1973).Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1234 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added). This case is a gray one. Did the testimony belong in the State's case-in-chief or rebuttal? Since it is a close call, the circuit court judge is afforded discretion.
This Court has long held that a definition of reasonable doubt is not a proper instruction for the jury; "[r]easonable doubt defines itself." Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Boutwell v.State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479, 483 (1932)). ¶ 13.
Id. See also Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988), and Johnson v. State, 347 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1977).
He reasoned that Mississippi courts should side with a majority of courts that allow a jury to be instructed on the definition of reasonable doubt. The circuit court recognized that in Barnes v. State 532 So.2d 1231 (Miss. 1988) our Mississippi Supreme Court said it is not permissible to define reasonable doubt. Based on that precedent, the circuit court denied D-5.
¶42. Archie argues that D-1 should have been granted because it was a correct statement of law and because "[n]o other instruction given fairly covered the substance of instruction D-1." Archie acknowledges, however, that this Court's case law holds "that a definition of reasonable doubt is not a proper instruction for the jury; '[r]easonable doubt defines itself.'" Fulgham v. State, 46 So.3d 315, 332 (Miss. 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) ("Reasonable doubt defines itself; it therefore needs no definition by the court."
It fails to explain how its position—that a separate instruction explaining the reasonable doubt standard is not only permitted but required in circumstantial evidence cases—does not run afoul of longstanding precedent that reasonable doubt should not be defined. E.g. , Barnes v. State , 532 So. 2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) ; Gray v. State , 351 So. 2d 1342, 1348 (Miss. 1977) ; Pittman v. State , 350 So. 2d 67 (Miss. 1977) ; Boutwell v. State , 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479, 483 (1932). The dissent further fails to explain why, if the "reasonable hypothesis" language is merely part and parcel with "reasonable doubt," this instruction is not mandated in every single criminal case, regardless of the evidence presented.
We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying these two instructions. Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988) (quoting Boutwell v. State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479, 483 (1932)). XIII.
Id. at 757 (citing Medley v. State, 600 So.2d 957 (Miss. 1992); Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231 (Miss. 1988)). This Court has held that if a defendant makes an admission on a significant element of the offense, the admission constitutes direct evidence.
The Court recognized that the two-theory instruction is required only in purely circumstantial cases. Id.See alsoBarnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988); Boches v.State, 506 So.2d 254, 260 (Miss. 1987); Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Miss.
1974) (citing Coward v.State, 223 Miss. 538, 78 So.2d 605 (1955)). It is only in entirely circumstantial evidence cases that such an instruction is required. Barnes v. State, 532 So.2d 1231, 1235 (Miss. 1988); Boches v. State, 506 So.2d 254, 260 (Miss. 1987); Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277, 278-79 (Miss.