Opinion
CR–12–1450.
11-08-2013
Leon Maurice BARNETT v. STATE of Alabama.
Leon Maurice Barnett, pro se. Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Tracy M. Daniel, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Leon Maurice Barnett, pro se.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Tracy M. Daniel, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Opinion
BURKE, Judge.
Leon Maurice Barnett appeals the circuit court's summary dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. The petition challenged his convictions for one count of trafficking in marijuana, a violation of § 13A–12–231(1), Ala.Code 1975; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of § 13A–12–260, Ala.Code 1975; and two counts of the unlawful distribution of marijuana, violations of § 13A–12–211, Ala.Code 1975. He was sentenced as an habitual offender to life imprisonment for the trafficking conviction; to 15 years' imprisonment for each of his convictions for distribution of marijuana; and to 12 months' imprisonment for his conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia.
This Court affirmed Barnett's convictions and sentences in an unpublished memorandum issued on August 22, 2008. Barnett v. State (No. CR–06–1660), 27 So.3d 625 (Ala.Crim.App.2008) (table). After Barnett's petition for a writ of certiorari to this Court was quashed by the Alabama Supreme Court, this Court issued its certificate of judgment on April 10, 2009.
Barnett filed the instant petition, his first, on April 1, 2010. Barnett filed the standard Rule 32 form found in the appendix to Rule 32 and attached a supplement setting out his claims. In his supplement to the petition, Barnett raised four claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Barnett alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to object to the State's presentation of certificates of analysis concerning the marijuana “when no expert witness was subpoenaed to verify the report; thus, violating the Confrontation Clause”; (2) for failing to request that the trial court instruct the jurors that they could not draw any adverse inferences from Barnett's failure to testify on his own behalf; (3) for failing to object to the trial court's failure to swear the jury venire before voir dire; and (4) for failing to object to the State's failure “to establish the Frye [ v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923),] predicates” before presenting the certificates of analysis concerning the marijuana. (C. 15–16.) After receiving a response from the State, the circuit court summarily dismissed Barnett's petition on June 15, 2010. (C. 28–35.) After determining that Barnett did not receive notice of the dismissal, the circuit court granted Barnett an out-of-time appeal on March 12, 2013. (C. 50.)
Although the petition was not stamped as filed in the circuit clerk's office until April 14, 2010, Barnett certified that he placed the petition in the prison mail system on April 1, 2010. Thus, the petition is deemed filed on that date. Moody v. State, 95 So.3d 827, 833 n. 2 (Ala.Crim.App.2011).
On appeal, Barnett reiterates the claims raised in his petition and argues that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing his petition.
Concerning our review of a circuit court's dismissal of a Rule 32 petition, this Court has stated that “ ‘ “[i]f the circuit court is correct for any reason, even though it may not be the stated reason, we will not reverse its denial of the petition.” ’ ” McGahee v. State, 885 So.2d 191, 201 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (quoting Grady v. State, 831 So.2d 646, 648 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), quoting in turn Reed v. State, 748 So.2d 231, 233 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) ).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner must ultimately prove (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance actually prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). “To meet the first prong of the test, the petitioner must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable, considering all the circumstances.” Ex parte Lawley, 512 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Ala.1987). “ ‘This court must avoid using ‘hindsight’ to evaluate the performance of counsel. We must evaluate all the circumstances surrounding the case at the time of counsel's actions before determining whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance.' ” Lawhorn v. State, 756 So.2d 971, 979 (Ala.Crim.App.1999) (quoting Hallford v. State, 629 So.2d 6, 9 (Ala.Crim.App.1992) ). “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To prove prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693.
Under Rule 32.3, Ala. R.Crim. P.,
“[t]he petitioner shall have the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The state shall have the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion, but once a ground of preclusion has been pleaded, the petitioner shall have the burden of disproving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Under Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.,
“[e]ach claim in the petition must contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional right has been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings.”
In Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), this Court stated:
“ ‘Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition itself disclose the facts relied upon in seeking relief.’ Boyd v. State, 746 So.2d 364, 406 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). In other words, it is not the pleading of a conclusion ‘which, if true, entitle[s] the petitioner to relief.’ Lancaster v. State, 638 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Ala.Crim.App.1993). It is the allegation of facts in pleading which, if true, entitle a petitioner to relief. After facts are pleaded, which, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief, the petitioner is then entitled to an opportunity, as provided in Rule 32.9, Ala. R.Crim. P., to present evidence proving those alleged facts. ”
Furthermore, this Court has stated that
“[t]he burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b) is a heavy one. Conclusions unsupported by specific facts will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). The full factual basis for the claim must be included in the petition itself. If, assuming every factual allegation in a Rule 32 petition to be true, a court cannot determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the petitioner has not satisfied the burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). See Bracknell v. State, 883 So.2d 724 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). To sufficiently plead an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a Rule 32 petitioner not only must ‘identify the [specific] acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment,’
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), but also must plead specific facts indicating that he or she was prejudiced by the acts or omissions, i.e., facts indicating ‘that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ 466 U.S. at 694. A bare allegation that prejudice occurred without specific facts indicating how the petitioner was prejudiced is not sufficient.”
Hyde v. State, 950 So.2d 344, 356 (Ala.Crim.App.2006).
The circuit court may summarily dismiss a Rule 32 petition pursuant to Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R.Crim. P.,
“[i]f the court determines that the petition is not sufficiently specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the petitioner to relief under this rule and that no purpose would be served by any further proceedings....”
In his petition, Barnett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims failed to sufficiently plead facts supporting the rule set forth in Strickland. Concerning claims (1) and (4) in his petition, Barnett failed to plead any fact that, if true, would show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's failure to object to the introduction of the certificates of analysis, the result of his trial would have been different. Barnett failed to state that the certificates of analysis were inaccurate; that the analyzed substances upon which his convictions were based were not marijuana; that his ability to confront the forensic scientists who prepared the reports would have changed the outcome of the proceeding; that the certificates were, in fact, inadmissible under the Frye test; or any other fact that would show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's failure to object to the introduction of the certificates of analysis, the result of his trial would have been different. Therefore, Barnett failed to plead facts that would support a finding that his trial counsel's performance actually prejudiced the defense.
Likewise, concerning claim (2) in his petition, Barnett failed to plead any fact that, if true, would show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction concerning Barnett's failure to testify, the result of his trial would have been different. Barnett also failed to plead any fact that would show that his trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction concerning Barnett's failure to testify fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In his petition, Barnett simply made the conclusory allegation that his “counsel's failure to request such an instruction amounted to ineffective assistance, and he was prejudiced as a result.” (C. 21.)
This Court has held that a “no-adverse-inference” instruction is mandatory only if the instruction is requested, and we have recognized that trial counsel may make a strategic decision to not request such an instruction because he or she believes that it would unduly direct the jury's attention to the fact that the defendant chose not to testify. See Phillips v. State, 726 So.2d 292, 295 (Ala.Crim.App.1998). Furthermore, this Court has stated that the failure to give a requested “no-adverse-inference” instruction “may be harmless where the evidence without material conflict shows that the accused committed the crime and the failure of the accused to testify was not commented upon by counsel or referred to in any manner.”Gaston v. State, 359 So.2d 1170, 1171 (Ala.Crim.App.1978).
In his petition, Barnett failed to plead any facts that, if true, would show that his trial counsel's decision to not request a “no-adverse-inference” instruction could not have been justified as a strategic decision. Barnett also failed to plead facts that, if true, would show that his failure to testify was commented upon or was otherwise used against him at trial. Further, Barnett failed to plead any other facts that, if true, would show that his trial counsel's failure to request a “no-adverse-inference” instruction fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and reasonably could have changed the result of his trial. Therefore, Barnett failed to plead facts that would support a finding that his trial counsel's performance was deficient or that would support a finding that his counsel's performance actually prejudiced the defense.
Similarly, concerning claim (3) in his petition, Barnett failed to plead any fact that, if true, would show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's failure to swear the venire before voir dire, the result of his trial would have been different. Initially, we note that it is undisputed that the petit jury was sworn. See Brooks v. State, 845 So.2d 849, 851 n. 4 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) (stating that “there is a difference between a claim that the trial court failed to administer the oath to both the venire and the petit jury—which is a jurisdictional claim—and a claim that the trial court failed to administer the oath to either the venire or the petit jury—neither of which are, by themselves, jurisdictional claims”). In his petition, Barnett simply alleged that the record was silent as to the swearing of the venire and that he was entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel did not object to the trial court's failure to swear the venire. Again, Barnett did not allege any actual prejudice caused by his trial counsel's failure to object. For example, Barnett did not allege that an unsworn veniremember falsely answered a question propounded to him or her and that, if that veniremember had been sworn, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.
To support the claim in his petition, Barnett cited Ex parte Hamlett, 815 So.2d 499 (Ala.2000), and its progeny. In Hamlett, the defendant filed a Rule 32 petition in which he argued that his conviction should be set aside because, he said, the venire was not properly sworn and his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to preserve that error for review. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that it could not tell from the record whether the venire had been sworn and that it could not reach the petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without knowing whether the venire had been sworn. Thus, the case was remanded to the circuit court to determine whether the venire was properly sworn. However, the opinion in Hamlett simply does not discuss the prejudice prong of Strickland. Likewise, other cases that have relied on Hamlett to remand the case to the circuit court to determine whether the venire was properly sworn and to address the petitioners' postconviction ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims have failed to discuss the prejudice prong of Strickland. See, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 939 So.2d 51, 54–55 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) ; Burgin v. State, 857 So.2d 162, 164 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) ; Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 2, 4–5 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) ; and Evans v. State, 842 So.2d 22, 24 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).
Perhaps the petitions in these cases sufficiently pleaded a claim of prejudice under Strickland and that fact was not mentioned in the opinions, or perhaps no one argued that the petition did not sufficiently plead a claim of prejudice. In any event, we find that, under Rules 32.3 and 32.6(b), Ala. R.Crim. P., and Strickland, a petitioner who asserts a claim of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel always has the burden of specifically pleading how the deficient performance actually prejudiced the defense, even if the allegedly deficient performance was trial counsel's failure to object to the trial court's failure to swear the venire.
Based on Barnett's petition, even assuming that the trial court failed to swear the venire and that his trial counsel did not object to that failure, a court cannot determine whether Barnett is entitled to relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because he did not plead specific facts indicating that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's omission. See Hyde, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that Barnett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was insufficient on its face and that summary disposition of the claim was appropriate. See Lott v. State, 826 So.2d 457, 459 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002) (holding that the defendant's postconviction claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's failure to swear the venire was properly summarily denied because the defendant did not allege that the omission by his counsel caused any harm).
All Barnett's claims are merely bare allegations, unsupported by any factual basis; accordingly, they fail to satisfy either his burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 or the specificity requirements of Rule 32.6(b). Even assuming that every factual allegation in Barnett's Rule 32 petition is true, he has failed to plead any facts suggesting that trial counsel's performance actually prejudiced the defense. Because Barnett's claims were not sufficiently pleaded, the circuit court did not err in summarily dismissing his petition.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
WINDOM, P.J., and WELCH, J., concur. KELLUM, J., concurs in the result. JOINER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
JOINER, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the portions of the opinion addressing claims (1), (2), and (4); I dissent, however, with that part of the opinion addressing claim (3).
In his petition, Barnett claimed, among other things, that the jury venire was not sworn and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object; Barnett cited specific portions of the record in support of his claim and cited caselaw supporting his contention that failing to administer an oath to the jury venire is reversible error. The State did not dispute Barnett's claim. (C. 28–31.) In a subsequent order summarily dismissing Barnett's claims, the circuit court dismissed Barnett's petition concluding, among other things, that Barnett's allegation that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's failure to administer an oath to the jury venire (“jury-oath claim”) was insufficiently pleaded because Barnett did not allege prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
On appeal, Barnett reiterates those claims raised in his petition, including his jury-oath claim. The majority opinion concludes that Barnett's jury-oath claim was insufficiently pleaded because “Barnett did not allege any actual prejudice caused by his trial counsel's failure to object.” 154 So.3d at 259. In support of this conclusion, the majority opinion discusses and distinguishes Ex parte Hamlett, 815 So.2d 499 (Ala.2000), as well as Wheeler v. State, 939 So.2d 51, 54–55 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), Burgin v. State, 857 So.2d 162, 164 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), Wilson v. State, 845 So.2d 2, 4–5 (Ala.Crim.App.2002), and Evans v. State, 842 So.2d 22, 24 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), on the basis that those decisions “have failed to discuss the prejudice prong of Strickland ” with respect to postconviction claims raising ineffective assistance of counsel related to an unsworn jury venire. I disagree with the majority's reading of these cases; although I understand the position the majority is taking—and question the continued workability of Ex parte Hamlett and its progeny—I dissent because I believe the majority opinion conflicts with caselaw from both this Court and the Alabama Supreme Court.
The majority opinion tries to distinguish Ex parte Hamlett, Wheeler, Burgin, Wilson, and Evans on the basis that those decisions “have failed to discuss the prejudice prong of Strickland. ” Those cases, however, establish that the success of a petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is contingent upon whether the jury venire was actually sworn. Specifically, this Court in Fortner v. State, 825 So.2d 876 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), stated:
“Our rereading of Hamlett teaches us ... that the [Alabama Supreme] Court remanded the cause to the circuit court both because it would not assume from a silent record that the venire had been sworn and because it could not reach Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without knowing whether Hamlett's counsel had in fact rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court's alleged failure to administer the oath to the venire. Thus, because of Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the Court could not simply find that Hamlett had waived his claim that the venire had not been sworn because that claim had a direct bearing on the result of Hamlett's claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. If the Court allowed the waiver of the jury-swearing claim, it effectively allowed the waiver of Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, which would have been contrary to the law in Alabama concerning the waivability of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”
825 So.2d at 879–80 (emphasis added). This Court followed the holding of Fortner in Burgin —a case nearly identical to this one and written by then Judge Shaw—in which this Court held:
“Burgin contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the trial court's alleged failure to swear in the jury venire before the voir dire examination. In its response and motion to dismiss, the State argued that the venire was sworn and that Burgin's claim in this regard was meritless. However, the record from Burgin's direct appeal is silent as to whether the venire was sworn. The circuit court had before it conflicting allegations regarding whether the venire was properly sworn. In its order summarily denying Burgin's petition, the circuit court found that ‘the petition is without merit,’ but it did not make specific findings of fact regarding whether the venire was sworn. (C. 233.) From the record before us, we simply cannot evaluate the merits of Burgin's claim that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the alleged failure to swear the venire without knowing whether the venire was, in fact, sworn. See, e.g., Ex parte Hamlett, 815 So.2d 499 (Ala.2000), and Fortner v. State, 825 So.2d 876 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).”
857 So.2d at 164 (emphasis added).
Unlike the majority, I do not read the progeny of Ex parte Hamlett as simply ignoring the prejudice prong of Strickland. Instead, I read both Fortner and Burgin as applying a per se prejudice standard, presumably because the failure to swear a jury venire—when preserved—is reversible error. See Ex parte Benford, 935 So.2d 421, 429 (Ala.2006) (“ ‘A trial court's failure to administer the oath to a jury venire, while reversible error, does not rob the trial court of its jurisdiction to render judgment and to impose sentence against a defendant.’ ” (quoting Fortner v. State, 825 So.2d 876, 879–80 (Ala.Crim.App.2001) )); Ex parte Deramus, 721 So.2d 242, 244 (Ala.1998) (“The fact that the record is silent as to whether the trial court reminded the petit jurors that they were still under oath or administered another oath would be reversible error only if Deramus had objected to that defect ‘during the progress of the trial.’ Ala.Code 1975, § 12–16–173.”); Holland v. State, 668 So.2d 107, 108 (Ala.Crim.App.1995) (“If, however, the trial court determines that the oath was not administered, or if the trial court cannot determine whether the oath was administered, the trial court is directed to set aside the appellant's conviction and to grant the appellant a new trial or other relief consistent with this opinion.”); Tarver v. State, 500 So.2d 1232, 1242 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (“In the case before us, the record affirmatively shows that the prospective jurors were properly sworn and thus, were properly qualified.... There is no basis of error to reversal here.”).
The holding in Fortner —and by extension the holding in Burgin —was later cited and expressly approved by the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Benford. See Ex parte Benford, 935 So.2d at 429 (“We conclude that the Fortner court correctly interpreted our opinion in Hamlett .”). Ex parte Hamlett is still the law of this State, and, pursuant to Ex parte Benford, our interpretation of Ex parte Hamlett in Fortner is still viable; this Court is not in a position to overrule decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court. Applying this caselaw to the current case, I conclude that Barnett is entitled to a remand for an evidentiary hearing.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that Ex parte Hamlett was correct when it was decided, and I question whether Fortner and Burgin —along with a number of other cases that attempt to interpret and limit Ex parte Hamlett —are workable interpretations of Ex parte Hamlett.
In Ex parte Hamlett, the Alabama Supreme Court addressed a petitioner's postconviction claim that the jury venire in his case was not sworn; the Ex parte Hamlett Court apparently addressed this jury-venire-oath claim independently—i.e., not associated with an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—and addressed the claim without respect to possible preclusionary grounds. See Ex parte Hamlett, 815 So.2d at 500–01 (“Therefore, we do not reach Hamlett's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We remand this case for the Court of Criminal Appeals to remand for the trial court to make such findings as are necessary to determine whether the venire was properly sworn.”). Such analysis is puzzling, especially in light of Ex parte Deramus —a case decided well before Ex parte Hamlett —which holds that a jury-oath-defect claim is waivable. See Ex parte Deramus, 721 So.2d at 244 (“The fact that the record is silent as to whether the trial court reminded the petit jurors that they were still under oath or administered another oath would be reversible error only if Deramus had objected....”). It is unclear, then, why the majority decision in Ex parte Hamlett would address the independent jury-venire-oath claim outside the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and, further, without respect to the possible preclusionary grounds that apply to a claim that, as recognized a few years earlier by that same court, is waivable.
The treatment of the jury-oath claim in Ex parte Hamlett —without reference to preclusionary grounds and before the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—appears to have immediately caused problems for this Court.
A year after Ex parte Hamlett was decided, this Court in Nix v. State, 819 So.2d 84 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), “held that a claim that the jury venire was not sworn before voir dire was jurisdictional and could not be waived or precluded” but then almost immediately overruled Nix in Fortner, concluding that “Ex parte Hamlett does not indicate that we are to treat jury-swearing issues as jurisdictional and therefore nonwaivable.” Ex parte Benford, 935 So.2d at 428 (quotations omitted). This Court in Fortner —after a “rereading of Ex parte Hamlett ”—offered the following explanation of the rationale of Ex parte Hamlett:
“[T]he [Supreme] Court remanded the cause to the circuit court both because it would not assume from a silent record that the venire had been sworn and because it could not reach Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without knowing whether Hamlett's counsel had in fact rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court's alleged failure to administer the oath to the venire. Thus, because of Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the Court could not simply find that Hamlett had waived his claim that the venire had not been sworn because that claim had a direct bearing on the result of Hamlett's claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. If the Court allowed the waiver of the jury-swearing claim, it effectively allowed the waiver of Hamlett's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim, which would have been contrary to the law in Alabama concerning the waivability of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.”
825 So.2d at 879–80. As established earlier in my writing, the Alabama Supreme Court later expressly approved Fortner in Ex parte Benford. This Court's rationale in Fortner, however, is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, the legal principle that this Court “would not assume from a silent record that the venire had been sworn,” Fortner, supra, does not appear to have any import in a postconviction-relief appeal; “Rule 32 provides a limited scope of review,” Acra v. State, 105 So.3d 460, 464 (Ala.Crim.App.2012), and the existence of error in the trial record is not itself a basis for postconviction relief.
Second, in the postconviction-relief setting, it is simply incorrect that this Court or a circuit court “could not reach [an] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim without knowing whether ... counsel had in fact rendered ineffective assistance.” Fortner, supra. Instead, this Court addresses the substance of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised in a petition for postconviction relief only if a petitioner pleads facts—satisfying the two prongs of Strickland —which, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Boyd v. State, 913 So.2d 1113, 1125 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). Put another way, this Court does not predetermine the outcome of a claim before addressing the claim; instead, the claim must be sufficiently pleaded and then, and only then, will that claim be addressed.
Third, and finally, it is not true that allowing “the waiver of the jury-swearing claim, [would] effectively allow[ ] the waiver of [an] ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim.” Fortner, supra. As an example, a claim that a defendant was denied a fair trial based on the State's use of peremptory strikes is procedurally barred in the postconviction setting, but an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on the same allegation may still be raised in a first, timely filed petition for postconviction relief. Boyd v. State, 746 So.2d 364, 382 (Ala.Crim.App.1999).
For these reasons, I believe that Ex parte Hamlett was incorrectly decided, and I also believe that those cases that try to interpret it are no longer workable. I strongly urge the Alabama Supreme Court to review its decision in Ex parte Hamlett; Ex parte Hamlett and its progeny, however, are still the law, and the majority opinion conflicts with Ex parte Benford, Fortner, and Burgin. Accordingly, I dissent from this portion of the majority opinion.