Opinion
1:23-CV-00263-SPB-RAL
12-12-2023
ETIENNE BARKSDALE, Plaintiff v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RANDY IRWIN, OFFICER J. HICKS, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
ECF NO. 8
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Etienne Barksdale's motion for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order (ECF No. 8) be DENIED as to its request for a temporary restraining order and DEFERRED pending service as to its request for a preliminary injunction.
II. Report
Plaintiff Etienne Barksdale, an individual currently incarcerated at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Forest (“SCI-Forest”), initiated this pro se action against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), SCI-Forest Superintendent Irwin, and SCI-Forest Corrections Officer Hicks on August 31, 2023. See ECF No. 1. The Complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and Pennsylvania tort law, based on Defendants' alleged use of Oleoresin Capsicum (“OC”) spray upon him despite their knowledge of Barksdale's asthma, hypertension, and mental health issues. See ECF No. 6. Pending before the Court is Barksdale's motion for a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (“TRO”). See ECF Nos. 8 (motion), 9 (brief). For relief, Barksdale asks the Court to “direct[] the Defendants to stop using [OC] Spray on him due to him being asthmatic and at risk of suffering from a serious bodily injury and/or death” until his underlying claims are litigated. ECF No. 8.
A. Standard of Review
Temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are governed under the same standard. The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court should issue the injunction only if the movant produces evidence sufficient to convince the trial judge that all four factors favor preliminary relief. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 192 (citing ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987)).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). The facts clearly must support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n. 3 (3d Cir. 1990). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a “clear showing of irreparable injury.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent a showing of immediate, irreparable injury, the court should deny preliminary injunctive relief.
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211,1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are “in court” . .Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527(1979).
B. Discussion
' As a threshold procedural matter, Barkdale's request for a temporary restraining order must be denied based on his failure to state “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show[ing] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and identifying “any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b)(1). Substantively, Barksdale's allegations fail to support a likelihood of success on the merits or “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989).
Barksdale asserts in his Complaint and motion that corrections officer Hicks twice sprayed OC spray into his cell after Barksdale had covered his cell windows. Barksdale does not . allege that these incidents induced an asthma attack or that prison medical personnel had not cleared him for OC spray. Instead, he alleges that exposure to OC spray has caused him “physical and psychological stress to which routinely stimulated Plaintiff s heart with the hormone epinephrine (i.e. Adrenaline), the principal blood pressure-raising hormone, along with cortisol, which is a hormone produced by the adrenal cortez (sic), and to which its levels in his blood became elevated in response to the aforesaid physical and psychological stress caused by him being consistently sprayed with OC.” ECF No. 6, ¶ 20. These physiological responses are common among individuals exposed to OC spray, whether or not they suffer from a medical condition. They do not necessarily evidence that the use of OC spray is medically contraindicated or unreasonably dangerous. Although Barksdale alleges in conclusory terms that the two uses of OC spray on him were excessive, he alleges no facts to support such a finding. See id., ¶ 26. Use of OC spray is not categorically prohibited in the presence of inmates who suffer from asthma. See Davis v. Brown, 556 Fed.Appx. 87, 91 (3d Cir. 2014). The facts alleged do not support a finding that Barksdale's asthma was so severe that OC spray use on him was or should have been prohibited. The factual allegations also do not support a finding that the use of OC spray on Barksdale on the two occasions complained of was unreasonable. Indeed, Barksdale's own pleadings acknowledge that he had covered the window of his cell in violation of prison rules on each occasion. Given the absence of any allegations from which the Court could find that the use of pepper spray on the occasions at issue were unjustified or unreasonable, Barksdale's request that the Court enjoin any future use of OC spray would improperly interject it into matters of routine prison administration. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 527; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
Barksdale has also failed to meet his burden of establishing that the threat of harm from the use of OC spray is “immediate and present.” Enoch v. Perry, 2019 WL 2393783, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 6, 2019) (citing Simmons v. Overmyer, 2018 WL 6078085, *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2018)). That is, “an injunction cannot be issued based on past harm.” Id. (citing Boyd v. Larson, 2017 WL 1904278, *6 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 21,2017)). Nor may a preliminary injunction “be used simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury.” Holiday Inns of Am., Inc., v B&B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969). Barksdale does not allege facts to support that the use of OC spray against him is ongoing. Indeed, he acknowledges that each of the two specific prior uses of OC spray were in response to his covering his cell window in violation of prison rules. Given this, it appears that Barksdale can avoid similar incidents simply by refraining from covering his cell window.
Consistent with Third Circuit precedent, the Court need not analyze every factor of the temporary restraining order analysis because Barksdale has not alleged facts to support either a likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm. See Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 374 (3d Cir. 2012) (declining to address the remaining injunction factors when the plaintiff failed to meet one factor). Accordingly, Barksdale's motion for a temporary restraining order should be DENIED, and his motion for a preliminary injunction should be DEFERRED pending service upon Defendants.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff s motion (ECF No. 8) be DENIED to the extent it seeks a temporary restraining order and DEFERRED pending service of the Complaint upon the Defendants to the extent it seeks a preliminary injunction. Upon acceptance of this Report and Recommendation and service upon the Defendants, the undersigned will direct a response from the Defendants and, if appropriate, schedule further proceedings on Plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).