Opinion
Cause No. 1:99-CV-496
June 4, 2002
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
Currently before the Court is a motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint submitted by the plaintiff in this case, Kenneth Barnes ("Barnes"), on May 30, 2002. Attached to the motion is a copy of Barnes's proposed Second Amended Complaint, containing a new claim of retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
On December 9, 1999, Barnes filed a pro se complaint against PACE Union Local 7903 ("the Union") under Title VII. Barnes alleged that the Union had discriminated against him on the basis of his race by not adequately challenging his dismissal from Dana. Barnes attached an EEOC Charge and Right to Sue letter pertaining to his claims against the Union only.
On or about February 22, 2000, Barnes retained counsel. His new attorney filed an amended complaint on March 7, 2000. The amended complaint named Dana Corporation ("Dana") as an additional defendant, but did not state that Barnes was bringing a claim for retaliation. Nor did the amended complaint include any Charge of Discrimination against Dana.
In fact, Barnes had filed an EEOC Charge against Dana on December 28, 1995 alleging race discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation. The Fort Wayne Metropolitan Human Relations Commission ("FWMHRC") had investigated Barnes's EEOC Charge against Dana and had determined that there was probable cause to credit the allegations. In the course of its investigation, the FWMHRC contacted Dana on several occasions.
The parties stipulated to the dismissal of the Union on August 30, 2000, leaving Dana as the sole defendant in this case. On January 11, 2001, Barnes's counsel withdrew from the case. On June 6, 2001, this Court appointed a second attorney to represent Barnes.
Dana moved for summary judgment on February 7, 2001. Plaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment on April 29, 2002. In Plaintiff's response, Plaintiff argued, in part, that his discharge from Dana had been in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge against Dana in November 1995. Dana then filed a final reply on May 16, 2002, arguing that since Barnes had not stated a claim for retaliation in his complaint, the claim is now barred.
To iron out this complicated procedural history, the Court held a telephone conference with both parties on May 20, 2002. At the telephone conference, Barnes's counsel indicated that he would file a motion to amend the complaint a second time. This motion is now pending before the Court. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff's motion to file a Second Amended Complaint will be GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), once the initial pleadings have been served, a party may amend its pleading "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party." Moreover, Rule 15(a) states that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Here, Dana does not object to the filing of the amended complaint. Moreover, the Court is satisfied that justice requires an amendment of the pleadings in this case.
Dana has been aware from the outset of this litigation that Barnes was claiming retaliation in addition to his discrimination and harassment claims. The Defendant had been served with Barnes's December 28, 1995 Charge of Discrimination which alleged retaliation, even if a retaliation claim had not been included in the first amended complaint. Moreover the FWMHRC had contacted Dana about the December 28, 1995 Charge on several occasions. Accordingly, Dana had notice of the retaliation claim.
In addition, Dana has had the opportunity to perform discovery on the retaliation claim. Barnes's retaliation claim is closely intertwined with his discrimination claim in that Barnes claims that the fact that he was fired shortly after he filed an earlier Charge of Discrimination on November 9, 1995 is circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive. In fact, Dana did ask Barnes questions about the November 9, 1995 Charge and his termination in December 1995 when it took Barnes's deposition. Based upon these considerations, the Court is satisfied that justice requires granting Plaintiff leave to file his Second Amended Complaint, containing a claim for retaliatory discharge.
In light of the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, the Court will permit the parties additional time to supplement their summary judgment briefs to address the retaliation claim on the merits. Dana will have thirty (30) days from the date of this order to file and brief a motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim. Barnes will then have thirty (30) days to respond. Dana will have an additional fifteen (15) days to reply to Barnes's response.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff Kenneth Barnes's motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to file and docket Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Dana has thirty (30) days from the date of this order to file and brief a motion for summary judgment on the retaliatory discharge claim. Barnes will then have thirty (30) days to file a response. Dana will have an additional fifteen (15) days to reply to Barnes's response.