Opinion
1:23-cv-248
01-02-2024
JOMO BARNETT, Plaintiff v. HONORABLE JUDGE J. MEAD, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. Recommendation
It is recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff, a pre-trial detainee awaiting trial at the Erie County Prison, commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on August 21, 2023. ECF No. 1. He filed a document purporting to be an Amended Complaint on September 5, 2023. See ECF No. 2-1. In his pleadings, Plaintiff maintains that a host of individuals acting pursuant to state law have violated his constitutional rights during an ongoing criminal drug prosecution in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. Included among the many Defendants are: the judge overseeing his criminal proceedings; the district attorney, assistant district attorney, and public defender involved in his prosecution; the police officers who effectuated his arrest and secured evidence during a contemporaneous security sweep; and numerous governmental entities including Erie County, the City of Erie Police Department, the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, the Erie County District Attorney's Office, and the Erie County Public Defender's Office. ECF No. 1.
The Court granted Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis on December 12, 2023. ECF No. 10.
According to Plaintiff, he was arrested on August 26, 2021, at his girlfriend's house. The arrest was executed by City of Erie police officers pursuant to a warrant. During a protective sweep, officers took photographs and obtained illegal drugs and other contraband. Plaintiff maintains that state officials, including the trial judge, district attorney, his own attorney, and various police officers, have thwarted his repeated attempts to obtain this evidence through the discovery process to assist in his defense. He also maintains that the prosecution has tampered with evidence and accuses Judge Mead of failing to resolve his pending motion to dismiss. In addition to seeking monetary compensation, Plaintiff requests that the officers of the district attorney and public defender be forced to undergo training “about the importance and the necessity of Pennsylvania Rule(s) of Professional Conduct” and that the drug evidence against him be evaluated by an independent laboratory.
B. Standard for review'
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see ECF No. 4, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D 'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997)
C. Analysis
Plaintiffs claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915 for several reasons. Most pressingly, Plaintiffs challenge to his ongoing prosecution and detention is barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: “to recover damages [or other relief] for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote and internal citation omitted). In other words, “a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). Notably, the Heck bar applies “whether Plaintiff is still a pre-trial detainee or whether he has already been convicted of the charges for which he is currently incarcerated.” Keys v. Pennsylvania, 2011 WL 766978, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2011) (citing Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir.1996) (“In terms of the conflicts which Heck sought to avoid, there is no difference between a conviction which is outstanding at the time the civil rights action is instituted and a potential conviction on a pending charge that may be entered at some point thereafter. Because of these concerns, we hold that a claim that, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction on a pending criminal charge is not cognizable under § 1983.”)).
Although Heck is dispositive, the Court notes that many of the Defendants are protected by absolute immunity. It is a well-settled “that judges are generally immune from a suit for money damages.” Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). The same is true of public defenders and, in many situations, prosecutors. Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[P]ublic defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.”) (quoting Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 320 (3d Cir. 1982); Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[P]rosecutors are immune from claims arising from their conduct in beginning a prosecution, including soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings, presenting a state's case at trial, and appearing before a judge to present evidence.”).
In his complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that he has not yet been convicted of the charges pending in the Erie County of Common Pleas, much less had a conviction reversed or overturned. A review of his state court docket confirms this. See Commonwealth v. Barnett, No. CP-25-CR-462-2022. Consequently, Plaintiffs claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. See, e.g., Keys, 2011 WL 766978, at *14 (“Since Plaintiff has not been convicted of the 7 charges filed against by Defendant Wilson, and since no conviction in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas has as of yet been reversed or overturned, Plaintiffs present challenge to his pending criminal case and his claims regarding who was responsible for the incident at SCI-Dallas are Heck-barred.,,); Ortiz v. New Jersey State Police, 747 Fed.Appx. 73, 77 (3d Cir. 2018) (claims that the defendants fabricated and suppressed evidence are barred by Heck because success on those claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiffs conviction); Spuck v. Clearfield Cnty., Pa., 540 Fed.Appx. 73, 74 (3d Cir. 2013) (allegations of prosecutorial misconduct related to “destroying or refusing to turn over exculpatory evidence” barred by Heck). That said, these claims should be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs ability to file a new complaint challenging the same conduct if he is convicted and his conviction is later overturned.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Considering the many deficiencies identified in this order, including Heck v. Humphrey and absolute immunity, it is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile. However, said dismissal should be without prejudice in two respects: (1) Plaintiff is not precluded from challenging his conviction in a timely-filed habeas corpus petition if, in fact, he is later convicted; and (2) Plaintiff may file a renewed § 1983 seeking damages for malicious prosecution or abuse of process if any such criminal conviction is later overturned. All other claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Ch. 2007).