Opinion
No. 394, 1997.
Decided: December 22, 1998.
Family (Kent) CK96-4457.
Affirmed.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
CHERYL BARRAS, Respondent Below, Appellant, v. DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, Petitioner Below, Appellee. No. 394, 1997. In the Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Submitted: October 23, 1998. Decided: December 22, 1998.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 22nd day of December, 1998, upon consideration of the initial briefs and supplemental memoranda of the parties it appears to the Court as follows:
(1) This is an appeal by the Respondent in a Family Court custody proceeding initiated by the appellee, Division of Family Services ("DFS"). Respondent filed a counterclaim against DFS asserting violations of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the § 1983 claims), as well as due process violations. When DFS withdrew its custody petition on the day scheduled for hearing in the Family Court, the court also dismissed the § 1983 claims as moot. Because the reasons for the Family Court's ruling had not been fully explained, we remanded this matter to the Family Court to permit that court to address directly, and in the first instance, Respondent's contentions that its counterclaim was not moot. Barras v. Division of Family Services, Del. Supr., No. 394, 1997 (Apr. 7, 1998) (ORDER).
(2) The Family Court issued its supplementary decision on August 6, 1998 and the parties have filed supplementary memoranda directed to the Family Court's ruling. In its latest ruling, the Family Court clarified its previous decision and determined that: (1) the Family Court does have jurisdiction over Respondent's § 1983 claims; (2) there is no private cause of action under the "reasonable efforts" or "services" provisions of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671 ("AACWA"); (3) Respondent has an enforceable right of action under the case plan provisions of the AACWA, but the claim is factually not supportable because Respondent rejected DFS's offer of meaningful services; and (4) there is no basis for Respondent's due process claims because the State, through DFS, is under no affirmative obligation to provide services to the general public.
(3) We conclude that the Family Court's August 6, 1998 decision reflects a careful and thorough analysis of Respondent's § 1983 and due process claims. We affirm the Family Court's conclusions and note they are consistent with a recent ruling of the Washington Supreme Court in a case factually similar. See Washington State Coalition for the Homeless v. Department of Social and Health Services, Wash. Supr., 949 P.2d 1291 (1997). With respect to the Family Court's factual determinations we find them to be supported by the record and the result of an orderly and logical deductive process. Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972); Eberly v. Eberly, Del. Supr., 489 A.2d 433, 443 (1985).
(4) When this matter was remanded to the Family Court pursuant to our order of April 7, 1998, the Respondent sought to amend her counterclaim to add her DFS caseworker, Suzanne Madanat, as an individual counterclaim defendant. Upon the objection of DFS, the Family Court refused to permit the amendment, ruling that consideration of the merits of a claim against an individual defendant was beyond the scope of the matters subject to remand. The Family Court's ruling was clearly correct. The inclusion of an individual State employee as a defendant in Respondent's counterclaim raises issues not present in the original appeal to this Court, nor within the scope of this Court's remand order. Our affirmance of the Family Court's order is without prejudice, however, to Respondent's right to amend her counterclaim in the Family Court. We express no opinion on the merits of the proposed amendment since the Family Court has not ruled upon Respondent's motion to amend.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.