"`Where a parent has no special reason to anticipate that a child, either through known dangerous proclivities or because of its possession of dangerous instrumentalities, may inflict harm on the person or property of others, mere failure to supervise the child's play activities is not a failure to exercise ordinary care on the part of the parent so as to subject [her] to liability . . . . [Cits.]' Barlow v. Lord, 112 Ga. App. 352 (1) ( 145 S.E.2d 272). "Since appellant had no reason to anticipate that [her daughter would take the gun and shoot another with it, she] had no duty to guard against it. Hatch v. O'Neill, 133 Ga. App. 624 ( 212 S.E.2d 11)."

"Where a parent has no special reason to anticipate that a child, either through known dangerous proclivities or because of its possession of dangerous instrumentalities, may inflict harm on the person or property of others, mere failure to supervise the child's play activities is not a failure to exercise ordinary care on the part of the parent so as to subject him to liability . . . [Cits.]" Barlow v. Lord, 112 Ga. App. 352 (1) ( 145 S.E.2d 272). Since appellant had no reason to anticipate that his son would take the lighter and start a fire, he had no duty to guard against it. Hatch v. O'Neill, 133 Ga. App. 624 ( 212 S.E.2d 11).

"Where a parent has no special reason to anticipate that a child, either through known dangerous proclivities or because of its [sic] possession of dangerous instrumentalities, may inflict harm on the person or property of others, mere failure to supervise the child's play activities is not a failure to exercise ordinary care on the part of the parent so as to subject him to liability... [Cits.]" Barlow v. Lord, 112 Ga. App. 352 ( 145 S.E.2d 272) (1965). The evidence demonstrates that appellee's son had no "dangerous proclivity," known to appellee or otherwise, for obtaining the golf club and swinging it in the presence of others.

Also, consistent with common law principles, a parent may be held liable for an injury caused directly by his minor child where the parent's own original negligence or contributing negligence has made the child's act possible. For example, an action will lie for negligently permitting a child to have access to a dangerous weapon ( Hulsey v. Hightower, 44 Ga. App. 455, supra), or negligence per se in permitting a child to have items which a valid ordinance or statute prohibits, Barlow v. Lord, 112 Ga. App. 352 ( 145 S.E.2d 272); Faith v. Massengale, 104 Ga. App. 348 ( 121 S.E.2d 657). Also, if a parent knows his child is irresponsible, incompetent, or unqualified regarding certain activities, and knowingly permits the child to engage in such activities, this may constitute such negligence on the part of the parent as will support a recovery.

The true test is not the fact of escape. It is whether (a) a duty was raised against the parent by the facts of the case of anticipating that in the absence of his supervision a particular type of injury to another will result, and (b) whether he then exercised reasonable care to control and supervise the infant to prevent such result." See also Barlow v. Lord, 112 Ga. App. 352 ( 145 S.E.2d 272). The petition fails to include these essential allegations. 3. There can be no doubt but that a loaded pistol in the hands of a minor child too young to understand its nature is a dangerous instrumentality.

We are not here concerned with cases where a "dangerous instrumentality" was furnished to the child, nor with cases where the child has shown such habits of action, known to the parent, as would make his use of the instrument furnished him probably or likely dangerous to others. See Assurance Co. of America v. Bell, 108 Ga. App. 766, 772 (4) ( 134 S.E.2d 540), citing Davis v. Gavalas, 37 Ga. App. 242 ( 139 S.E. 577); Barlow v. Lord, 112 Ga. App. 352 ( 145 S.E.2d 272). (It might be well to state at this point that we do not agree with the statement on page 775 of the Bell case that the question "is whether (a) a duty was raised against the parent by the facts of the case of anticipating that in the absence of his supervision a particular type of injury to another will result,. . ." (Under the decisions of this court it is a question of whether a duty is raised to anticipate injury to another rather than a particular type of injury.))