Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-353.
February 16, 2005
MEMORANDUM
On January 18, 2005, the Court issued a memorandum and judgment in this case granting the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing Barr's complaint with prejudice, and awarding the Defendants their costs of this action. [Court File Nos. 51, 52]. The Defendants have since moved for attorney's fees and costs pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d), Local Rule 54.1, and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. [Court File No. 53]. The Defendants seek $12,617 in attorney's fees and $2,619.84 in costs and expenses. [ Id.].
The Court already awarded the Defendants their costs of this action. [Court File No. 52]. To obtain these costs, the Defendants should comply with the requirements of Local Rule 54.1. Pursuant to that rule, if the parties "are able to agree on costs, they need not file a bill of costs with the clerk." However, if the parties cannot agree on the costs:
a bill of costs shall be filed by the prevailing party with the clerk within thirty (30) days from the entry of final judgment. A copy of the bill of costs shall be served upon opposing counsel. The opposing party shall file written objections within thirty (30) days from the date of service. The clerk shall then assess the costs.
Local Rule 54.1. As the Court has already awarded the Defendants their costs of this action, the Court will GRANT the current motion to that extent and direct the Defendants to follow the strictures of Local Rule 54.1.
Turning to the Defendants' motion for attorney's fees, the issue is slightly more complicated. Barr's suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and, as such, the motion for attorney's fees is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988 provides that "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
The text of § 1988 appears to grant district court's complete discretion to decide whether to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a § 1983 action, but subsequent case law has greatly limited its scope. "An award of attorney's fees against a losing plaintiff in a civil rights action is an extreme sanction, and must be limited to truly egregious cases of misconduct." Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1232 (6th Cir. 1986); accord Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir. 2003); Dubuc v. Green Oak Tp., 312 F.3d 736, 754-55 (6th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Egensperger, 266 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Smythe-Cramer Co., 754 F.2d 180, 182-83 (6th Cir. 1985). Indeed, a prevailing defendant should only recover attorney's fees if "the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Cristiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) and applying Christianburg to the fee provisions of § 1988); accord N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 596; Dubuc, 312 F.3d at 754; Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547; Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dep't, 207 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2000); Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994).
In considering a prevailing defendant's application for attorney's fees, district court's must "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22; accord Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 596; Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547-53; Wilson-Simmons, 207 F.3d at 823; Wayne, 36 F.3d at 530; Smythe-Cramer, 754 F.2d at 183. Indeed, "a plaintiff may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing the suit even when the law or facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset." Smythe-Cramer, 754 F.2d at 183. Accordingly, a "plaintiff should not be assessed his opponent's attorney fees unless the court finds the claim was groundless at the outset or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so." Id.; accord Riddle, 266 F.3d at 547-48; Wilson-Simmons, 207 F.3d at 823.
Applying these limitations to the instant case, the Court finds that Barr's suit was not a "truly egregious case of misconduct" that was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" when filed. Granted, the Court dismissed Barr's complaint on a summary judgment motion. However, to deem Barr's claims "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation" because he could not identify a genuine dispute of a material fact after discovery would be to engage in the very hindsight logic the Supreme Court prohibits.
Instead, examining Barr's basis for filing this suit, as this Court must, see Riddle, 366 F.3d at 548, Tahfs, 316 F.3d at 596, the Court finds that the claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Barr's suit included unlawful entry, unlawful seizure, and excessive force claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. As a basis, Barr contended that the Defendants busted through his screen door and entered his apartment without a warrant and despite him repeatedly refusing their requests to enter. Further, Barr asserted that, in effecting the arrest, the Defendants fought with him, at times striking him. The Defendants admitted these allegations but argued that their actions were not unconstitutional, and the Court agreed. [Court File No. 51, 52].
That the officers' actions did not ultimately result in constitutional violations — entry was justified due to exigent circumstances, seizure was justified under Tennessee domestic abuse statute, and use of force was justified due to Barr's resistance — does not mean that Barr's claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. To the contrary, the Defendants' admissions to Barr's factual allegations indicates otherwise. Based on these facts, the Court finds that Barr's claims were not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Accordingly, the Defendants are not entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and their motion to that extent will be DENIED.
A separate order will enter.
ORDER
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, the Defendants' motion for costs and attorney's fees [Court File No. 53] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. As indicated in the Court's previous judgment [Court File No. 52], as the prevailing party, the Defendants are entitled to their costs of this action. Thus, the Defendants' motion for costs is GRANTED. In obtaining those costs, the Defendants shall comply with the strictures of Local Rule 54.1. The Defendants' motion for attorney's fees is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.