The parties agree that, pursuant to such doctrines, employers may be held liable for the torts of their employees committed within the scope of their employment. See, e.g., Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, 408-09; Barnhard v. Barnhard, 578 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616 (2d Dep't 1992). Defendant Winston Strawn moves to dismiss this claim (and all claims premised on vicarious liability) on the basis that Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts supporting a claim that Bristol maintained and allowed Starr permissive use of his attorney trust account in Winston Strawn's ordinary course of business, or with Winston's authority, or within the scope of Bristol's responsibilities as a Winston Strawn partner. (Winston Br. at 15). The Court will assess Winston's argument in this regard in connection with each particular tort claim asserted (to the extent it is premised on vicarious liability). For purposes of Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claim, suffice it to say, at this juncture, that Plaintiffs' claim as against Winston Strawn rises or falls with their claim against Bristol.

Analogizing this law firm partnership to a corporate employer, against whom New York courts have allowed awards of punitive damages, "where management has authorized, participated in, consented to or ratified the conduct giving rise to such damages, or deliberately retained the unfit servant [citations omitted], or the wrong was in pursuance of a recognized business system of the entity [citation omitted]" ( Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, 67 N.Y.2d 369, 378, supra), we would also sustain the claim for punitive damages against Dreyer and Traub. Although the partnership may not have explicitly ratified Morse's activities on behalf of their client QMAX, the trial court properly found that because the alleged misconduct was conducted within the scope of the partnership's business, the firm may be held liable to the same extent as the individual defendant (Partnership Law § 24; see also, Barnhard v Barnhard, 179 A.D.2d 715; Clients' Sec. Fund v Grandeau, 72 N.Y.2d 62, 67). An award of punitive damages is appropriate based upon a jury's determination that such an award would advance the goal of deterring wrongful conduct by motivating an employer, or, here, a partnership, adequately to supervise its employees, particularly those whose actions may reflect what has become known as the "corporate culture" and implicate the "'institutional conscience'" ( Aldrich v Thomson McKinnon Sec., 589 F. Supp. 683, 686, vacated on other grounds 756 F.2d 243), and to take preventative measures ( Loughry v Lincoln First Bank, 67 N.Y.2d 369, 377, supra).

Moreover, the record supports the conclusion that Jay D. Fischer remained the supervising attorney over the plaintiff's case while a partner at both Fischer Kagan and Proskauer Rose Goetz Mendelsohn, and therefore the defendants' argument that there was no continuous force which was active up until the time of the plaintiff's harm is disingenuous. As there is a question of fact as to whether Jay D. Fischer was continually negligent in pursuing the plaintiff's case after becoming a partner at Proskauer Rose Goetz Mendelsohn, Proskauer Rose Goetz Mendelsohn was not entitled to summary judgment (see, Partnership Law § 24; see generally, Barnhard v Barnhard, 179 A.D.2d 715). We further find that the legal malpractice action is not premature, as the plaintiff's damages are neither speculative nor incapable of being proven with reasonable certainty (cf., Brown v Samalin Bock, 168 A.D.2d 531). The record reflects, as the Supreme Court acknowledged upon reargument, that unsecured creditors most likely will not receive any distribution in the bankruptcy.

In addition to offering Jannetty's and Gammino's sworn, categorical denials of any knowledge of, or participation in, the granting of the Easement, and Gammino's personal repudiation of, what purports to be, his signature on page two of the Easement, movants assert that if there was fraudulent conduct, the conduct was that of Gomez, acting independently of his partners. Citing Barnhard v Barnhard (179 AD2d 716 [2d Dept 1992]) and its progeny, Jannetty and Gammino also assert that, despite their interest in the partnership, knowledge of Gomez's actions cannot be imputed to them because Gomez was acting outside the scope of the ordinary course of LMA business when he: surreptitiously granted the Easement; failed to inform his partners about the Easement; somehow arranged for Gammino's signature to appear on page two of the Easement without Gammino's knowledge or participation; and falsely stated that there were no encumbrances on the Property.

In addition to offering Jannetty's and Gammino's sworn, categorical denials of any knowledge of, or participation in, the granting of the Easement, and Gammino's personal repudiation of, what purports to be, his signature on page two of the Easement, movants assert that if there was fraudulent conduct, the conduct was that of Gomez, acting independently of his partners. Citing Barnhard v Barnhard ( 179 AD2d 716 [2d Dept 1992]) and its progeny, Jannetty and Gammino also assert that, despite their interest in the partnership, knowledge of Gomez's actions cannot be imputed to them because Gomez was acting outside the scope of the ordinary course of LMA business when he: surreptitiously granted the Easement; failed to inform his partners about the Easement; somehow arranged for Gammino's signature to appear on page two of the Easement without Gammino's knowledge or participation; and falsely stated that there were no encumbrances on the Property.

In addition to offering Jannetty's and Gammino's sworn, categorical denials of any knowledge of, or participation in, the granting of the Easement, and Gammino's personal repudiation of, what purports to be, his signature on page two of the Easement, movants assert that if there was fraudulent conduct, the conduct was that of Gomez, acting independently of his partners. Citing Barnhard v Barnhard ( 179 AD2d 716 [2d Dept 1992]) and its progeny, Jannetty and Gammino also assert that, despite their interest in the partnership, knowledge of Gomez's actions cannot be imputed to them because Gomez was acting outside the scope of the ordinary course of LMA business when he: surreptitiously granted the Easement; failed to inform his partners about the Easement; somehow arranged for Gammino's signature to appear on page two of the Easement without Gammino's knowledge or participation; and falsely stated that there were no encumbrances on the Property.