Id. Consequently, we will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel only when the court acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, without reference to any guiding principles. See Barnett v. Cty. of Dall., 175 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).

The introduction of such evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that the person named in the tax records is liable for the taxes in the amount stated, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut that presumption. SeeBarnett v. County of Dallas , 175 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2005, no pet.) ; Pete Dominguez Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Dallas , 188 S.W.3d 385, 387 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2006, no pet.). However, this statutory presumption of ownership arises only if the defendant named in the lawsuit is the person or entity identified in the records.

Consequently, we will reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel only when the trial court acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, without reference to any guiding principles. See Barnett v. County of Dallas, 175 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Years ago, the Texas Supreme Court cautioned that:

An appellate court should reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel only when the trial court acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, without reference to any guiding principles. Macy, 294 S.W.3d at 651; see also Barnett v. Cty. of Dall., 175 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). GFH and Gonzalez argue that, despite several requests, Kraken refused to provide any documents or make any documents available for copying and inspection as requested in their requests for production sent to Kraken on July 23, 2013.

Additionally, as to "conflicting evidence on market value," a defendant "may not challenge the property's appraised value in a suit to collect delinquent taxes." Barnett v. Cty. of Dallas, 175 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing TAX CODE § 42.09); accord City of Bellaire v. Sewell, 426 S.W.3d 116, 121-22 & n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). We decide against Asymblix on its second issue.

In fact, Section 42.09(b) of the Code was amended by the Legislature in 1987 in response to Robstown Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Anderson, 706 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1986), which held a non-ownership defense was waived because the taxpayer did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Barnett v. Cty. of Dall., 175 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.) (citing Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. City of Corpus Christi, 850 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied)). That amendment further clarified the Legislature's intent "that it desires the taxpayer to always have available the defense that he did not own the property."

An appellate court should reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel only when the trial court acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, without reference to any guiding principles. See Barnett v. County of Dallas, 175 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Discovery requests must be reasonably tailored to include only matters relevant to the case.

Moreover, public tax records are available to both parties and need not be produced in discovery. See Barnett v. County of Dallas, 175 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Finally, the best evidence rule was not raised when the map was offered, but was raised when Capps's testified to paying tax bills.

An appellate court should reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel only when the trial court acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, without reference to any guiding principles. See Barnett v. County of Dallas, 175 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). Macy states that he "attempted to pursue discovery regarding Revenue Management System and the `substantial impact' of a potential $60 Million write down on the company's books and records as compared to the accrual balance Macy was accused of accumulating."

An appellate court should reverse a trial court's ruling on a motion to compel only when the court acts in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, without reference to any guiding principles. See Barnett v. County of Dallas, 175 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). 2.