Id. The Trial Court's distribution of property is presumed to be correct, unless the evidence preponderates against the Court's ruling. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 449-450 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991). III. DISCUSSION
Trial courts are afforded wide discretion in dividing the interests of parties in jointly owned property. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991), perm.app.denied (Jan. 21, 1992); Ford v. Ford, 952 S.W.2d 824 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996), perm.app.denied (July 14, 1997). Whether or not to award attorney's fees in this case is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial judge, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against such action.
Absent a clear intent that Wife intended the $28,000 to remain her separate property, we find that there has been a transmutation of these funds. See Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 542 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1991); see also Batson, 769 S.W.2d at 858. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in classifying the $28,000 as Wife's separate property.
This state is a dual property state, distinguishing between marital and separate property. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 456 (Tenn. App. 1991). T.C.A. § 36-4-121(a) provides only for the division of marital property, thus it is incumbent upon the trial court to first classify the property of the parties.
In determining issues of child custody, our primary concern is the best interest and welfare of the child. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn.App. 1991). Courts routinely employ a comparative fitness analysis, whereby the court determines which of two or more available custodians is more fit than others. Bah v. Bah, 668 S.W.2d 663, 666; Edwards v. Edwards, 501 S.W.2d 283, 290 (Tenn.App. 1973).
However, a spouse's separate property is not subject to division by statute. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A spouse's separate property includes "[a]ll real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage."
We have also determined that Husband waived any objections he may have to the content of the statement of the evidence approved by the trial court because Husband failed to object to the statement of the evidence approved by the trial court. See Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (in which the court concluded the appellant was attempting to raise an issue for the first time on appeal because he had failed to make a motion or objection at the trial court level); see also Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983) (stating it has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained for the first time on appeal).
"In making parenting decisions, the court's paramount concern must be the welfare and best interest of the children; parenting decisions must not be made to reward or punish parents." Irvin v. Irvin, No. M2011-02424-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Adelsperger, 970 S.W.2d at 484-85); Griffin v. Stone, 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). When presented with a request to modify a parenting arrangement, the existing parenting order is considered res judicata on the facts as they existed at the time the most recent order was entered.
1993). These decisions are not intended to reward or to punish parents, see Barnhill v.Barnhill , 826 S.W.2d 443, 453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991), and, in fact, the interests of the parents are secondary to those of the children. SeeDoles v. Doles , 848 S.W.2d 656, 661 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Griffin v. Stone , 834 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).
However, a spouse's separate property is not subject to division by statute. Barnhill v., Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d 443, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991). A spouse's separate property includes "[a]ll real and personal property owned by a spouse before marriage."