Barnard v. Shelburne

12 Citing cases

  1. Wright and Pierce v. Town of Wilmington, Mass

    290 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1961)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that mistake as to the character of the ground constituted a sufficient mutual mistake to void the contract

    Very possibly majority action would be required even without such a provision. Cf. Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 1915, 222 Mass. 76, 79, 109 N.E. 818; Murdough v. Inhabitants of Revere, 1896, 165 Mass. 109, 112-113, 42 N.E. 502. In any event, such limitations on the contracting authority of a town's officers are unquestionably valid and binding on parties dealing with the town.

  2. Greenhill v. Bailey

    378 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Iowa 1974)   Cited 6 times
    In Greenhill v. Bailey, 378 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Iowa 1974), the court rejected a medical student's claim that he was entitled to prior notice.

    The cases cited above also stand for the proposition that the courts will not review a decision of the school authorities relating to the academic qualifications of the students. See also: Depperman v. University of Kentucky (E.D.Ky., 1974), 371 F. Supp. 73, 76; Foley v. Benedict (1932), 122 Tex. 193, 55 S.W.2d 805, 809; West v. Board of Trustees of Miami University, etc. (1931), 41 Ohio App. 367, 181 N.E. 144; Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelbourne (1915), 222 Mass. 76, 109 N.E. 818; Gleason v. University of Minnesota (1908), 104 Minn. 359, 116 N.W. 650; Miller v. Dailey (1902), 136 Cal. 212, 68 P. 1029. However, plaintiff is not without remedy when it is alleged that a decision by the school authorities to dismiss a student, supposedly for academic deficiencies, was in fact made arbitrarily and capriciously and in bad faith.

  3. Connelly v. University of Vermont and St. Agr. Col.

    244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965)   Cited 72 times
    Holding that UVM's status as a body corporate disqualifies it from Eleventh Amendment immunity

    This rule has been stated in a variety of ways by a number of courts. It has been said that courts do not interfere with the management of a school's internal affairs unless "there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or where [the school officials'] action has been arbitrary or unlawful," State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert. den. 319 U.S. 748, 63 S.Ct. 1158, 87 L.Ed. 1703 (1942), or unless the school authorities have acted "arbitrarily or capriciously", Frank v. Marquette University, 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932), or unless they have abused their discretion, Coffelt v. Nicholson, 224 Ark. 176, 272 S.W.2d 309 (1954), People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 10 Ill. App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635, 58 A.L.R.2d 899 (1956), or acted in "bad faith", Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, supra, and see 222 Mass. 76, 109 N.E. 818 (same case). The effect of these decisions is to give the school authorities absolute discretion in determining whether a student has been delinquent in his studies, and to place the burden on the student of showing that his dismissal was motivated by arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith.

  4. Burch v. Moulton

    980 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    Recognizing "that [public university officials] have discretion in determining a student's academic status"

    This Court noted: "`It has been said that courts do not interfere with the management of a school's internal affairs unless "there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or where (the school officials') action has been arbitrary or unlawful," State ex rel. Sherman v. Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822 [(1942)], cert. den. 319 U.S. 748, 63 S.Ct. 1158, 87 L.Ed. 1703 (194[3]), or unless the school authorities have acted "arbitrarily or capriciously," Frank v. Marquette University, 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932), or unless they have abused their discretion, Coffelt v. Nicholson, 224 Ark. 176, 272 S.W.2d 309 (1954), People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 10 Ill.App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635, 58 A.L.R.2d W. 899 (1956), or acted in "bad faith," Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, supra, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 [(1913)], and see 222 Mass. 76, 109 N.E. 818 [(1915)] (same case). "`The effect of these decisions is to give the school authorities absolute discretion in determining whether a student has been delinquent in his studies, and to place the burden on the student of showing that his dismissal was motivated by arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith.

  5. Mustell v. Rose

    211 So. 2d 489 (Ala. 1968)   Cited 15 times
    In Mustell v. Rose, 282 Ala. 358, 211 So.2d 489 (1968), a former medical-school student sought reinstatement as a medical student.

    * * * * * * "This rule has been stated in a variety of ways by a number of courts. It has been said that courts do not interfere with the management of a school's internal affairs unless `there has been a manifest abuse of discretion or where [the school officials'] action has been arbitrary or unlawful,' State ex rel. Sherman Hyman, 180 Tenn. 99, 171 S.W.2d 822, cert.den. 319 U.S. 748, 63 S.Ct. 1158, 87 L.Ed. 1703 (1942), or unless the school authorities have acted arbitrarily or capriciously', Frank v. Marquette University, 209 Wis. 372, 245 N.W. 125 (1932), or unless they have abused their discretion, Coffelt v. Nicholson, 224 Ark. 176, 272 S.W.2d 309 (1954), People ex rel. Bluett v. Board of Trustees of University of Illinois, 10 Ill. App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635, 58 A.L.R.2d 899 (1956), or acted in `bad faith', Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, supra, 216 Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095, and see 222 Mass. 76, 109 N.E. 818 (same case). "The effect of these decisions is to give the school authorities absolute discretion in determining whether a student has been delinquent in his studies, and to place the burden on the student of showing that his dismissal was motivated by arbitrariness, capriciousness or bad faith.

  6. Marshall v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles

    324 Mass. 468 (Mass. 1949)   Cited 14 times

    Whatever the nature of the procedure, it must result in a decision by the department itself and not by a single officer in the department. Damon v. Selectmen of Framingham, 195 Mass. 72, 78. Barnard v. Shelburne, 222 Mass. 76, 79. Pettengell v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 295 Mass. 473, 477. The allegation that an appeal was taken under G.L. (Ter.

  7. O'Brien v. Pittsfield

    316 Mass. 283 (Mass. 1944)   Cited 22 times

    The evidence concerning the talk that the superintendent of schools had with the mayor when he presented the estimates of the school committee to him was properly excluded by the judge, and the city's exception to that action must be overruled. See Barnard v. Shelburne, 222 Mass. 76, 79. Counsel for the city has argued, however, that the vote of the committee of June 12, 1941, was not effective because only tentative, that it was not modified by any subsequent vote of the committee, and that the city is not bound "to appropriate money, to be paid out, or not paid out, by the school committee within its discretion, when the . . . committee has not previously bound itself by contract or vote to pay out such sums."

  8. Kenney v. McDonough

    315 Mass. 689 (Mass. 1944)   Cited 14 times

    The title following his signature added nothing to his individual powers. See Barnard v. Shelburne, 222 Mass. 76, 79. Petition dismissed.

  9. Lawrence v. Stratton

    45 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. 1942)   Cited 8 times

    The council did not authorize the mayor to transfer the property upon condition that Dobbins should expend $40,000 instead of $50,000 on the mill buildings. Reed v. Scituate, 5 Allen, 120. Murdough v. Revere, 165 Mass. 109. Damon v. Selectmen of Framingham, 195 Mass. 72. Adams v. County ofEssex, 205 Mass. 189. Rowe v. Peabody, 207 Mass. 226, 236. Barnard v. Shelburne, 222 Mass. 76. Carbone, Inc. v. Kelly, 289 Mass. 602. Pettengell v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 295 Mass. 473. We need not discuss the fact that the certificate of the assistant city clerk, which was attached to the deed, did not correctly and accurately set forth the entire vote of the city council.

  10. Pettengell v. Alcoholic Beverages Con. Com

    295 Mass. 473 (Mass. 1936)   Cited 9 times

    It was said in Damon v. Selectmen of Framingham, 195 Mass. 72, 78, with citation of supporting authorities: "The general rule that such a board of public officers should act jointly, and that all should have an opportunity to participate in their action, is unanimously recognized." Barnard v. Shelburne, 222 Mass. 76, 79. The authority to make the estimate rested in the licensing authorities as a collective body.