Barnes v. State

34 Citing cases

  1. Parker v. State

    691 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1997)   Cited 7 times

    1973).Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1234 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added). This case is a gray one. Did the testimony belong in the State's case-in-chief or rebuttal? Since it is a close call, the circuit court judge is afforded discretion.

  2. Martin v. State

    2002 KA 607 (Miss. 2003)   Cited 33 times
    Addressing the definition of reasonable doubt

    This Court has long held that a definition of reasonable doubt is not a proper instruction for the jury; "[r]easonable doubt defines itself." Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Boutwell v.State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479, 483 (1932)). ¶ 13.

  3. Parker v. State

    606 So. 2d 1132 (Miss. 1992)   Cited 104 times
    In Parker, because the trial at issue was a retrial of the same charges of the earlier trial, we held the witness' former testimony was admissible.

    Id. See also Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988), and Johnson v. State, 347 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1977).

  4. Marbra v. State

    2003 KA 2142 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 17 times

    He reasoned that Mississippi courts should side with a majority of courts that allow a jury to be instructed on the definition of reasonable doubt. The circuit court recognized that in Barnes v. State 532 So.2d 1231 (Miss. 1988) our Mississippi Supreme Court said it is not permissible to define reasonable doubt. Based on that precedent, the circuit court denied D-5.

  5. Archie v. State

    No. 2022-KA-00326-SCT (Miss. Apr. 4, 2024)

    ¶42. Archie argues that D-1 should have been granted because it was a correct statement of law and because "[n]o other instruction given fairly covered the substance of instruction D-1." Archie acknowledges, however, that this Court's case law holds "that a definition of reasonable doubt is not a proper instruction for the jury; '[r]easonable doubt defines itself.'" Fulgham v. State, 46 So.3d 315, 332 (Miss. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) ("Reasonable doubt defines itself; it therefore needs no definition by the court."

  6. Nevels v. State

    325 So. 3d 627 (Miss. 2021)   Cited 42 times
    In Nevels v. State, 325 So. 3d 627 (Miss. 2021), our Supreme Court made clear that "the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence" and therefore abolished the use of "circumstantial evidence instructions" in purely circumstantial cases.

    It fails to explain how its position—that a separate instruction explaining the reasonable doubt standard is not only permitted but required in circumstantial evidence cases—does not run afoul of longstanding precedent that reasonable doubt should not be defined. E.g. , Barnes v. State , 532 So. 2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) ; Gray v. State , 351 So. 2d 1342, 1348 (Miss. 1977) ; Pittman v. State , 350 So. 2d 67 (Miss. 1977) ; Boutwell v. State , 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479, 483 (1932). The dissent further fails to explain why, if the "reasonable hypothesis" language is merely part and parcel with "reasonable doubt," this instruction is not mandated in every single criminal case, regardless of the evidence presented.

  7. Fulgham v. State

    46 So. 3d 315 (Miss. 2010)   Cited 53 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Finding our State Constitution "has been interpreted to provide criminal defendants the right to a unanimous jury verdict of twelve impartial jurors"

    We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying these two instructions. Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Boutwell v. State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479, 483 (1932)). XIII.

  8. Thorson v. State

    894 So. 2d 85 (Miss. 2005)   Cited 79 times
    Holding that the aggravator was supported where, after raping his victim, the defendant wiped down the car, asked the victim whether she would tell anyone what happened, decided that he did not believe her and killed her

    Id. at 757 (citing Medley v. State, 600 So.2d 957 (Miss. 1992); Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231 (Miss. 1988)). This Court has held that if a defendant makes an admission on a significant element of the offense, the admission constitutes direct evidence.

  9. Lynch v. State

    877 So. 2d 1254 (Miss. 2004)   Cited 128 times
    Finding criminal history of juror or juror's family member to be race-neutral reason

    The Court recognized that the two-theory instruction is required only in purely circumstantial cases. Id.See alsoBarnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988); Boches v.State, 506 So.2d 254, 260 (Miss. 1987); Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Miss.

  10. State v. Rogers

    2002 CA 590 (Miss. 2003)   Cited 23 times
    Outlining the burden-shifting process in determining if there has been purposeful discrimination

    1974) (citing Coward v.State, 223 Miss. 538, 78 So.2d 605 (1955)). It is only in entirely circumstantial evidence cases that such an instruction is required. Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988); Boches v. State, 506 So.2d 254, 260 (Miss. 1987); Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Miss.