Because "[i]t is an elementary principle that ordinances of a city are subordinate to charter provisions[,]" Appellees argue that the Memphis City Charter provides the act of equal or greater dignity necessary to perform the renaming in this case. Wilgus v. City of Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) (citing Barnes v. Ingram, 217 Tenn. 363, 397 S.W.2d 821 (1966)). In addition, Appellees argue that the holding in Morrell is inapposite to the case-at-bar because in Morrell, the city council was required at that time by state statute to initiate annexation by ordinance.

This was pointed out in the case of Marshall Bruce Co. v. City of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 512, 71 S.W. 815, 819 (1903), wherein it was stated: "The provisions of the charter are mandatory, and must be obeyed by the city and its agents; and, if in conflict with an ordinance, the charter must prevail." See also Barnes v. Ingram, 217 Tenn. 363, 397 S.W.2d 821 (1965). In the more recent case of Wilgus v. The City of Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50 (Tenn. App. 1975), the Chancery Court for Rutherford County declared a zoning ordinance of the City of Murfreesboro as violative of the city charter and thus void. Article III, § 5 of the charter of the City of Murfreesboro provided with respect to zoning ordinances that "[n]otice of the adoption of such amendment, supplement or change in the ordinance shall be given by publishing such notice three (3) times in some daily or weekly newspaper of general circulation in the city."

Marshall & Bruce Co. v. City of Nashville , 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S.W. 815, 819 (1903) (emphasis added). See alsoBarnes v. Ingram , 217 Tenn. 363, 397 S.W.2d 821, 825 (1965) (same); State ex rel. Lewis v. Bowman , 814 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ("It has long been the law in this state, as in many other states, that ordinances of a city are subordinate to the charter provisions."). As described in detail above, Ordinance 11590 amended the City Charter to require only two readings to pass an ordinance, and expressly repealed all laws or parts of laws in conflict with this provision.

. . ." Barnes v. Ingram, 217 Tenn. 363, 397 S.W.2d 821, 825 (1965) (quoting Marshall Bruce Co. v. City of Nashville, 109 Tenn. 495, 71 S.W. 815, 819 (1903)); see also Faust v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville Davidson County, 206 S.W.3d 475, 485 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2006) (holding a reclassification of civilian employees to be outside the authority provided by the Metropolitan Code). The rationale for these principles is well-settled in the law:

See also Wilgus v. City of Murfreesboro, 532 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tenn. App. 1975). Moreover, "`[t]he provisions of the charter are mandatory, and must be obeyed by the city and its agents. . . .'" Barnes v. Ingram, 217 Tenn. 363, 373, 397 S.W.2d 821, 825 (1965). When a municipality fails to act within its charter or under applicable statutory authority, the action is ultra vires and void or voidable.

Chief Fox has appealed, assigning this action as error. Invoking the proposition that the city charter prevails over an ordinance, Barnes v. Ingram, 217 Tenn. 363, 397 S.W.2d 821, 825, Chief Fox relies on § 18 of the city charter, relating to the termination of employment of Civil Service employees, for the proposition that the sole authority to make provision for the termination of Civil Service employees under any circumstances is vested by the charter in the Civil Service Board. § 18 is as follows: "Sec. 18. Civil Service employees may be dismissed, suspended, reduced in rank, or otherwise punished only by judgment of the Civil Service Board after trial and conviction by said Civil Service Board upon a written charge or charges, a copy of which shall be furnished the accused at least ten days prior to such trial.

1988)). Furthermore, "'[t]he provisions of the charter are mandatory, and must be obeyed by the city and its agents . . . .'" Allmand, 292 S.W.3d at 625 (quoting Barnes v. Ingram, 397 S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tenn. 1965) (in turn quoting Marshall & Bruce Co. v. City of Nashville, 71 S.W. 815, 819 (Tenn. 1903))).

We must construe together the portions of both the Charter and the Code of Ordinances dealing with the same subject matter. See 421 Corp. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, 36 S.W.3d 469 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); see also Barnes v. Ingram, 397 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tenn. 1966) (construing the Charter and Ordinances together); Posey, 164 S.W.3d at 576-77 (same). Article 7, Section 53 of the City Charter vests the Board of Commissioners with authority to establish a retirement or pension system for the officers and employees of the Fire Department and the Police Department and to determine who may be included as members of such system.

The provisions of the Charter are mandatory and must be obeyed by the City and its agents. Barnes v. Ingram, 217 Tenn. 363, S.W.2d 821, 825 (Tenn. 1965).

"[T]he provisions of the charter are mandatory, and must be obeyed by the city and its agents. . . ." Barnes v. Ingram, 217 Tenn. 363, 373, 397 S.W.2d 821, 825 (1965). When a municipality fails to act within its charter or under applicable statutory authority, the action is ultra vires and void or voidable.