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Barrett v. Grubham

United States District Court, N.D. New York
Apr 24, 2023
3:22-CV-0953 (LEK/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023)

Opinion

3:22-CV-0953 (LEK/ML)

04-24-2023

JEFFERY BARRETT; and KIMBERLY BARRETT, Plaintiffs, v. LEW GRUBHAM, Supervisor; and CHAD MORAN, Code Officer, Defendants.

JEFFERY BARRETT Plaintiff, Pro Se KIMBERLY BARRETT Plaintiff, Pro Se


APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

JEFFERY BARRETT Plaintiff, Pro Se

KIMBERLY BARRETT Plaintiff, Pro Se

ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION

Miroslav Lovric U.S. Magistrate Judge

The Clerk has sent a pro se complaint in the above captioned action together with an application to proceed in forma pauperis filed by Jeffery Barrett and Kimberly Barrett (collectively “Plaintiffs”) to the Court for review. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5.) For the reasons discussed below, I (1) grant Plaintiffs' in forma pauperis application, and (2) recommend that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed in its entirety with leave to amend. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5.)

I. BACKGROUND

Construed as liberally as possible, Plaintiffs' Complaint-which was completed on a form complaint alleging violations of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983-alleges that defendants Lew Grubham and Chad Moran (collectively “Defendants”) “force[d Plaintiffs'] large animal rescue to close” and remove animals from the property. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Complaint alleges that, as a result of Defendants' actions, Plaintiffs “lost a land lease for (6 month's) [sic].” (Id. at 3.) In addition, the Complaint alleges that Defendants “placed [Plaintiffs'] personal info to [their] home” which caused “people [to come] to [Plaintiffs'] home all hour's [sic] of the night.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that they were “forced . . . to rehome many animal's [sic] with[]out just cause.” (Id.) Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs do not appear to assert any causes of action. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) As relief, Plaintiffs request $250,000.00 in damages. (Id. at 4.)

The court must interpret pro se complaints to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Soto v. Walker, 44 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

Although it is not clear from the Complaint, the Court presumes that Plaintiffs intended to allege that Defendants published their personal information in some format.

Plaintiffs also filed an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. No. 5.)

II. PLAINTIFFS' APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

When a civil action is commenced in a federal district court, the statutory filing fee, currently set at $402, must ordinarily be paid. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court is authorized, however, to permit a litigant to proceed in forma pauperis status if a party “is unable to pay” the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiffs' in forma pauperis application (Dkt. No. 5), the Court finds that Plaintiffs meet this standard. Therefore, Plaintiffs' application to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

The language of that section is ambiguous because it suggests an intent to limit availability of IFP status to prison inmates. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (authorizing the commencement of an action without prepayment of fees “by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses”). The courts have construed that section, however, as making IFP status available to any litigant who can meet the governing financial criteria. Hayes v. United States, 71 Fed.Cl. 366, 367 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Fridman v. City of N.Y., 195 F.Supp.2d 534, 536 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

Plaintiffs are reminded that, although the application to proceed in forma pauperis has been granted, they will still be required to pay fees that they may incur in this action, including copying and/or witness fees.

III. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

In addition, the Court shall dismiss any action where the Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3); see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1988) (holding that subject matter jurisdiction is a “threshold question that must be resolved . . . before proceeding to the merits.”); Humphrey v. Syracuse Police Dep't, 758 Fed.Appx. 205, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Bond, 762 F.3d 255, 263 (2d Cir. 2014)) (“[b]efore deciding any case on the merits, a district court must determine that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.”); Koziel v. City of Yonkers, 352 Fed.Appx. 470, 471 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint on initial review for lack of subject matter); Talley v. LoanCare Serv., Div. of FNF, 15-CV-5017, 2018 WL 4185705, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2018) (dismissing on initial review, action challenging state court mortgage foreclosure judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction); Eckert v. Schroeder, Joseph & Assoc., 364 F.Supp.2d 326, 327 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967 (1988)) (“[a] court shall, sua sponte, dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as soon as it is apparent that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”).

“In reviewing a complaint . . . the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (reading the plaintiff's pro se complaint “broadly, as we must” and holding that the complaint sufficiently raised a cognizable claim). “[E]xtreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and [the] parties . . . have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983).

IV. ANALYSIS

In addressing the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, the court must construe his pleadings liberally. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Having reviewed Plaintiffs' Complaint with this principle in mind, I recommend that it be dismissed.

Section 1983 authorizes a suit in law, equity, or “other proper proceeding for redress” against any person who, under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws ....” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but is a vehicle for vindicating federal rights embedded in the United States Constitution and federal statutes. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see also Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: “(1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” Castilla v. City of New York, 09-CV-5446, 2013 WL 1803896, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2013); see also Annis v. Cnty of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d. Cir. 1998).

The Complaint fails to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' constitutional or federal statutory rights. Instead, the Complaint alleges-in the vaguest of terms-that Defendants “force[d]” Plaintiffs' large animal rescue to “close it's [sic] door's [sic] and remove all the animals from the place of service.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) This single allegation does not attribute any specific action to either of Defendants. In addition, it does not allege that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' statutory or constitutional rights.

Moreover, even applying special solicitude, the undersigned can identify no other law or statute under which Plaintiffs can properly bring their claims in this Court based on the facts presently alleged in the Complaint.

As a result, I recommend that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed.

V. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND

Generally, a court should not dismiss claims contained in a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once “when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”). An opportunity to amend is not required, however, where “the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive” such that “better pleading will not cure it.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Cortec Indus. Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.”). Stated differently, “[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.” Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); accord, Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.).

See also Carris v. First Student, Inc., 132 F.Supp.3d 321, 340-41 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (Suddaby, C.J.) (explaining that the standard set forth in Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999)-that the Court should grant leave to amend “unless the court can rule out any possibility, however unlikely it might be, that an amended complaint would be successful in stating a claim”-is likely not an accurate recitation of the governing law after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)), rev'd on other grounds, 682 Fed.Appx. 30.

It is not clear whether a better pleading would permit Plaintiffs to assert cognizable claims against Defendants. Because Plaintiffs have not previously amended their Complaint, I recommend that they be granted leave to replead their claim(s).

If Plaintiffs choose to file an amended complaint, they should note that the law in this circuit clearly provides that “‘complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning.'” Hunt v. Budd, 895 F.Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987)); accord Pourzancvakil v. Humphry, 94-CV-1594, 1995 WL 316935, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, J.). Therefore, in any amended complaint, Plaintiffs must clearly set forth facts that give rise to the claims, including the dates, times, and places of the alleged underlying acts, and each individual who committed each alleged wrongful act. In addition, the revised pleading should allege facts demonstrating the specific involvement of any of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged in sufficient detail to establish that they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986). Finally, Plaintiffs are informed that any such amended complaint will replace the existing Complaint, and must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the Court. See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (“It is well established that an amended complaint ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”).

ACCORDINGLY, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiffs' application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 5) is GRANTED only for purposes of filing and any appeal unless the trial court certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith; and it is further

RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD Plaintiffs' Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall file a copy of this order, report, and recommendation on the docket of this case and serve a copy upon the parties in accordance with the local rules.

The Clerk shall also provide Plaintiffs with copies of all unreported decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)).

If you are proceeding pro se and served with this report, recommendation, and order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date that the report, recommendation, and order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).


Summaries of

Barrett v. Grubham

United States District Court, N.D. New York
Apr 24, 2023
3:22-CV-0953 (LEK/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023)
Case details for

Barrett v. Grubham

Case Details

Full title:JEFFERY BARRETT; and KIMBERLY BARRETT, Plaintiffs, v. LEW GRUBHAM…

Court:United States District Court, N.D. New York

Date published: Apr 24, 2023

Citations

3:22-CV-0953 (LEK/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023)