Opinion
02 C 7596
January 23, 2003.
OPINION
This is an action for race discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff, Aziz Baroody, alleges that three days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, defendants Bankair, Inc. ("Bankair") and John Dickerson, president of Bankair, interrogated Mr. Baroody about his possible connections to terrorists and terrorist activity, subjected him to racial harassment because of his Arab ethnicity, demoted him, canceled his benefits, and ultimately terminated him. Mr. Baroody also alleges that when he sent a letter to defendants opposing the alleged discrimination, defendants immediately retaliated against him by suing him in South Carolina for violations of the Federal Aviation Act and for negligence in connection with two accidents allegedly caused by Mr. Baroody involving planes owned or leased by Bankair. This complaint also includes a claim for breach of contract arising from Mr. Baroody's failure to repay a loan given to him by Bankair for pilot training. Defendants have moved to dismiss Mr. Baroody's complaint or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to South Carolina.
Defendants argue that they both should be dismissed because Mr. Dickerson is not subject to jurisdiction in Illinois, and Mr. Baroody's claims against Bankair are compulsory counterclaims to the South Carolina suit. With respect to Mr. Dickerson, Mr. Baroody has made no allegations that Mr. Dickerson has made any contacts with the state of Illinois in a personal capacity. All of Mr. Dickerson's contacts with Illinois alleged by Mr. Baroody were made by Mr. Dickerson in his corporate capacity as president of Bankair, and a court does not have jurisdiction over an officer of a corporation simply because the court has jurisdiction over the corporation. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 780 n. 13 (1984). Mr. Dickerson's contacts with the forum state must be assessed individually. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322 (1980). All of Mr. Dickerson's alleged contacts with Illinois were made in his official capacity and therefore, this court does not have jurisdiction over him.
Bankair argues that Mr. Baroody's claims against it are compulsory counterclaims to its South Carolina action. According to Fed.R.Civ.P. 13, a counterclaim is compulsory if "it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." In determining whether two suits arise from the same transaction or occurrence, courts use a "logical relationship" test, which examines the totality of the claims. See Gildorn Sav. Ass'n v. Commerce Sav. Ass'n, 804 F.2d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1986); Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Strong, 907 F.2d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 1990). Of Mr. Baroody's claims, I find that only one might be considered a compulsory counterclaim to the Bankair suit, which is his discrimination claim with respect to his discharge. One of Bankair's claims against Mr. Baroody is a breach of contract claim alleging failure to repay a loan, and in his defense, Mr. Baroody argues that because his termination was discriminatory, he does not have to repay the loan. In Goose Island Dev. Corp. v. Preferred Investments IX Lim'd P'ship, 1992 WL 220649, *4 (N.D.Ill. 1992), it was found that a logical relationship exists when the legal arguments presented as an affirmative defense in one case forms the basis for the claims in another. Bankair's breach of contract claim and Mr. Baroody's discrimination claim with respect to discharge both arise out of the same occurrence, namely Mr. Baroody's termination. Therefore, it appears that these two are logically related.
With respect to Mr. Baroody's racial harassment and retaliation claims, I do not see a logical relationship between either of these claims and Bankair's suit. Bankair's suit arises out of Mr. Baroody's termination and two accidents allegedly caused by Mr. Baroody. Although Bankair argues that it is apparent that Mr. Baroody's retaliation claim and its South Carolina suit are logically related, Mr. Baroody's retaliation claim arises from the act of Bankair filing its suit and has nothing to do with any of the transactions or occurrences giving rise to Bankair's suit. In contrast to Mr. Baroody's discriminatory discharge claim and Bankair's breach of contract claim, Mr. Baroody's retaliation claim does not arise from the same transactions or occurrences as Bankair's lawsuit against him and therefore, is not logically related to that action.
However, whether Mr. Baroody's discriminatory discharge claim is a compulsory counterclaim is not for me to decide, because I am transferring this case to South Carolina. Although Mr. Baroody's choice of forum is a factor to be considered, I find that other considerations, such as situs of material events and convenience, outweigh Mr. Baroody's desire to keep the case in Illinois. Mr. Baroody's permanent residence is in South Carolina, not Illinois, and the defendants are also located in South Carolina. Looking at the preliminary witness list, it appears that most of the witnesses are located in South Carolina as well. Mr. Baroody argues that many witnesses are in Illinois and that many of the alleged acts of racial harassment occurred in Illinois. However, after reviewing Mr. Baroody's allegations, even if I were to accept all of his allegations as true, which I must for the purpose of this motion, there is only one alleged incident that occurred in Illinois for which defendants might be found liable, specifically the November 2001 comment made by a Bankair pilot at the Taylorville, Illinois airport. Other allegations made by Mr. Baroody involve individuals, namely employees of Chicago's Midway airport and the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, who were not employed by defendants. Thus, individuals concerning those incidents are not witnesses to this case, and consequently, South Carolina appears to be a more convenient forum, especially considering that all other alleged occurrences, such as Mr. Dickerson's interrogation and Mr. Baroody's termination, occurred in South Carolina. With respect to public interest factors, I have no reason to doubt the ability of a South Carolina district court to handle this case, and the congestion factor actually favors the District of South Carolina over the Northern District of Illinois. Finally, even though Mr. Baroody strongly objects to transferring the case to South Carolina, the transfer actually benefits him as well as defendants since a South Carolina court clearly has jurisdiction over Mr. Dickerson, whereas this court does not.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is denied, and defendants' motion to transfer venue to South Carolina is granted.