Opinion
No. 05-03-01084-CR.
Opinion issued February 24, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-25428-WS. Affirmed.
Before Justices JAMES, WRIGHT, and BRIDGES.
OPINION
A jury convicted Wilson Omar Barrera of aggravated sexual assault of a child younger than fourteen years and assessed punishment at five years confinement and a $5000 fine. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). In a single point of error, appellant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel, which created reversible error. We affirm the trial court's judgment. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). When faced with a silent record as to defense counsel's strategy, the court will not speculate as to counsel's tactics or reasons for taking or not taking certain actions. Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994). Without evidence of the strategy and methods involved concerning counsel's actions at trial, the court will presume sound trial strategy. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. Appellant argues counsel was ineffective in not filing a plea to the trial court's jurisdiction. Appellant asserts the indictment was returned in the 363rd Judicial District Court and there is no order transferring the case to the 282nd Judicial District Court, where the judgment was rendered. Appellant argues that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. The State responds appellant fails to show how he was harmed by counsel's alleged failures or that the results of the proceeding would have been different. We agree with the State. The judge of a district court in a county with two or more district courts may, in his discretion, transfer any criminal proceedings on his docket to the docket of one of the other district courts. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.303(a) (Vernon 1988); see also Gregory v. State, 495 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex.Crim. App. 1973). The fact that no transfer order is contained in the record does not render the actions of the transferee court void, but merely makes them subject to a valid and timely plea to the court's jurisdiction. See Sharkey v. State, 994 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.). If a defendant does not file a timely plea to the jurisdiction, he waives any right to complain that a transfer order does not appear in the record. See id. at 419. Although counsel did not file a plea to the trial court's jurisdiction, nothing in the record shows the trial would not have proceeded in the 282nd Judicial District Court had an objection been made. Likewise, nothing in the record shows appellant would not have been convicted and sentenced had counsel complained about the lack of a transfer order. Other than his bare statements, appellant has not shown the results of the proceeding would have been different had counsel objected about the absence of a transfer order. Thus, we conclude appellant has not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.