what questions and in what manner the trial court will permit inquiry concerning insurance. See, Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100, 102-103 (Mo.App. 1973). Inquiry in accordance with the court's instructions will necessarily be in good faith.

Nevertheless, a defendant may waive this rule by introducing an issue himself in his closing argument, thereby opening up that issue and allowing plaintiff in the reply part of his argument the opportunity to respond on that point. Sullivan v. Hanley, 347 S.W.2d 710 (Mo.App. 1961); Barrett v. Morris, 495 S.W.2d 100 (Mo.App. 1973). Defendant concedes that its counsel did, on several occasions in the closing argument, refer to the amounts plaintiff was claiming.