The respondents suggest that cases decided under the prior Negotiable Instruments Law, C.R.S. 1963 95-1-1 to 95-4-7, support their argument that Quick's addition of words of restriction destroyed his ability to negotiate the check. See Barnes v. Cherry Creek National Bank of Denver, 163 Colo. 414, 431 P.2d 471 (1967) (under Negotiable Instruments Law a restrictive indorsement destroys negotiability). Section 4-3-206(1) of the Code expressly provides that "[n]o restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or negotiation of the instrument."
Rutherford v. Darwin, 95 N.M. 340, 622 P.2d 245 (1980); Underpinning Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 46 N.Y.2d 459, 386 N.E.2d 1319 (1979). See also Barnes v. Cherry Creek National Bank, 163 Colo. 414, 431 P.2d 471 (1967) (similar result under Negotiable Instruments Law, which was the predecessor of the Uniform Commercial Code). In view of the above holding, the bank's contention that plaintiffs lack standing to sue is without merit.