Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-cv-00927
08-18-2023
RYAN BARNES Plaintiff, v. RUTHERFORD COUNTY Defendant.
Richardson Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
JEFFERY S. FRENSLEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending before the Court is Motion for Sanctions and Dismissal with Prejudice filed by the Defendant in this matter. Docket No. 19. The Plaintiff has not responded to the motion or had any communication with the Court since returning the summons in this matter on March 7, 2023. Docket No. 12. For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends that the motion for sanctions be GRANTED IN PART and this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND
The Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at the Rutherford County Adult Detention Center brought this action on November 15, 2022. Docket No. 1. On initial review, the Court allowed Plaintiff's claims against the County under the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection Clauses based on the alleged banning religious material to proceed. Docket No. 7. The Court's order gave the Plaintiff instructions regarding service and also cautioned the Plaintiff that “this case may be dismissed if Plaintiff fails to notify the clerk's office to any change in address.” Docket No. 8. After being served, the Defendant answered the Complaint on April 23, 2023. Docket No. 17.
On July 20, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for sanctions and asked that the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Docket No. 19. In support of its motion, the Defendant asserts that on June 15, 2023, its first set of interrogatories and request for production of documents was sent to the Plaintiff by U.S. Mail. Id. at p. 2; 19-1. On June 27, 2023, counsel for the Defendant received the envelope with the discovery requests marked “Return to Sender, Vacant, Unable to Forward” “Inmate Has Been Released.” Docket No. 19-2, 19-3. Thereafter, counsel for the Defendant contacted the jail administration and learned the Plaintiff had been released from custody on May 23, 2023, and did not provide a forwarding address. Docket No. 19, p. 2; 19-3. As of the filing of the motion, Plaintiff has not contacted the county to provide notice of any change of address nor has he responded to the county's discovery requests. Docket No. 19. P. 2.
The Defendant contends that in light of the Plaintiff's failure to participate in discovery and violation of this Court's orders regarding the filing of change of address, sanctions are appropriate and should be granted. Docket No. 19, p. 3. Specifically, Defendant contends that based on the Plaintiff's failure to advise the Court of his current contact information, the matter should be dismissed for failure to prosecute with prejudice. Id. at p. 4. As noted above, the Plaintiff has not responded to the motion.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard.
The imposition of sanctions and the type of sanctions imposed are matters within the sound discretion of the court based on the facts of each particular case. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976). Sanctions are set forth in Rule 37(b)(2) and include the sanction of “dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Rule 16(f) also provides that “on motion or on its own, the court may issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(vii), if a party ... (C) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f)(1).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) “confers on district courts the authority to dismiss an action for failure of a Plaintiff to prosecute the claim or comply with the Rules or any order of the Court. Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Department, 529 F.3d 731, 736 (6th Cir. 2008)(citing Knoll v. AT & T, 176 F.3d 359, 362-3 (6th Cir. 1999)); Carpenter v. City of Flint, 723 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2013)(“It is well settled that a district court has the authority to dismiss sua sponte a lawsuit for failure to prosecute.”). Similarly, this Court's Local Rules provides that “[c]ivil suits that have been pending for an unreasonable period of time without any action having been taken by any party may be summarily dismissed . . . without prejudice to refile or to move the Court to set aside the order of dismissal for just cause.” Local Rule 41.01(a)(dismissal for unreasonable delay. Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a tool for district courts to manage their dockets and avoid unnecessary burdens on opposing parties and the judiciary. See Schafer, 529 F.3d at 736 (quoting Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363).
The Court considers four factors in determining whether dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate: (1) the willfulness, bad faith, or fault of the plaintiff; (2) whether the opposing party has been prejudiced by the plaintiff's conduct; (3) whether the plaintiff was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) the availability and appropriateness of other, less drastic sanctions. Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep't, 529 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008). A dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) constitutes an adjudication on the merits unless the dismissal order states otherwise. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has noted, however, that dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh sanction” and should only apply in extreme situations where there is a “clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Carter, 636 F.2d at 161, quoting Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 586 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 1978).
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal of an action if a Plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the Court. See, Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir., 1991). “[W]hile pro se litigants may be granted some latitude when dealing with sophisticated legal issues, acknowledging their lack of formal training, there is no cause for extending this margin to straightforward procedural requirements that a lay person can comprehend as easily as a lawyer.” Id. “[T]he lenient treatment of pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996).
When a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more favorably than a party who is represented. Id. Additionally, Courts have an inherent power “acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of inaction or dilatoriness of the party seeking relief.” Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
This is not a case of a plaintiff simply filing documents past deadlines or filing inadequate briefs. See Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that the district court abused its discretion by granting a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute). Giving due consideration to each of the factors, the Court finds that dismissal for failure to prosecute is an appropriate and necessary sanction, as no alternative sanction “would protect the integrity of pre-trial procedures.” Carter v. City of Memphis, 636 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1980).
B. The Case at Bar
The undersigned finds that dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriate because the four relevant factors, considered under the “relaxed” standard for dismissal without prejudice show a record of delay, refusal to advance the case and failure to comply with the Court's orders by the Plaintiffs.
1. Bad Faith, Willfulness, or Fault
A plaintiff's actions demonstrate bad faith, willfulness, or fault where they “display either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of [plaintiff's] conduct on those proceedings.” Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mulbah, 261 F.3d at 591(6th Cir 2001)). Although there is no indication that the Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of his new mailing address or respond to written discovery was driven by bad faith, he is still “at fault for failing to comply with the Court's Order[ ].” Malott v. Haas, 2017 WL 1319839, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 8, 2017), report and recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1244991 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2017); see id. (finding that first factor weighed in favor of dismissal where plaintiff had failed to respond to the defendants' summary judgment motion, despite receiving additional time to do so, and had failed to respond to the court's show-cause orders). This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
2. Prejudice
The Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] defendant is prejudiced by a plaintiff's dilatory conduct if the defendant is ‘required to waste time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide.'” Carpenter, 723 F.3d at 707 (second alteration in original) (quoting Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Schafer, 529 F.3d at 739 (same). Such prejudice typically arises in the discovery context. See, e.g., Harmon, 110 F.3d at 368 (finding prejudice where plaintiff failed to respond to defendant's interrogatories and a related motion to compel); Wright v. City of Germantown, 2013 WL 1729105, at *2 (W. D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2013) (finding prejudice where defendant “expended time and money pursuing [plaintiff's] required initial disclosures and deposition testimony”). Notably, time and effort spent on “typical steps in the early stages of litigation[,]” such as answering a complaint or filing pretrial motions to advance the defendant's position, are not actions “necessitated by any lack of cooperation” and therefore do not weigh in favor of dismissal for failure to prosecute. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 739. The Sixth Circuit explained in Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Department that “[i]f such efforts . . . [were] alone sufficient to establish prejudice,” for the purpose of Rule 41(b), “then every defendant who answers a complaint and responds minimally to a lawsuit would be able to claim prejudice[,]” a “result [that] would defy common sense.” 529 F.3d at 740.
Here, the defendant attempted to participate in discovery with the Plaintiff by sending written discovery requests to him at the address he provided. However, those requests were returned as he was no longer at that address. Further, the Plaintiff has made no effort to update his address with either the Court or the Defendant. Apart from taking no affirmative steps to advance the litigation himself, the Plaintiff's conduct prevents the Defendant from advancing the litigation or pursuing their right to engage in discovery. Further, since Plaintiff has neither updated his address nor had any other communication with the Court, it is impossible for the Court or the Defendant to communicate with the Plaintiff regarding this matter or otherwise determine his intentions regarding this proceeding. Because of the Plaintiff's failure to update his address or communicate with the Defendant there is no way for this action to proceed resulting in prejudice to the Defendant. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
3. Prior Notice
Whether a party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal “is a ‘key consideration'” in the Rule 41(b) analysis. Schafer, 529 F.3d at 740 (quoting Stough, 138 F.3d at 615). Here, the Court expressly warned Plaintiff that “this case may be dismissed if Plaintiff fails to notify the Clerk's Office of any change in address.” Docket No. 8. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.
4. Appropriateness of Other Sanctions
The less-drastic sanction of dismissal without prejudice is available and appropriate here. Dismissal without prejudice balances the Court's interest in “sound judicial case and docket management” with “the public policy interest in the disposition of cases on their merits.” Muncy, 110 Fed.Appx. at 557 n. 5; see also Mulbah, 261 F.3d at 590-91. That is so even though the defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. See Watsy v. Richards, No. 86-1856, 1987 WL 37151, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 20, 1987) (affirming dismissal of action for failure to prosecute where plaintiff had not provided the court with a current mailing address or responded to the defendants' motion dismiss despite a sixty-day extension); Thomas-Wilson v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 3:14-cv-01968, 2016 WL 4775738, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 15, 2016) (dismissing pro se plaintiff's claims without prejudice for failure to prosecute and finding defendants' pending motion for summary judgment moot). Such a sanction is particularly appropriate in cases of prolonged inactivity and where, as here, the plaintiff appears pro se. See Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737 (noting that courts apply the four-factor test “more stringently in cases where the plaintiff's attorney's conduct is responsible for the dismissal.” Id. (quoting Harmon, 110 F.3d at 367)).
All four factors set forth above weigh in favor of dismissal of this case. While dismissal under Rule 41(b) is a “harsh” sanction. Plaintiff has been given every opportunity to participate in this litigation and has chosen not to do so. The Plaintiff has been given ample opportunity to cure the defects and specifically advised that their failure to cooperate and comply with the Court's orders could lead to dismissal. No further less drastic sanction would be appropriate in this case.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the motion for sanctions and dismissal with prejudice be GRANTED IN PART. The undersigned recommends that the Plaintiff's claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party has fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation in which to file any written objections to this Recommendation with the District Court. Any party opposing said objections shall have fourteen (14) days from receipt of any objections filed in this Report in which to file any response to said objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of further appeal of this Recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986).