Opinion
2:18-CV-00171-CRE
07-09-2021
BRANDON DANTE BARNES, Plaintiff, v. SGT. MILLER, LT JENKINS, C/O MCGUIRE, C/O DREW, C/O PRICE, C/O VALENCIA, LT. KELLY, CAPT. GUMBAREVIC, TRACY SHAWLEY, SGT MATTHEWS, C/O GASO, MICHEAL SMITH, M. ZAKEN, MAJOR LEGGETT, RACHEL WILSON, C/O KELLER, LT. BRAUNLICH, LT.. MICHNIAK, CAPT DURCO, LT. LEWIS, C/O EAGLE, DORINA VARNER, ROBERT GILMORE, INDIVIDUALLYAND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES; JOHN DOE 1-6, JANE DOE 1-6, Defendants,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
This civil action was initiated by pro se Plaintiff Brandon Dante Barnes (“Plaintiff”) for alleged violations of his civil rights while incarcerated in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI Greene”).
Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by Corrections Defendants (ECF No. 45).
The court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and while Plaintiff was given until June 14, 2021 to respond to the pending motion, no response has been received and this recommendation is made without the benefit of Plaintiff's response.
For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion be denied without prejudice, that the parties conduct limited discovery related to exhaustion of administrative remedies and statute of limitations issues and Defendants file a motion for summary judgment on these issues.
II. REPORT
a. Background
Plaintiff initiated the instant action on January 15, 2018 alleging constitutional violations which he allegedly suffered in connection with events that occurred between October 2014 and May 2015. Specifically, he complains of the following:
1. A cell search on October 14, 2014 which led to the confiscation of cigarettes and other personal property from his cell. Plaintiff filed a grievance related to this incident on October 23, 2014 (ECF No. 6-4) and appears fully grieved on May 11, 2015 (ECF No. 6-8 at 2).
2. Issuing a misconduct and placement in the Restricted Housing Unit in March 2015. It is unclear whether this incident was grieved.
3. Issuing a fabricated misconduct in May 2015 causing the loss of an exercise period. Plaintiff filed a grievance related to this incident on June 12, 2015 (ECF No. 6-12 at 1). It is unclear if he exhausted all administrative remedies related to this incident.
4. The deprivation of two meals in May 2015. Plaintiff filed a grievance related to this incident on June 13, 2015 (ECF No. 6-13 at 1). It is unclear if he exhausted all administrative remedies related to this incident.
Plaintiff also filed another grievance related to the October 2014 cell search on April 20, 2015 which was fully grieved on August 11, 2015. (ECF No. 6-11 at 11).
Plaintiff initiated this action on January 15, 2018 against 23 Corrections Officials, six John Does and six Jane Does. Compl. (ECF No. 1-1 at 22).
b. Standard of Review
A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges, ” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, ” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.... Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a general rule, if a court “consider[s] matters extraneous to the pleadings” on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). However, a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents integral to or explicitly relied on in the complaint, even if they are not attached thereto, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 256 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
c. Discussion
Corrections Defendants mainly argue that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. They argue that Plaintiff's complaint was deemed filed on January 15, 2018 and under the applicable two-year statute of limitations implied in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions and for any of Plaintiff's state law claims, any claims which accrued before January 15, 2016 are barred by the statute of limitations. Defs' Br. (ECF No. 46) at 5. Corrections Defendants argue that the claims are time barred, because his claim related to the illegal search and confiscation of his property occurred on October 14, 2014, the claim related to the issuance of a misconduct and subsequent placement in the RHU occurred on March 20, 2015, the claim related to the issuance of a fabricated misconduct and the loss of an exercise period occurred on May 28, 2015 and his claim related to the deprivation of two meals occurred on May 31, 2015. Id. at 5. Thus, Corrections Defendants argue that because all of Plaintiff's claims stem from events that accrued before January 15, 2016, his complaint should be dismissed.
While Corrections Defendants may be correct in arguing that Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, such a finding cannot be made at this procedural juncture. A plaintiff need not include facts in his complaint “sufficient to overcome an affirmative defense” like a statute of limitations. Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2014). “While the language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) indicates that a statute of limitations defense cannot be used in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, an exception is made where the complaint facially shows noncompliance with the limitations period and the affirmative defense clearly appears on the face of the pleading.” Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1385 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (abrogated on other grounds by Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 2018) (citations omitted)). Moreover, while Corrections Defendants recognize that Plaintiff filed grievances related to the claims that he asserts, Corrections Defendants' argument does not account for the tolling required related to Plaintiff exhausting his administrative remedies. Pearson v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015) (“the PLRA is a statutory prohibition that tolls Pennsylvania's statute of limitations while a prisoner exhausts administrative remedies[.] . . .”).
From the grievances attached by Plaintiff to his complaint, there is a possibility that his claims could be time-barred even accounting for the tolling period provided during the time he was exhausting his administrative remedies. There is also a possibility that Plaintiff's claims could be dismissed for his failure to fully exhaust his administrative remedies related to him being issued a misconduct and being placed in the RHU in March 2015, being issued a fabricated misconduct in May 2015, and being denied two meals in May 2015. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), a prisoner cannot bring an action related to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or any other federal law “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner's requirement to exhaust available administrative remedies is “mandatory, ” and the issue of “[e]xhaustion is no longer left to the discretion of the district court.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1856, 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, without a completed record as to these issues, it would be procedurally improper for the court to make a determination as a matter of law at this juncture.
For example, Plaintiff's cell search occurred on October 14, 2014. He filed a grievance nine days later which tolled the statute of limitations until his final appeal was denied on May 11, 2015. Under the applicable statute of limitations, he would have until May 2, 2017 to file his complaint, yet filed his complaint on January 15, 2018.
As a result, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss be denied without prejudice, that the parties conduct limited discovery to discern whether Plaintiff's claims are time barred and whether he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that Defendants be permitted to file a motion for summary judgment on those limited issues.
Corrections Defendants also raised substantive arguments in support of dismissal. In the interests of judicial economy and because a determination of Plaintiff's claims as time barred or his failure to exhaust administrative remedies is case dispositive, it is respectfully recommended that the remainder of Corrections Defendants' motion to dismiss be held in abeyance and should Plaintiff's claims not be time barred or deficient for failure to exhaust, the Court should address those arguments in full.
d. Conclusion
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Corrections Defendants' motion to dismiss be denied without prejudice.
Any party may file objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, must file objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by July 28, 2021 and Corrections Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, must file objections by July 23, 2021. The parties are cautioned that failure to file objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).