And in Altmeyer v. Fassig, et al., 114 W. Va. 266, 171 S.E. 529, we held that where a demurrer to a bill of complaint had been overruled at a special term held September 10 that an order could be entered on October 11 regularly filing an answer thereto, basing the decision upon the fact that acting upon the demurrer at a special term violated a rule of the circuit court, and consequently furnished good cause for extending the time to file an answer under Code, 56-4-56. It probably would have been more sound to hold that the order overruling the demurrer and entered at a special term in violation of the court's rule was void, instead of that it furnished good cause for an extension of time. As opposed to the holdings in the Carleton case and the Altmeyer case we have the statement of this Court in Barnes v. Warth, Judge, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547, the syllabus of which reads as follows: "Under the provisions of Code, 56-4-56, a trial chancellor cannot enlarge the time for filing answer to a bill of complaint after a demurrer or plea thereto has been overruled, unless motion for such enlargement is made within fifteen days from the entry of the order overruling demurrer or plea."

In the recent case of State ex rel. Sangster v. Sencindiver, 153 W. Va. 548, 170 S.E.2d 673, this Court held that it was the mandatory duty of the judge of a circuit court to dismiss certain parties, as required by Section 34, Article 4, Chapter 56, Code, 1931, as amended, on the ground of misjoinder and that mandamus lies to compel the performance of such duty. It is clear that in that case the duty of the circuit court to dismiss the parties from the case was a ministerial or nondiscretionary duty. In Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547, this Court awarded a writ of mandamus which required the judge of the Common Pleas Court of Cabell County to vacate and set aside an order previously entered by him which permitted a defendant to file an answer in a suit after the expiration of 15 days from the date of an order which overruled a demurrer to an amended bill of complaint. In Biggs v. Moats, 117 W. Va. 14, 183 S.E. 603, this Court held in point 2 of the syllabus that the Supreme Court of Appeals may by mandamus require a trial chancellor to enforce a decree entered by him awarding suit money to a woman to enable her to prosecute an appeal from an adverse decree in a divorce suit.

" Although the revisers' note to this section states that it "omits provision for the rule to answer and prescribes in lieu thereof a definite time within which the defendant must answer after plea or demurrer overruled.", a discussion of the section by Mr. Leo Carlin in the West Virginia Law Quarterly, Volume 40, Page 360, shortly after the revision, in which he said that the final effect of the provision must await "the test of judicial construction," has proved prophetic in view of the many exceptions to the rule which have been established by decisions of this Court. State ex rel. Trent v. Amick, 137 W. Va. 842, 74 S.E.2d 587; Powell v. Sayres, 134 W. Va. 653, 60 S.E.2d 740; Wolford v. Wolford, 133 W. Va. 403, 56 S.E.2d 614; Strachan v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 130 W. Va. 692, 44 S.E.2d 845; Smith v. City of Parkersburg, 125 W. Va. 415, 24 S.E.2d 588; Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547. It is not necessary to here review all of those cases, and none will be specifically referred to except State ex rel. Trent v. Amick, supra, although it is interesting to compare Wolford v. Wolford, supra, with Crouch v. Crouch, 124 W. Va. 331, 20 S.E.2d 169.

"A plaintiff in equity may have any plea or demurrer set down to be argued. If the same be overruled, no other plea or demurrer shall afterwards be received, but the defendant shall file his answer, in court, if in session, or, if not in session, in the clerk's office of the court in which the suit is pending, within fifteen days after the overruling of his plea or demurrer, unless, for good cause shown, the time is enlarged by the court, or the judge thereof in vacation; and if he fail to appear and answer the bill within such fifteen days, or additional time, if any such be granted, the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree against him for the relief prayed for therein, * * *". In the case of Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547, this Court held that enlargement of the time for filing an answer must be done within the fifteen day period from the entry of an order overruling a plea or demurrer. This Court again considered Code, 56-4-56 in the case of Strachan v. Insurance Co., 130 W. Va. 692, 44 S.E.2d 845.

The prayer of the petition in this proceeding to review the disposition of the real and personal property is not appropriate. Mandamus will not be utilized as a substitute for an appeal or writ of error. State v. County Court, 33 W. Va. 589, 11 S.E. 72. See Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 776, 22 S.E.2d 547; Smith v. Road Com., 110 W. Va. 296, 299, 158 S.E. 163. The jurisdiction of a circuit court sitting in equity to make a disposition of property will be found in Chapter 70, Article 2, Section 15, Acts of the Legislature, 1953, Regular Session, reading in part as follows: "* * * For the purpose of making effectual any order or decree provided for in this section the court, or judge thereof in vacation, may make any order or decree concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them, as it shall deem expedient."

The genesis of the principle just stated will be found in Coal Corp. v. Herndon, 101 W. Va. 445, 449, 132 S.E. 879, where it is said, "The other points are to the effect that petitioner coal corporation has other adequate and complete remedies by way of appeal, or, not being a party, could obtain relief by bill of review. The answer to this is that prohibition is a writ of right made so by the statute * * * and petitioner may elect to pursue it rather than to proceed by some other method. It is a quick, inexpensive and adequate method of stopping litigation where there is no jurisdiction. Why wait the tedious length of chancery litigation to ascertain if the very foundation of the case, jurisdiction, is wanting?". To the same general effect are the holdings of this court in Wolfe v. Shaw, Judge, 133 W. Va. 735, 738, 169 S.E. 325; Morris v. Calhoun, 119 W. Va. 603, 195 S.E. 341; White Sulphur Springs v. Ripley, 124 W. Va. 486, 491, et. seq. 20 S.E.2d 794; Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 775, 22 S.E.2d 547. See State v. Easley, 129 W. Va. 410, 414, 40 S.E.2d 827; Cosner v. See, 129 W. Va. 722, 748, 42 S.E. 31; Staley v. Hereford, 131 W. Va. 84, 45 S.E.2d 738; Fisher v. Bouchelle, 134 W. Va. 333, 337, 61 S.E.2d 305.

Code, 56-4-56, quoted above, has been given consideration by this Court in a number of cases. Its history may be gathered from the following cases: Powell v. Sayres, 134 W. Va. 653, 60 S.E.2d 740; Wolford v. Wolford, 133 W. Va. 403, 56 S.E.2d 614; Strachan v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 130 W. Va. 692, 44 S.E.2d 845; Smith v. City of Parkersburg, 125 W. Va. 415, 24 S.E.2d 588; Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547. In the Strachan case this Court held: "Upon demurrer to a bill of complaint being overruled, and after the lapse of the time provided by Code, 56-4-56, for the filing of an answer or of a proper extension of that time as therein provided, without the incoming of an answer, the right of the plaintiff to a default decree as upon a bill taken for confessed becomes absolute.

Wolford v. Wolford, 133 W. Va. 403, 56 S.E.2d 614. In Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547, it was held that a motion for an enlargement of time for filing an answer must be made within the fifteen-day period following the entry of an order overruling a demurrer. The principles announced in the Strachan and Wolford cases have been developed in a number of comparatively recent cases.

From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that a bill of complaint in a suit for seperate maintenance, when no divorce is prayed for, unlike a bill of complaint in a statutory suit for divorce, may be taken for confessed against a defendant who fails to appear, as provided generally in Code, 56-4-49, and that the failure of a defendant in such suit to file his answer to the bill of complaint within fifteen days after his demurrer has been overruled when that period of time has not been enlarged, entitles a plaintiff to a decree against him for the relief prayed for in the bill of complaint as provided in Code, 1931, 56-4-56. Strachan v. Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 130 W. Va. 692, 44 S.E.2d 845; Barnes v. Warth, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547; Hughes v. McElwee, 120 W. Va. 176, 197 S.E. 631; Kinkead v. Securo, 112 W. Va. 671, 166 S.E. 382. By virtue of the statute just referred to and upon the authority of the above cited cases, the answer of the defendant, which was not tendered or filed until December 10, 1946, almost six months after his demurrer to the bill of complaint had been overruled, was properly rejected. For the same reason, however, the action of the circuit court in refusing to enter a proper decree in favor of the plaintiff upon her bill of complaint was clearly erroneous.

In State v. Tate, 125 W. Va. 38, 22 S.E.2d 868, a criminal case, it was held: "A bill of exceptions signed by the trial judge after the expiration of sixty days from the date of adjournment of court for the term during which the final judgment in the case was entered, where no extension of time for that purpose has been made within sixty days, is void." That case holds two things: (1) That a bill of exceptions must be signed within the sixty-day period prescribed by the statute; or (2) within such extension or extensions of time as has or have been made by the trial court, within the sixty-day period prescribed by statute, or within the extension period or periods. Reasoning by analogy, the same principle was applied in Barnes v. Warth, Judge, 124 W. Va. 773, 22 S.E.2d 547. It was there held that under the provisions of Code, 56-4-56, any extension of the fifteen-day period allowed for the filing of an answer in a chancery cause, after the overruling of a demurrer or plea to a bill, must be ordered within the fifteen-day period provided by statute for the filing of such answer. In the case at bar, petitioner had sixty days within which to obtain its bill of exceptions. Had it secured an extension of that time, by an order entered before the expiration of the first sixty-day period, or before the expiration of any extension period thereafter granted, its right to have signed its bill of exceptions, or, in lieu thereof, a certificate of the evidence, would have continued.