Barnhill v. Barnhill

242 Citing cases

  1. Caldwell v. Caldwell

    No. M2007-01205-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2008)   Cited 6 times

    Id. The Trial Court's distribution of property is presumed to be correct, unless the evidence preponderates against the Court's ruling. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 449-450 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991). III. DISCUSSION

  2. Mosley v. Mosley

    No. M2003-01686-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2004)   Cited 1 times
    Noting that "appellate courts routinely decline to second-guess the credibility determinations made by the trial court."

    Trial courts are afforded wide discretion in dividing the interests of parties in jointly owned property. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991), perm.app.denied (Jan. 21, 1992); Ford v. Ford, 952 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996), perm.app.denied (July 14, 1997). Whether or not to award attorney's fees in this case is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial judge, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against such action.

  3. Norman v. Norman

    No. M2001-02796-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that the balance in the husband's 401(k) account at his marriage was his separate property but that the remainder of the monies in the account as of the time of the parties' divorce was "to be divided equitably as marital property"

    Absent a clear intent that Wife intended the $28,000 to remain her separate property, we find that there has been a transmutation of these funds. See Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 542 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991); see also Batson, 769 S.W.2d at 858. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in classifying the $28,000 as Wife's separate property.

  4. Hofer v. Hofer

    C.A. No. 02A01-9510-CH-00210 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1997)   Cited 14 times

    This state is a dual property state, distinguishing between marital and separate property. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 456 (Tenn. App. 1991). T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a) provides only for the division of marital property, thus it is incumbent upon the trial court to first classify the property of the parties.

  5. Jackson v. Jackson

    Appeal No. 01A01-9504-CV-00132 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 1995)   Cited 1 times

    In determining issues of child custody, our primary concern is the best interest and welfare of the child. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn.App. 1991). Courts routinely employ a comparative fitness analysis, whereby the court determines which of two or more available custodians is more fit than others. Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666; Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 290 (Tenn.App. 1973).

  6. Richardson v. Richardson

    No. E2019-02108-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2020)   Cited 2 times

    However, a spouse's separate property is not subject to division by statute. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A spouse's separate property includes "[a]ll real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage."

  7. Williams v. Williams

    No. M2013-01910-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015)   Cited 7 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming the trial court's award of fees pursuant to the parties' MDA, stating its discretion and determining that wife was entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to the parties' MDA

    We have also determined that Husband waived any objections he may have to the content of the statement of the evidence approved by the trial court because Husband failed to object to the statement of the evidence approved by the trial court. See Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (in which the court concluded the appellant was attempting to raise an issue for the first time on appeal because he had failed to make a motion or objection at the trial court level); see also Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) (stating it has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained for the first time on appeal).

  8. Williams v. Singler

    No. W2012-01253-COA-R3-JV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 31, 2013)   Cited 23 times
    Vacating the finding of contempt and remanding for "factual findings as to specific instances of contempt during the relevant time period, including factual findings to support a holding of willfulness"

    "In making parenting decisions, the court's paramount concern must be the welfare and best interest of the children; parenting decisions must not be made to reward or punish parents." Irvin v. Irvin, No. M2011-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d at 484-85); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). When presented with a request to modify a parenting arrangement, the existing parenting order is considered res judicata on the facts as they existed at the time the most recent order was entered.

  9. Hyde v. Bradley

    No. M2009-02117-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2010)   Cited 44 times
    Explaining that the court considers whether modification of the current parenting schedule is in the child's best interests only after a determination that there has been a material change in circumstance

    1993). These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v.Barnhill , 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. SeeDoles v. Doles , 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone , 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

  10. Gentile v. Gentile

    No. M2008-02685-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Jul. 19, 2010)

    However, a spouse's separate property is not subject to division by statute. Barnhill v., Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A spouse's separate property includes "[a]ll real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage."