Opinion
No. CV 06-4009050 S
May 16, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendant, Mulberry Gardens of Southington, LLC, has moved to dismiss this action on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff, Susan Baroudjian, has not exhausted her administrative remedies at the Workers' Compensation Commission; and thus, the court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter. The defendant filed its motion to dismiss on February 21, 2006. On March 22, 2006, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion.
The plaintiff initially brought this action on January 10, 2006, claiming money damages resulting from discrimination against her on account of her exercising her rights afforded to her by the workers' compensation act, pursuant to C.G.S. § 31-290a.
The defendant claims that the plaintiff has mis-characterized her claims as retaliation in an attempt to have the superior court address matters that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers' compensation commission.
I.
"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 544, 590 A.2d 914 (1991). "A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." Upson v. State, 190 Conn. 622, 624, 461 A.2d 991 (1983). "[I]n ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lawrence Brunoli, Inc. v. Branford, 247 Conn. 407, 410-11 (1999).
"Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Crystal, 251 Conn. 748, 763, 741 A.2d 956 (1999). "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnik, 244 Conn. 781, 787, 712 A.2d 396, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017, 119 S.Ct. 542, 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Community Collaborative of Bridgeport, Inc. v. Ganim, 241 Conn. 546, 552, 698 A.2d 245 (1997). "[P]arties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent." Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 237 Conn. 184, 192, 676 A.2d 831 (1996). "The trial court . . . [can determine] sua sponte that its subject matter jurisdiction [is] in question . . ." Glastonbury Volunteer Ambulance Ass'n., Inc. v. Freedom of Information Commission, 227 Conn. 848, 851, 633 A.2d 305 (1993); see also Daley v. Hartford, 215 Conn. 14, 28, 574 A.2d 194, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 573, 112 L.Ed.2d 525 (1990). ("[T]he question of subject matter jurisdiction . . . can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time.").
II.
The defendant claims that the matter must be dismissed due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies at the workers' compensation commission.
The plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendant discriminated against her in violation of general statutes § 31-290a. That statute provides, in part, that "(n)o employer . . . shall . . . in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter . . . Any employee who is so . . . discriminated against may either: (1) Bring a civil action in the superior court . . .; or (2) file a complaint with the chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission alleging violation of the provisions of subsection (a) of this section." C.G.S. § 31-290a.
The court must construe the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's allegations are that the defendant began discriminating against the plaintiff on account of her exercising her rights afforded to her pursuant to the workers' compensation act, in violation of general statutes § 31-290a. As such, it appears that this matter generally belongs in a class of cases that the legislature deemed to be brought either in the superior court or the commission.
The defendant's claim is that the alleged violations are within the exclusivity provision of the act. In Yuille v. Bridgeport Hospital, 89 Conn.App. 705 (2005), the defendant moved to strike a complaint on a number of grounds including the exclusivity provision of the workers' compensation act. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's granting a motion to strike and rendering judgment in favor of the defendant. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates, 244 Conn. 269, 270, 709 A.2d 558 (1998). Since the defendant is claiming that the specific acts alleged by the plaintiff do not constitute discrimination and are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the act, the motion is more properly brought as a motion to strike.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is denied.