When assessing equal protection challenges, a statute is tested under a standard of strict scrutiny if it either operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class or interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right.... If neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is affected by the statute, the statute need only bear a rational relationship to some legitimate state purpose. [288 Ga. 247] Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472, 472, 510 S.E.2d 527 (1999) (citations and punctuation omitted).          The defendants do not contend that they are members of a suspect class.

¶ 16. In Barnett v. State, 510 S.E.2d 527 (Ga. 1999), the Georgia Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to OCGA § 40-6-391 (k), which set forth a blood alcohol concentration standard of .02 grams for persons under the age of twenty-one and a standard of .10 grams for persons over age twenty-one. The court held that the statute bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate state purposes of the protection of the public safety and safeguarding the physical well-being of children.

An equal protection challenge is assessed under the "rational relationship" test when neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is affected by the challenged statute. Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472 ( 510 S.E.2d 527) (1999). Since neither the right to drive nor the ingestion of marijuana is a fundamental right and appellant's status as one with a low level of metabolites in his bodily fluids is not a suspect class, the legislative classification created by subsection (a)(6) can withstand constitutional assault "`when the classification is based on rational distinctions and bears a direct and real relation to the legitimate object or purpose of the legislation.' [Cit.

[Cit.]"Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472 ( 510 SE2d 527) (1999). Although inmates of correctional facilities are seriously disadvantaged when they are compared to individuals at liberty and although they are the subject of political hostility, they do not constitute a suspect class because their status is the result of precise, individualized application of otherwise neutral laws.

Under this test, a legislative classification will be upheld as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.Central State Univ. v. Am. Assn. of Univ. Professors, 526 U. S. 124, 127-128 ( 119 SC 1162, 143 LE2d 227) (1999); Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472, 472 ( 510 SE2d 527) (1999).Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Central Iowa, 539 U. S. 103, 107 (123 SC 2156, 156 LE2d 97) (2003); Rouse v. Dept. of Nat. Resources, 271 Ga. 726, 730 ( 524 SE2d 455) (1999).

For discussion of the Homestead Freeze LCA's effect upon a constitutional right to travel, see Division 4, infra. Although the trial court's language would seem to implicate the heightened equal protection test of strict scrutiny for classifications involving suspect classes, see generally Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472 ( 510 S.E.2d 527) (1999), we do not find strict scrutiny appropriate in this case. A facially neutral law, such as the LCA here, warrants strict scrutiny "only if it can be proved that the law was `motivated by a racial purpose or object,' [cit.], or if it is `"unexplainable on grounds other than race."' [Cit.]"

Farley, 272 Ga. at 433, quoting Reed, 264 Ga. at 467.Kendrick v. Hollingsworth Concrete Products, 274 Ga. 210 ( 553 S.E.2d 270) (2001); Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472 ( 510 S.E.2d 527) (1999); Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406, 407 ( 383 S.E.2d 555) (1989). Id.

As the statute at issue does not affect a fundamental right or a suspect class, to survive Odett's constitutional challenge it "need only bear a rational relationship to some legitimate state purpose." Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472 ( 510 S.E.2d 527) (1999). "The State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors is compelling and beyond the need for elaboration."

Clearly, law enforcement and public safety are compelling and legitimate state purposes. See Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472 ( 510 S.E.2d 527) (1999). However, the State is not entitled to exercise indiscriminate subpoena power as an investigative substitute for procedural devices otherwise available to it in the criminal context, such as a search warrant.Johnson v. State, 156 Ga. App. 496 ( 274 S.E.2d 837) (1980) (State cannot use a notice to produce as a procedural substitute for a search warrant).

For these reasons, we conclude that Rouse's equal protection challenge is without merit. Barnett v. State, 270 Ga. 472 ( 510 S.E.2d 527) (1999); City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 187-88 ( 475 S.E.2d 896) (1996); Craven v. Lowndes County Hosp. Authority, 263 Ga. 657, 659 ( 437 S.E.2d 308) (1993).Watson, 267 Ga. at 187-88.