We do not possess jurisdiction to review such a finding. See Barney v. Shinseki, 464 F. App'x 884, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (no jurisdiction "to review the factual determination of service connection" (citing Johnson v. Derwinski, 949 F.2d 394, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1991))). Johnson's second contention, that his heart condition should be considered service-connected through his anemia condition, even if not waived, similarly presents a factual determination that we lack jurisdiction to address.

We have held that each of these arguments presents an issue that lies outside of our statutory jurisdiction. See Barney v. Shinseki, 464 F. App'x 884, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (no jurisdiction "to review the factual determination of service connection" (citing Johnson v. Derwinski, 949 F.2d 394, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1991))); Glover v. West, 185 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (no jurisdiction to review whether the duty to assist was breached in a particular case because it involves application of law to fact); Ferguson v. Principi, 273 F.3d 1072, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (no jurisdiction to review whether benefit of the doubt was correctly applied in any given case). We therefore conclude that we lack jurisdiction to hear his appeal.

Where, as here, service connection turns entirely on weighing the VA examiners' medical evaluations against Coley's testimony, and not on any statutory or regulatory presumptions, it presents a quintessential factual inquiry outside our limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Barney v. Shinseki, 464 F. App'x 884, 885 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing Johnson v. Derwinski, 949 F.2d 394, 395 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); cf. Lennox v. Principi, 353 F.3d 941, 945 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (evaluation of presumptive service connection may entail interpretation of statutes or regulations). Coley further argues that the Veterans Court misapplied § 3.159(a)(2), which defines competent lay evidence, but the court did not interpret that regulation. Although the Veterans Court did conclude that Coley was not competent to render a medical opinion about her DJD, Decision, 2018 WL 3006170, at *2, it did not question the Board's finding that Coley was competent to provide lay testimony about the circumstances surrounding the spider bite, Board Decision, slip op. at 11.